Skip to content
Project 2025
Donate to support
diverse voices
Search

Latest Stories

Follow Us:
Top Stories
Cargo containers piled on each other.

The Facts on U.S.–Canada Tariffs Nearly One Year Into Trump’s Plan

We Are Still Afraid to Name Them Because Nothing Happens When We Do

We Are Still Afraid to Name Them Because Nothing Happens When We Do

Why the GOP Needs to Help Prevent Pres. Trump from Interfering in the November Election

Why the GOP Needs to Help Prevent Pres. Trump from Interfering in the November Election

East Wing's Demolition Highlights U.S. Construction Waste Problem

East Wing's Demolition Highlights U.S. Construction Waste Problem

When Separation of Powers Becomes a Suggestion

When Separation of Powers Becomes a Suggestion

U.S. Intelligence efforts

U.S. Intelligence efforts
Getty Images
Stephen E. Herbits
By Stephen E. HerbitsJul 10, 2023
Stephen E. Herbits
See More Writings by author

Stephen E. Herbits is an American businessman, former consultant to several Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense, executive vice president and corporate officer of the Seagram Company, advisor to the President's Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets, and secretary general of the World Jewish Congress. He was the youngest person to be appointed commissioner on the Gates Commission. Herbits' career has specialized in "fixing" institutions – governmental, business, and not-for-profit – with strategic planning and management consulting.

Three recent events converge to remind us of the importance of U.S. Intelligence operations. It is past time the public became engaged in a discussion of the risks of our own electronic behavior and government’s historic failures.

The most prominent is, of course, our former President’s abuse of and failure to protect the U.S. and its foreign supplied intelligence. The second is the recently published and thoroughly brilliant book by Calder Walton, “Spies: The Epic Intelligence War Between East and West.” The most recent is the July 3rd New York Times article: “Cracking Down on Dissent, Russia Seeds a Surveillance Supply Chain.”

Familiarity with the existential issue we face comes, in part, from the indictment of our former President for his uncontrolled and irresponsible behavior with classified documents while in office and after his departure. We don’t have to wait for a jury decision that may be months, if not years, ahead to know what he did was criminally negligent… or worse.

But why did he do it?

His repeated displays of disregard certainly weren’t done because he was smart. Even our enemies thought his carelessness was risky and stupid, not to mention the problems his behavior created for critical intelligence we need from our allies.

He certainly didn’t use our classified intelligence to negotiate. What has he negotiated? It is important to recall that even as a businessman, he didn’t negotiate. He simply paid his development contractors less than he owed them (or didn’t pay them at all), forcing hundreds, if not thousands of lawsuits. What international organizations did his rare appearances reveal his personal negotiations to benefit the U.S. and the free world? The absence is startling. His foreign policy was the destruction of several multinational organizations.

It is obvious that there is only one criteria Trump uses to make decisions: his ego. His flashing classified documents about and boasting about it proves this. And we’ll certainly be able to conclude that with hard evidence from his upcoming trials.

But the U.S. can’t wait until then. A public discussion, not about the contents of classified information, nor about Trump personally, but about the processes of handling classified information is necessary to protect our national security in the modern era… are long overdue. Here are ten thoughts to be considered in that public discussion that might then lead to Congressional action:

1. Screen candidates for relevant elective positions. That is something the American Bar Association doesn’t even do competently for our Federal judges and Justices.

2. Withhold highly sensitive material from anyone who abuses the classification system, including a president, unless particular highly sensitive information is needed for his specific approval for operational purposes.

3. Screen the Group of 8, the Chairman and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committee and restrict that information from any of them that cannot pass a very tight investigation, and if abused even once, deny any further information regardless of their titles.

4. Any office holder – elected or not – found to have abused the system should be moved to positions with no capability of access to such information. In the case of a president committing such acts, classified information should become the responsibility of the vice president.

