The fact that China and Russia have responded vocally—but not militarily—to the U.S. strike on Iran reveals much about both the limits and nature of their influence in the Middle East, as well as the broader global risks at play.
China wields significant economic leverage, particularly through its energy ties with Iran and infrastructure investments via the Belt and Road Initiative. However, its military footprint in the region remains minimal. Aside from a small base in Djibouti, China lacks both the capability and the appetite to project hard power across the Middle East. Instead, it is positioning itself as a diplomatic counterweight to the U.S., offering mediation and calls for de-escalation. This is soft power in action—but it also underscores that Beijing’s influence hinges more on optics and economics than on military presence.
Russia, by contrast, has a deeper history of involvement in the region—most notably in Syria. Yet its current posture is more rhetorical than operational, constrained by its own entanglements, especially the ongoing war in Ukraine. Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes is limited, and its response to the U.S. strike reveals the growing gaps in its regional effectiveness.
Both nations clearly wish to be seen as major stakeholders in Middle Eastern affairs. But in moments of crisis —particularly those initiated by U.S. military action—their ability to influence events is limited. They are influential, certainly, but not decisive. This strategic calculus was almost certainly part of the Trump Administration’s considerations before launching the strike on Iran.
During the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20, President Putin addressed the rising tensions between Iran and the U.S. He voiced deep concern over developments near Iranian nuclear facilities, stating that Russia is “strongly worried about what’s going on around the Iranian nuclear facilities and possible consequences.” Putin also noted that Israel had pledged to protect Russian personnel stationed at Iran’s nuclear sites, including the Russia-built Bushehr plant.
In a separate statement, Putin reiterated that Iran does not intend to develop nuclear weapons—a position Russia has “repeatedly conveyed” to Israel. He further emphasized the complexity of Russia’s position, pointing to Israel’s substantial Russian-speaking population, which shapes Moscow’s approach to the conflict.
Thus far, Putin has chosen a carefully calibrated diplomatic posture: condemning the strikes, defending Iran’s nuclear stance, and signaling a desire to avoid escalation—without indicating any intent for military involvement.
Given the absence of meaningful backing from China or Russia, Iran’s ability to directly retaliate against the United States is constrained. Its network of non-state allies and proxy groups—traditionally a key asset—has also weakened significantly over the past year.
Hezbollah, historically Iran’s most capable proxy, has been diminished by recent Israeli strikes. While it has declared solidarity with Iran, its capacity to launch a major offensive, particularly against U.S. forces, is currently limited.
Hamas, meanwhile, has condemned the U.S. action as “brazen aggression” and voiced full support for Iran. However, it remains deeply engaged in its own conflict with Israel and is unlikely to have the bandwidth for broader escalation.
The Houthis in Yemen, known for launching drone and missile attacks against U.S. and Saudi targets, could act in solidarity with Iran—especially in the Red Sea. But their ability to inflict significant strategic damage remains marginal.
In summary, while Iran may still employ asymmetric warfare through proxies, the prospect of a full-scale military coalition against the U.S. remains remote, particularly without direct support from any major world powers. As it stands, Iran's response options remain limited and largely symbolic.
David Nevins is co-publisher of The Fulcrum and co-founder and board chairman of the Bridge Alliance Education Fund.
image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.