D'Angelo is founder of the Congressional Research Institute, which investigates legislatures and institutional reforms with an eye toward improving representation.
Rank-and-file members of Congress are unhappy. In both chambers, leadership cuts them out of the amending process via an array of parliamentary tricks like "closed rules" and "filling the tree."
Frustrated, the members readily direct their anger at the top brass. But this is a mistake. The real culprit is transparency – weaponized transparency that grew out of congressional sunshine reforms a half-century ago.
With enactment in 1970 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, Congress switched, almost overnight, from being one of the most secretive of institutions to one of the most transparent.
In the wake of these reforms there was an immediate uptick in partisanship, anger and a startling rise of chamber deliberations on hot-button issues.
The logic for this is clear. Taking advantage of the novel ability for any member to call for a recorded vote, rank-and-file minority members were suddenly able to take public potshots at leadership. And they did so with frequency – significantly driving up the number of votes pushed to the floor.
Before 1970, all committees on appropriations, taxation, trade, etc. were closed-door affairs. No transcripts were delivered to the public. And the lobbyists (the few that there were) were obliged to wait in the lobby.
The most significant change, however, was that amendments were first voted on in the Committee of the Whole. Before 1970, this was a secretive committee made up of all House members – and imbued with the power of rejection, but not passage. The flame-throwing amendments were dispatched in secret. But amendments adopted received a public vote on the floor.
This calming layer of secrecy was essential.
The 1970 law forced the Committee of the Whole into the sunshine. For the first time, any member could force any other member to cast a public vote on any issue. And junior members squeezed leadership into difficult spots, forcing repetitive public votes on things like abortion, busing and school prayer.
The increase in transparency brought two marked changes: a substantial increase in the number of issues debated, and a seismic increase in what is euphemistically known as "messaging."
Among members, the lexicon is less polite. Messaging is often referred to as "plundering schemes" or "bomb-throwing." And the amendments are referred to as "gotchas," "November amendments," "poison pills" etc.
The more colloquial names unveil malicious intent. "Gotchas' are not written to improve legislation but to gum up the works or extract maximum political pain, driving members apart.
Some mistakenly claim this onslaught of weaponized amendments was an unforeseen consequence of sunshine. But the dynamic was investigated by the Framers. Alexander Hamilton insisted on secrecy specifically to limit animosity. Had members crafted legislation in sunshine, he wrote, "much food would have been afforded to inflammatory declamation." James Madison agreed.
To limit partisan anger, the Framers employed rules of secrecy in the Constitutional Convention and placed a right to legislative secrecy in Article I.
But in the hearings and debates leading up to the 1970 law, the ideas of the Framers were overlooked. Worse, the spirit of the Constitution was scorned.
Future Speaker Tip O'Neill brandished legislative secrecy like a form of profanity, calling the secret amending process a "cowardly system." And no one references the Constitution.
But think of the difference. Unlike the 1970 reformers, Hamilton spoke from experience. In debates over the Articles of Confederation, he suffered through heated sessions of public debates. Contrast this to O'Neill who had spent his early career sheltered by a process permitting calming secrecy.
Looking back, the data is unequivocal. It leans heavily in favor of Hamilton. O'Neill claimed the changes would result in no more than 15 additional roll call votes a year. By 1978 the number had soared to 900.
Political scientist Steven Smith was the first to investigate this dynamic. "Frustration with floor amending activity reached the boiling point," he wrote in "Call to Order." "Deals struck in committee came unglued when the parties were forced to cast recorded votes on unanticipated floor amendments. Reelection prospects could change as members were forced to cast repeated recorded votes on divisive issues."
Smith recounts the 1979 efforts of one member to stem the tide. Exasperated with the endless bomb-throwing, Democrat John LaFalce of New York penned an irate letter to leaders imploring them to implement "modified" open rules – where "modified" was essentially a euphemism for "closed."
"Some will cry out that the Leadership is trying to institute 'gag rules,' he wrote, but "without relief of some kind, we won't be able to do the jobs for which we were elected."
Today, it is hard to imagine any member reading that letter without squirming. Decades ago, LaFalce proposed to "fix" the House by neutering the input of the rank and file. Worse, a beleaguered leadership had little choice but to comply.
But LaFalce's plan proved to be a tragic mistake. Open amending had been an integral part of Congress since inception. It empowered the rank and file and it allowed the chamber to test novel ideas. (A group of congressional scholars recently included a return to pre-1970 rules as part of a broader reform package.)
If LaFalce had looked at data or queried the Framers, he would have seen the amending problem lies with transparency, not openness. Even a modern-day, pro-transparency reformer might notice the same. The surge in votes surely creates more data for the public to scrutinize, but it is the opposite of information.
Today's congressional record is littered with the fingerprints of warfare, misinformation and grandstanding. There are legions of votes on hot-button issues that drive mistrust, partisanship and cynical responses from the press. There are potshots at leaders who, in order to pass legislation, heed the words of LaFalce and close down the process.
The only thing missing in the data is a clean record of a member's intentions. In short, the only thing missing is pertinent information.
Discussing the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton wrote that more transparency would have guaranteed "the clamors of faction would have prevented any satisfactory result."
But because of Tip O'Neill and John LaFalce we have replaced a proven open amending process with an unproven transparent one. Are the results satisfactory? Hardly. Leadership is unhappy. The public is unhappy. The rank and file is unhappy.
If we revert to closed committees, partisan anger will slowly revert to pre-1970 levels – the lowest in history. Gotcha votes can be avoided. And a relieved leadership can re-open the amending process.
For their part, citizens will see far less anger, far fewer hot-button flare-ups and far less data. But ironically, via secrecy, we will enjoy far better information.



















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.