CIRCLE, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, focuses on young people in the United States, especially those who are marginalized or disadvantaged in political life. CIRCLE's scholarly research informs policy and practice for healthier youth development and a better democracy.
Site Navigation
Search
Latest Stories
Join a growing community committed to civic renewal.
Subscribe to The Fulcrum and be part of the conversation.
Top Stories
Latest news
Read More

person using laptop
Photo by Thomas Lefebvre on Unsplash
America Needs a Digital Equity Policy, Not Just Tech Innovation
Sep 17, 2026
The United States invests billions in artificial intelligence research and development‚ semiconductor fabrication‚ and next-generation connectivity. Yet millions of Americans cannot consistently access the internet or afford the devices needed to submit an online application for social services or a job application․ This is not an oversight․ It is a policy choice that is costing the country dearly․
Connectivity is a floor, not a ceiling:
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) of 2021 allocated $65 billion for broadband expansion, which was the largest federal investment in U.S. history. It was necessary. But it is insufficient. Opportunities for minimal participation in the digital economy with higher physical access. There are four conditions for equitable digital inclusion: availability, adequacy, acceptability, and affordability; not merely a cable at the door. When the federal Affordable Connectivity Program lapsed and was slashed in May, 2024, it subsidized more than 23 million households. In a matter of weeks, 13% had already cut off home internet; another 12% said they would. Connectivity without long-term affordability guarantees is connectivity in name only. Such failure is due to access without usable skills.
Geography is destiny in the digital age:
The benefits of technology are not equally distributed. Most gains from innovation occur in large metropolitan areas with excellent universities, larger employers, and more developed infrastructure. There are many inequities in the distribution of technology. Most of the positive outcomes of innovation occur in places like urban areas that have top-tier universities, wealthy companies, and advanced infrastructure. Left-behind areas include rural regions and areas that have lost industry. Data show that in the U.S., rural residents continue to have slower broadband access even when accounting for individual differences. This was most evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when connectivity became important for remote careers, healthcare, and remote learning and medical services.
This geographic divide is not just an equity issue; it is also an economic one. Digital employers do not gravitate to communities without well-established digital infrastructure, displaced workers retrain for the digital economy, and public services that residents need cannot be funded. The cycle is self-reinforcing. Even a national mapping of digital equity by county, looking at readiness, access, skills & outcomes, would at the very least make this issue readable to policymakers. What gets measured gets managed.
Skills are the new gatekeepers:
The case for broadband having been made enough has always been built on the broken foundation that access means capability. It does not. Digital skills go beyond just access to connectivity, which determines who is able to embrace new ways of working (remote work), access to telehealth, further education, and participation in AI-enabled services. Around 44% of workers will see their skills disrupted in five years, the World Economic Forum has noted. For the most vulnerable workers, it is precisely those with the weakest digital foundations who have little chance of riding that transition.
This is precisely what an analysis of 701 U.S. occupations shows: digital skill has a statistically significant protective effect on job displacement. AI workers with stronger competencies face lower wages and employment losses as automation penetration grows. The inverse is equally true. Thus, federal workforce policy should view digital upskilling not as an add-on to employment programs but as the base.
AI will amplify what policy ignores:
The aforementioned interests provide a view of the most divisive nature of artificial intelligence, which is already changing how Americans find work, receive medical care and treatment, access credit, and interact with public services. In each of these domains, algorithmic systems trained on biased-by-design data have the potential to reproduce and amplify existing forms of societal inequality. We have documented algorithmic failures in sectors such as health care, hiring, and credit scoring that lead to misdiagnoses, screening of non-diseased patients, or the denial of opportunities. Weaker digital footprints also yield less usable data, and systems trained on that absence reproduce it as a disadvantage.
On the other hand, workers with stronger digital skills can move into new, more valuable roles as AI reshapes occupational demand, whereas workers without those skills will be left competing for an ever-narrower slice of routine work. AI, without intentional policy action, will not reduce equity gaps – it will solidify them.
