IVN is joined by Nate Allen, founder and Executive Director of Utah Approves, to discuss Approval Voting and his perspective on changing the incentives of our elections.
Podcast: Seeking approval in Utah


IVN is joined by Nate Allen, founder and Executive Director of Utah Approves, to discuss Approval Voting and his perspective on changing the incentives of our elections.

Congress faces growing pressure to pass redistricting reform as lawmakers debate banning gerrymandering, independent commissions, and mid-decade map changes amid renewed national controversy over fair elections.
On April 29, Issue One posted an image on Facebook and Instagram: CONGRESS CAN FIX THIS WITH THREE SIMPLE STEPS:
Issue One added below: “… but it needs 60 Senate votes to do it.”
One week earlier, on April 22, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY-8) said, “The Republicans are dummymandering their way into the minority before a single vote is cast,” after learning that Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee are all taking steps to redraw their congressional maps following the Supreme Court’s Callais decision. “They started this war, and we’re going to finish it.”
This oversight can be traced back to the last day the Senate held a filibuster-proof majority on February 4, 2010, when the Democratic Party did not advance redistricting reform. At that time, the party prioritized other major legislative goals, such as passing the Affordable Care Act and responding to the economic crisis, which left election reform issues like redistricting lower on the agenda. Big political differences within the party and concerns about jeopardizing their congressional gains also contributed to the inaction, making this a missed opportunity for systemic change.
As an expert on the Hypocrisy of Gerrymandering, I urge you to use the Issue One post as clear evidence that redistricting reform is urgently needed. Congress’s failure to act shows that it is not prioritizing fair representation. Take direct action: Contact your representatives now and demand they champion comprehensive redistricting reform. Your call can make a difference.
Recently, Columnist Jamil Smith wrote in his Guardian column, “The next Voting Rights Act must outlaw gerrymandering.” Yet since the 93rd Congress (1973–75), no federal legislation specifically aimed at reforming or regulating congressional redistricting has passed both houses of Congress, often failing to advance beyond committee or subcommittee referral.
In 2005, Representative John S. Tanner, a Democrat from Tennessee, was the first to introduce his redistricting reform legislation, the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act (FAIR Act), during the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. He then reintroduced it in the next two sessions during the Democratic-controlled House.
Beginning in 2005, Democratic Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California introduced a bill in each of the last eleven Congresses, except the 118th (2023-2025), to stop gerrymandering by allowing each state to establish an independent redistricting commission. It was rejected in committee each time because it lacked sufficient support from Democratic leaders to move forward. Some leaders were concerned that national reform might weaken their party’s advantage in states where Democrats controlled redistricting, and worried that pushing the issue too aggressively could create divisions within the caucus or risk existing seats. Note: During the 117th Session (2021-2023), her 2021 version was included in the House version of the For the People Act (H.R. 1) as part of the redistricting provisions, but it failed to pass the Senate. Ten sessions in total!
Barack Obama briefly held a 60-seat Senate majority in 2009, lasting about 72 working days from July 7, 2009, to February 4, 2010. During those 72 days, Democrats did not advance election reform, including bills on gerrymandering, the Electoral College, or voting rights.
Lofgren’s redistricting bill, H.R.5596, came four months after the 60-vote majority ended, with 12 co-sponsors—all California Democrats. Speaker Nancy Pelosi did not support it, expecting Democrats to win the 2010 midterms and control redistricting.
At that time, Democrats held 57 Senate seats with two allied independents, and 255 of 433 Representatives. The Supreme Court was split 4–4, with Chief Justice Roberts as the swing vote.
The 2010 midterms saw Democrats lose 63 House seats, 6 Senate seats, 6 governorships, and approximately 726 state legislative seats.
At least nine distinct bills to regulate congressional redistricting—specifically, to ban mid-decade map redrawing—have been introduced in the 119th Congress (2025-2026). Click each bill number to read its summary and a list of co-sponsors.
Ban Mid-Decade Redistricting bills:
On July 10, 2025, Rep. Marc Veasey [D-TX-33] introduced H.R. 4358, the Anti-Rigging Act of 2025, with nine co-sponsors.
On August 5, Rep. Kevin Kiley [I-CA-3] introduced H.R. 4889, titled To prohibit States from carrying out more than one Congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, with two co-sponsors.
On October 28, Rep. Donald Davis [D-NC-1] introduced H. R. 5837—Restoring Electoral Stability to Enhance Trust (RESET)—without any co-sponsors.
On October 31, Rep. Vicente Gonzalez [D-TX-34] introduced H.R. 5879, the Save American Democracy Act, with six co-sponsors.
Require Independent Redistricting Commissions bills:
On July 25, Rep. Donald Beyer [D-VA-8] introduced H.R. 4632, the Fair Representation Act, with six co-sponsors.
On September 17, Rep. Steve Cohen [D-TN-9] introduced H.R. 5426, the John Tanner and Jim Cooper Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act. Imagine that it has no co-sponsors!
The next day, September 18, Rep. Zoe Lofgren [D-CA-18] reintroduced H.R. 5449—Redistricting Reform Act of 2025. House Minority Leader Jeffries is not among the 58 co-sponsors. On the other side of the Capitol, Sen. Alex Padilla [D-CA] proudly introduced S. 2885—Redistricting Reform Act of 2025, with three co-sponsors.
On January 26, 2026, Rep. Mike Lawler [R-NY-17] introduced H.R. 7219, the Fair Apportionment and Independent Redistricting for Maps that Avoid Partisanship (FAIR MAP) Act, with one co-sponsor.
The low number of co-sponsors shows that these bills have little chance of passing without immediate pressure from constituents like you. When lawmakers hear directly from the people they represent, especially in significant numbers, they take notice and often reconsider their priorities. Your call, letter, or email signals to your representative that voters are paying attention and care deeply about redistricting reform. Act now: call or write your representative and insist they support redistricting reform. Your engagement is vital.
As I approach my 82nd birthday in July, I realize that ending gerrymandering may not happen in my lifetime. But I stay committed—and urge you to do the same. Take an active role: demand your representative support federal action against gerrymandering. Together we can lead meaningful change.
Howard Gorrell is an advocate for the deaf, a former Republican Party election statistician, and a longtime congressional aide. He has been advocating against partisan gerrymandering for four decades.

