LaRue is former deputy director of the Eisenhower Institute, a nonpartisan think tank at Gettysburg College, and of the American Society of International Law. He adapted this piece from an article he wrote in 2018 for the Election Law Journal.
Getting reelected is becoming too easy for our presidents. Nine of the last 12 incumbents who sought a second term, including four of the last five, succeeded. A re-elected President Trump would make it four in a row.
The structure of maximum presidential service — eight years in two equal terms — strengthens this probability. Every incumbent has an advantage in pursuing reelection. And reelection itself is not a bad thing. But its timing at four years has become so unfair that I call it the "four-year crutch."
This crutch consists of a fluid mix of factors that boost each incumbent differently. Extensive public exposure and access to institutional resources support their candidacies. And myriad other factors lessen public interest in ousting them after four years: the permanent campaign, partisan hype, media bias, disinformation, voter fatigue — even the Electoral College skewing the value of millions of votes.
Voters give the incumbent the benefit of the doubt or see him as the better devil because he is known. Nonvoters are given reasons or find excuses to ignore their civic duty, or they are impeded from exercising it. (And they outnumbered Trump's 63 million voters in 2016 by 31 million.)
The four-year crutch is real, but also ephemeral. The electoral rhythm after a president's first wins is predictable: Pushback at two years, re-election at four and repudiation at six. Political commentator Kevin Phillips back in1984 labeled the phenomenon of the public souring on presidents they just re-elected as the "six-year itch," a valid term to this day. Such repudiation, however, does not stand alone; it extends to year eight, when lame-duck challenges and a nation's heightened desire for change weigh heavily against a would-be successor from the incumbent party.
These dynamics have produced an extraordinary record. From 1952 through 2016, Republicans and Democrats have taken eight-year turns in the White House with just two exceptions: A four-year interregnum for Democrat Jimmy Carter followed by a dozen straight GOP years under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
To be sure, defining trends in presidential elections over time is highly problematic, because the factors affecting each contest vary widely, change every election and differ in intensity.
But two patterns have held. First, after eight years of one party's service in the White House, the voters — or, more accurately, Electoral College electors — usually turn to the candidate of the other party. Second, when this candidate prevails, he is almost never rejected after just one term. Carter is the one exception, going back to the 19th century. Trump could still give Carter some company, but the four-year crutch makes his path to victory easier than his opponent's.
Fundamentally, re-election after four years is too soon for the American psyche.
The timetable is set by the Constitution, so altering it would require an amendment — seemingly impossible today. Still, different presidential term lengths merit consideration. A six-year first term and three-year second term could work particularly well. (Requisite electoral synchronicity would occur by making House terms three years and adjusting Senate elections to be for half the body every three years; a three-year election cycle would result.)
Re-election or rejection at six years would align better with the public's proven inclination to exercise a more demanding electoral voice at that time. Such a structure also would value presidential terms more accurately. Second terms may not be cursed, but their increasingly diminished contributions should not be valued the same — by length — as first terms.
The additional benefits are compelling: A six-year initial term would be long enough to address a president's top objectives; a three-year second term would be more like a bonus and less automatically pursued; winning re-election during a six-year itch would mean a stronger second-term mandate; the president would be a lame duck for only a third (not half) of his or her time in office; the system would provide a bit of a break from the permanent campaign.
And, importantly, single-term presidents would not necessarily be considered failures and we'd see more of them.
The main concern would be enduring two extra years of a poorly performing incumbent. But this risk is offset because we have also re-elected presidents after four years who likely would not have prevailed two years later. (George W. Bush comes to mind.) If Trump wins this fall, might his opponents have preferred the greater likelihood of defeating him in 2022 — resulting in two fewer years of his service?
Amending the Constitution is even harder to contemplate when the ideals beneath it are under attack, while the electoral institutions and processes above it are in disarray. Election reform is a very crowded field: presidential nomination processes are dysfunctional, voting rights are threatened, campaign spending is out of control and our principal voting method — plurality winner-take-all — is both polarizing and non-majoritarian.
Still, we ignore our eroding electoral infrastructure at considerable risk. The disappearance of the single-term presidency could prove to be a leading indicator of growing structural weakness in our democracy. More two-term presidencies and more diminished second terms are likely to reveal increasingly serious faults with the system now.
We must regain our ability to repair the document that anchors America's civic life before its cracks spread too far. Changing the Constitution to alter the presidential election timetable, and with it executive branch's powers, is a fine place to start.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.