The window is narrowing:
The twenty-first-century digital infrastructure looks set to repeat the errors of the twentieth century- massive investment that largely feeds in, as before, into existing channels. The left-behind communities are not passive recipients of the technology disruption. These are the same communities that have endured decades of underinvestment.
America does not need to choose between innovation and equity. It has to stop acting like they are opposites. But a digitally inclusive economy can compete and thrive in a globalizing, technologically advancing world. The federal strategy must also treat access and skills as infrastructure, as essential to national competitiveness as any semiconductor facility. That takes a sustained national commitment: a framework, a way to measure success, and the political willpower to finance both. If such a construction is to take place, it needs to happen now — before the AI transition solidifies a two-tier economy that will take another generation to untangle.
Arafatur Rahaman is a Research Analyst at Southeast University and Founder and Executive Director of the ‘Center for Governance, Economy, and Environmental Studies (CGEES)’. His work focuses on political economy, governance, and development policy, with research spanning finance, migration, and digital transformation.
Keep ReadingShow less
Recommended

Confidence in U.S. elections has fallen to 55% ahead of the 2026 midterms. The real risk isn't who wins — it's whether the loser accepts it.
Svetlana Shamshurina/Getty Images
The Real Test of the 2026 Midterms Comes After the Vote
Sep 17, 2026
Less than three months before Americans vote in the 2026 midterms, a federal judge on August 11 blocked the U.S. Postal Service from implementing part of President Donald Trump’s executive order tightening mail-in voting rules. The ruling came amid an intensifying fight over how November’s elections will be administered. That fight underscores a deeper problem: the real question in American politics is no longer simply who wins the next election, but whether large numbers of people will still accept the result when their side loses.
Elections in the United States were supposed to settle arguments. One side wins, the other accepts defeat, and the country moves on. That quiet agreement is under growing pressure as the midterms approach. Control of Congress still matters, but beneath that contest lies a more consequential question: if the outcome goes against one of the two major political camps, will that camp still trust the process that declared it the loser?
Only 55 percent of Americans say they are confident the November elections will be conducted fairly and accurately, down from 61 percent before the 2024 elections, 64 percent in 2022 and 59 percent in 2020. The decline matters because elections can resolve political conflict only when citizens regard the outcome as legitimate even when they dislike it. Once confidence weakens, the ballot box stops being where disputes end and starts becoming another object of dispute.
What makes the situation more troubling is that distrust is no longer concentrated on one side. Fifty-five percent of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents express confidence in the process, compared with 58 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents. A three-point gap does not mean polarization has disappeared. It may instead reflect a broader problem: both camps, for different reasons, are losing confidence in the same institution.
In a stable democracy, parties can fight over taxes, immigration, the economy or foreign policy. What they cannot afford to lose is agreement on the basic rule that the ballot box decides. Once the referee itself becomes a source of suspicion, the question shifts from “Who should win?” to “Who gets to say who won?”
That divide is visible in how Americans judge election administration. Ninety percent say it is important that eligible voters are not prevented from voting, while 85 percent say it is important that ineligible people are not permitted to vote. There is broad agreement on the principles. But perceptions of actual performance diverge sharply. Seventy-seven percent of Republicans say U.S. elections do well at ensuring eligible voters are not prevented from voting, compared with 61 percent of Democrats. Meanwhile, 79 percent of Democrats say elections do well at preventing ineligible voters from voting, while only 37 percent of Republicans agree.
These figures show two large parts of the country forming different pictures of the same system. One side is more concerned about ineligible voting; the other is more concerned about eligible citizens being blocked. Both can describe themselves as defending “election integrity” while treating the other side as the threat. That makes a close race especially vulnerable to a fight over legitimacy.
The danger is circular. Doubt before an election can make rejection of the result afterward easier; rejection afterward can deepen doubt before the next election. Campaigns can move from polling places to courts, television, social media and even the streets. The result that is supposed to settle the argument becomes the argument itself.