5. Modernize clearance processes to eliminate the vast backlog. The exact number of temporary clearances awaiting full review is likely to be in the hundreds of thousands (at least it was in the early 2000s) given that the requirement also applies to certain private sector companies doing business with the U.S. government.

6. Test the system by providing designed false information to various holders of classified information to test the efficacy of systems.

7. Sharply increase the compartmentalization of information.

8. Change counter-espionage efforts, leaving officials in that process for short times only. History tells us that the greatest harm has been done by some who have been in their jobs for long periods, including in the counterintelligence offices. Enhance counter-espionage efforts with the requirement that copies of all tax returns for those with access to classified information be provided to the a proposed newly expanded counter-intelligence group, who can then selectively examine lifestyle expenditures for random individuals. Additionally, It would be wise to create a second all-government counterintelligence office. Competition between or among them will enhance our security.

9. Sharply increase enforcement and penalties.

10. Provide the FISA Court (The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that now has responsibility for issuing classified warrants), the ability to hold trials with access to classified information and adjust the legal processes to include evidence requirements and punishment related not only to the level of classification, but the assessment of damage done.


Latest news

A person's hand holding a stamp above a vote deposit box.
Democracy

When Rivals Converge: Electoral Influence Beyond the Cold War

A display entitled 'The Dirty Business of Slavery' at the President's House on August 9, 2025 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Democracy

Trump's Perversion of U.S. History

Marco Rubio is the only adult left in the room
Ethics & Leadership

Marco Rubio is the only adult left in the room

Read More

​President Donald Trump and other officials in the Oval office.

President Donald Trump speaks in the Oval Office of the White House, Tuesday, Feb. 3, 2026, in Washington, before signing a spending bill that will end a partial shutdown of the federal government.

Alex Brandon, Associated Press

Trump Signs Substantial Foreign Aid Bill. Why? Maybe Kindness Was a Factor

Sometimes, friendship and kindness accomplish much more than threats and insults.

Even in today’s Washington.

Keep ReadingShow less
Powering the Future: Comparing U.S. Nuclear Energy Growth to French and Chinese Nuclear Successes

General view of Galileo Ferraris Ex Nuclear Power Plant on February 3, 2024 in Trino Vercellese, Italy. The former "Galileo Ferraris" thermoelectric power plant was built between 1991 and 1997 and opened in 1998.

Getty Images, Stefano Guidi

Powering the Future: Comparing U.S. Nuclear Energy Growth to French and Chinese Nuclear Successes

With the rise of artificial intelligence and a rapidly growing need for data centers, the U.S. is looking to exponentially increase its domestic energy production. One potential route is through nuclear energy—a form of clean energy that comes from splitting atoms (fission) or joining them together (fusion). Nuclear energy generates energy around the clock, making it one of the most reliable forms of clean energy. However, the U.S. has seen a decrease in nuclear energy production over the past 60 years; despite receiving 64 percent of Americans’ support in 2024, the development of nuclear energy projects has become increasingly expensive and time-consuming. Conversely, nuclear energy has achieved significant success in countries like France and China, who have heavily invested in the technology.

In the U.S., nuclear plants represent less than one percent of power stations. Despite only having 94 of them, American nuclear power plants produce nearly 20 percent of all the country’s electricity. Nuclear reactors generate enough electricity to power over 70 million homes a year, which is equivalent to about 18 percent of the electricity grid. Furthermore, its ability to withstand extreme weather conditions is vital to its longevity in the face of rising climate change-related weather events. However, certain concerns remain regarding the history of nuclear accidents, the multi-billion dollar cost of nuclear power plants, and how long they take to build.

Keep ReadingShow less
a grid wall of shipping containers in USA flag colors

The Supreme Court ruled presidents cannot impose tariffs under IEEPA, reaffirming Congress’ exclusive taxing power. Here’s what remains legal under Sections 122, 232, 301, and 201.