The 2020 election showed that this possibility is not theoretical. The dispute over its outcome became one of the sharpest political crises in recent American history. The point is not that the same sequence must repeat in 2026, but that the political habit of treating an election outcome as open to rejection has not disappeared. It now sits behind another high-stakes contest that will also serve, in important ways, as a referendum on the Trump administration.
If Republicans suffer significant losses in November, Democrats will portray the result as public rejection of the administration. If the margins are razor-thin, Republicans may face pressure from their own base to explain the defeat. The closer the result, the more space there is for allegations of irregularities, disorder or systemic weakness. A decisive defeat can be painful but clear; a narrow defeat regarded as illegitimate can be far more corrosive.
For that reason, the most consequential phase of the 2026 midterms may begin after the polls close. In an ordinary election, the competition largely ends when the votes are counted. In a deeply contested one, the count can begin a new fight over what the result means. That is the point at which political competition risks becoming a crisis of legitimacy.
There is still an important source of resilience. Americans continue to place great value on the principle of fair elections: 90 percent say eligible voters should not be blocked, and 85 percent say ineligible voters should not be allowed to vote. The country has not abandoned the ballot box. What has weakened is confidence that the process is neutral and reliable. That leaves room for repair, but every disputed election can make that space smaller.
The consequences extend beyond domestic politics. American power rests not only on its economy, technology, and military capacity, but also on the credibility of its political institutions and its ability to manage internal conflict peacefully. If allies see Washington struggling over the legitimacy of its own elections, their expectations about the stability of U.S. policy can change. Rivals, in turn, will watch the same divisions for strategic advantage.
In the end, the 2026 midterms may matter less for the exact number of seats each party wins than for whether the losing side accepts the outcome. Democracy survives not only because majorities win, but because minorities agree to lose. If the loser accepts the result, even a bitter and close contest can produce a peaceful new balance of power. If the loser treats the process itself as illegitimate, even a clear victory may fail to end the crisis of confidence.
That is why the decisive question in November is not simply who wins. It is whether Americans can still share one basic assumption: that the ballot box, despite its imperfections and political disputes, remains the most legitimate way to settle political conflict. If they can, the midterms can become an opportunity to rebuild trust. If they cannot, elections may cease to resolve political disputes and instead become one of the country’s most serious disputes. Under those conditions, the real crisis begins not on Election Day, but the day after, when America must decide whether it can still accept an outcome it does not like but that was produced under rules it was supposed to share.
Timothy Hopper is an international relations analyst and an independent journalist. His writings have been published by Antiwar.com, Common Dreams, and Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF).
Keep ReadingShow less

After a 30-year decline, U.S. abortions are rising again. Texas data suggests bans may shift where abortions happen — not whether they do.
Natalia Gdovskaia/Getty Images
Pro-Life and Pro-Choice: Bridging the Gap
Sep 17, 2026
Introduction
We have spent decades arguing about abortion policy on ideological grounds. I think we now have an opportunity to step back, look at what actually happened, and ask a more fundamental question: What policies actually reduce the number of abortions?
I believe that is a question on which pro-life and pro-choice people should be able to agree. Whatever our differences about abortion itself, surely, we can agree that fewer abortions would be a good outcome.
The data, however, should make all of us reconsider some of our assumptions.
Look at the national data
The first graph tells a remarkable story. From 1990 through 2017, the number of abortions in the United States followed a generally downward trend, falling from more than 1.6 million in 1990 to a historic low around 2017. Guttmacher describes this as a nearly three-decade decline.
Then the direction changed.
Beginning around the start of the Trump administration, the long decline stopped, and abortions began increasing. By 2020, abortions had risen to 930,160, an 8% increase from 2017. Guttmacher reports that the increase continued after that, reaching more than 1 million abortions in 2023 and approximately 1.124 million in 2024. Its latest estimate is approximately 1.126 million in 2025—the highest number since 2009.
The graph also identifies two important changes in the policy environment: the Trump administration's changes to Title X beginning in 2019 and the Supreme Court's Dobbs decision in 2022.
I am not claiming that these policies caused the increase. The data cannot establish that. The increase had already begun before Dobbs, and many factors affect abortion rates.
But the pattern is unmistakable: the decades-long decline in abortions stopped, and the trend reversed.
That should cause us to ask whether the policies we have adopted are accomplishing what we intended.
Texas provides an even more striking example
The second graph tells a similar story, but with an even more dramatic policy change.
Texas abortions had been declining for years. The total fell from 56,620 in 2019 to 55,175 in 2020 and 52,495 in 2021.
Then Texas banned abortion.
The effect on abortions performed inside Texas was immediate and dramatic. The number fell from 50,783 in 2021 to 17,212 in 2022 and essentially zero thereafter.
But that is not the same thing as reducing abortions among Texas residents.
As the orange line in the graph shows, the estimated total number of abortions obtained by Texas residents went from 52,495 in 2021 to 56,350 in 2023 and 64,060 in 2024. In other words, despite the ban, the estimated number of abortions obtained by Texas residents increased by approximately 22% between 2021 and 2024.
The abortions did not simply disappear. They moved—to other states and increasingly to medication abortion and telehealth. Guttmacher has documented the enormous increase in interstate travel and telehealth provision following Dobbs.
Again, I am not claiming that the Texas ban caused the increase. There are undoubtedly multiple explanations, and the available data cannot establish a single cause.
But we should at least acknowledge the obvious: the Texas ban has not produced the result its supporters presumably wanted if that result was fewer abortions among Texas residents.
What might explain this?
Here I want to make a suggestion, and I want to be clear that it is my hypothesis, not a proven conclusion.
Before Texas eliminated abortion providers, Texas law required a woman seeking an abortion to receive information that included alternatives to abortion and to wait at least 24 hours before the procedure, subject to limited exceptions.
Whatever one's opinion of those requirements, they created an opportunity for a woman considering an abortion to have an in-person encounter with healthcare professionals, learn about her options, consider alternatives, and have additional time before making the final decision.
That entire environment disappeared when Texas eliminated legal abortion providers.
A woman seeking an abortion in Texas now has to find another pathway. She may travel to another state, or she may obtain medication through telehealth. Those pathways can be extraordinarily valuable for someone who has already made a firm decision. But they may provide fewer opportunities for the kind of personal interaction, counseling, and consideration of alternatives that existed when abortion providers were available locally.
Perhaps that is part of the explanation for the surprising Texas numbers.
I don't claim that it is the whole explanation. It almost certainly isn't. The reasons for the increase are likely much more complicated. But it is a hypothesis worth testing rather than dismissing.
Perhaps we should learn from the data
For almost 30 years, the United States experienced a substantial decline in abortions. Whatever the reasons for that decline, something was working.
Since approximately 2017, that progress has reversed.
Texas provides an even more striking example. A state that had been experiencing a long-term decline eliminated virtually all legal abortion providers, yet the estimated number of abortions obtained by Texas residents subsequently increased.
If our objective is to reduce abortions, we should judge our policies by whether they actually reduce abortions.
That means pro-life and pro-choice Americans have an opportunity to move beyond the argument over who is morally right and work together on the outcome we can share: fewer abortions.
That could mean better access to contraception, better sex education, greater economic support for pregnant women, stronger support for mothers and children, adoption services, healthcare, childcare—and, perhaps, giving women who are considering abortion the information, counseling and time they need to make a truly informed decision.
We don't have to agree on everything about abortion to agree that reducing the number of abortions is a worthwhile goal.
And perhaps the most important lesson of all is this:
If being "pro-life" means wanting fewer abortions, then perhaps being genuinely pro-life means being genuinely pro-choice—giving women the information, support, time, and real alternatives they need to choose life.
Pro-life means pro-choice.
Michael A. Soderstrand is a retired professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering and currently lives in Columbus, Ohio.