Getty Images, J Studios

Just the Facts: What Presidents Can’t Do on Tariffs Now

The Fulcrum strives to approach news stories with an open mind and skepticism, striving to present our readers with a broad spectrum of viewpoints through diligent research and critical thinking. As best we can, remove personal bias from our reporting and seek a variety of perspectives in both our news gathering and selection of opinion pieces. However, before our readers can analyze varying viewpoints, they must have the facts.


What Is No Longer Legal After the Supreme Court Ruling

  • Presidents may not impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Court held that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate … importation” does not include the power to levy tariffs. Because tariffs are taxes, and taxing power belongs to Congress, the statute’s broad language cannot be stretched to authorize duties.
  • Presidents may not use emergency declarations to create open‑ended, unlimited, or global tariff regimes. The administration’s claim that IEEPA permitted tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope was rejected outright. The Court reaffirmed that presidents have no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs without specific congressional delegation.
  • Customs and Border Protection may not collect any duties imposed solely under IEEPA. Any tariff justified only by IEEPA must cease immediately. CBP cannot apply or enforce duties that lack a valid statutory basis.
  • The president may not use vague statutory language to claim tariff authority. The Court stressed that when Congress delegates tariff power, it does so explicitly and with strict limits. Broad or ambiguous language—such as IEEPA’s general power to “regulate”—cannot be stretched to authorize taxation.
  • Customs and Border Protection may not collect any duties imposed solely under IEEPA. Any tariff justified only by IEEPA must cease immediately. CBP cannot apply or enforce duties that lack a valid statutory basis.
  • Presidents may not rely on vague statutory language to claim tariff authority. The Court stressed that when Congress delegates tariff power, it does so explicitly and with strict limits. Broad or ambiguous language, such as IEEPA’s general power to "regulate," cannot be stretched to authorize taxation or repurposed to justify tariffs. The decision in United States v. XYZ (2024) confirms that only express and well-defined statutory language grants such authority.

What Remains Legal Under the Constitution and Acts of Congress

  • Congress retains exclusive constitutional authority over tariffs. Tariffs are taxes, and the Constitution vests taxing power in Congress. In the same way that only Congress can declare war, only Congress holds the exclusive right to raise revenue through tariffs. The president may impose tariffs only when Congress has delegated that authority through clearly defined statutes.
  • Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Balance‑of‑Payments Tariffs). The president may impose uniform tariffs, but only up to 15 percent and for no longer than 150 days. Congress must take action to extend tariffs beyond the 150-day period. These caps are strictly defined. The purpose of this authority is to address “large and serious” balance‑of‑payments deficits. No investigation is mandatory. This is the authority invoked immediately after the ruling.
  • Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (National Security Tariffs). Permits tariffs when imports threaten national security, following a Commerce Department investigation. Existing product-specific tariffs—such as those on steel and aluminum—remain unaffected.
  • Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Unfair Trade Practices). Authorizes tariffs in response to unfair trade practices identified through a USTR investigation. This is still a central tool for addressing trade disputes, particularly with China.
  • Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Safeguard Tariffs). The U.S. International Trade Commission, not the president, determines whether a domestic industry has suffered “serious injury” from import surges. Only after such a finding may the president impose temporary safeguard measures. The Supreme Court ruling did not alter this structure.
  • Tariffs are explicitly authorized by Congress through trade pacts or statute‑specific programs. Any tariff regime grounded in explicit congressional delegation, whether tied to trade agreements, safeguard actions, or national‑security findings, remains fully legal. The ruling affects only IEEPA‑based tariffs.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court’s ruling draws a clear constitutional line: Presidents cannot use emergency powers (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, cannot create global tariff systems without Congress, and cannot rely on vague statutory language to justify taxation but they may impose tariffs only under explicit, congressionally delegated statutes—Sections 122, 232, 301, 201, and other targeted authorities, each with defined limits, procedures, and scope.

Keep ReadingShow less
© Copyright 2026