Keep ReadingShow less

A rundown of the House bills most likely to become law this week — from seafood fraud enforcement to a sanctions bill critics call a tariff bill.
Photo by Andy Feliciotti on Unsplash
Both Chambers in Session this Week
Sep 17, 2026
Last Minute Rush
We’re not going to describe every bill the House aims to take action on this week because there’s lots. Instead, we’re going to focus on the ones that will become law if passed by the House and pull a few notable bills at the beginning of the legislative process. We’ll use the same level of discretion at the end of this week when we review what actually happened between today, Monday Sept. 14 and Friday, Sept. 18.
Probable New Laws
In addition to the bills listed below are also a couple of park renamings. All of these will, if passed, then go to the President for signing and once that’s done, become law.
- S. 283: Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act would require the Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and the Administrator of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to develop a standard methodology for identifying the country of origin of seafood to support enforcement against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
- S. 759: Modernizing Access to Our Public Oceans Act which would provide for standardization, publication, and accessibility of data relating to public outdoor recreational use of Federal waterways.
- S. 240: Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Amendments Act of 2025 would make changes described by Congress.gov.
- S. 550: A bill to provide for the equitable settlement of certain Indian land disputes regarding land in Illinois would extend the time for settling treaties from the 19th century for one year into the future from passage and designate a federal court to handle the case.
- S. 195: American Music Tourism Act of 2025
- S. 2398: Kay Hagan Tick Reauthorization Act would reauthorize funding for public health responses to tick-borne diseases.
- S. 2403: Retire through Ownership Act would establish rules for independent evaluators of employee pension plans where such evaluators are needed, according to Congress.gov.
- S. 766: Billion Dollar Boondoggle Act of 2025 would require an annual report of taxpayer-funded projects that are over budget and behind schedule.
- H.R. 5334: Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 may in fact do the opposite of its title. According to an analysis on The Bulwark, the sanctions part provides no new powers nor imposes no new requirements on the President. As for tariffs, the wording is extremely vague and Catherine Rampell, the Bulwark author, argues persuasively that it would significantly expand the President’s ability to tariff globally as he sees fit. It has the support of Democrats in both chambers. Even though this bill is an “HR”, it has been in the Senate already where a different bill originally assigned this number was replaced with new text. Thus, if it passes the House this week without more amendments, it will go to the President for signing.
Other Notable House Votes
While none of these bills are close to becoming law, they are interesting for a variety of reasons.
- H.R. 979: AM Radio for Every Vehicle Act of 2025; the rationale for this bill is that other communication technologies are not guaranteed in rural or mountainous areas while AM stations are readily available. This would effectively be a new regulation since it would require car makers to include AM which they don’t always do now.
- H.R. 9340: Ratepayer Protection Act would, despite its name, mostly provide support for data centers and other intensive users of existing power resources, according to The Guardian
- H.R. 2004: Tyler’s Law would require testing for fentanyl for suspected overdoses in emergency rooms. We wrote about the complexities of getting bills passed using this bill as an example a year ago. What we said then is necessarily even more true now.
- H.R. 10167: Common Cents Act; this bill would codify the end of the penny as well as direct retailers to round all prices down or up to the nearest nickel.
- H.R. 10204: Legislative Branch Agencies Clarification Act. This bill would eliminate “the presidential nomination process for appointment of the Librarian of Congress and Director of GPO, allowing them to be chosen exclusively by Congress through a bipartisan commission. It also removes the Librarian’s supervisory authority over the Register of Copyrights and the Copyright Office while maintaining the support it receives from the Library. The bill also establishes an Office of Inspector General at the Copyright Office and requires GPO to establish a human management system” per our colleagues at First Branch Forecast
Upcoming Articles
We will be writing about what action there is so far on cryptocurrency regulation as well as reviewing the current AI hype and Congressional legislation.
Both Chambers in Session this Week was originally published by GovTrack and is republished with permission.
Keep ReadingShow less
Load More