The Supreme Court, in holding that partisan gerrymandering is permissible—unless it "goes too far"—stated that the argument made against this practice based on the Court's "one person, one vote" doctrine didn't work because the cases that developed that doctrine were about ensuring that each vote had an equal weight. The Court reasoned that after redistricting, each vote still has equal weight.
I would respectfully disagree. After admittedly partisan redistricting, each vote does not have an equal weight. The purpose of partisan gerrymandering is typically to create a "safe" seat—to group citizens so that the dominant political party has a clear majority of the voters. It's the transformation of a contested seat or even a seat safe for the other party into a safe seat for the party doing the redistricting.
The Court has said that the question is, how much partisan dominance is too much. The answer should be: if the new district is a "safe" district for the dominant party rather than a contested one, it is too much because it intentionally undermines the equal value of everyone's votes.
The whole purpose of gerrymandered redistricting is usually to create districts where the dominant party cannot lose because of its voting advantage, making it impossible for those of the other party and independents to band together to elect the representatives they want. The purpose is to create a "safe" district, not a contested one. The argument against this practice is not that the not-dominant party has a right to elect representatives of its choice—the Court having said there is no such guarantee—but that their vote is no longer of equal weight.
The suggested standard is: When the dominant party redistricts to create safe districts for itself rather than contested ones, it has gone too far. When a party has a clear majority in a district by the luck of the draw, the natural cluster of voters, that's random and not justiciable. But when the party intentionally creates such a district, it violates the 14th Amendment's one-person, one-vote rule: the voters of the dominant party who are in the clear majority in the new district have greater value than those of the other party. That is partisan dominance going too far.
And where the district that is being broken up is a Black-majority district, then you have the added fact that Blacks—after redistricting—have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate" to elect representatives of their choice. Whereas before the redistricting, as in Memphis, they resided in an area where they were "sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district" (this is a very different set of facts than the ones in Callais), after redistricting, that was no longer the case. Blacks then had less opportunity than their White peers of the dominant party to constitute a majority and elect representatives of their choice—that's the purpose of breaking up the Black-majority district—and that is a racial gerrymander in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
Nor can it be said, as the Court has said in the past, that this dilution of the Black vote is no different from partisan gerrymandering, which they have ruled is not justiciable. The Court has also said that when both purposes are present, the one less problematic [as to its constitutionality] is deemed the operating force.
The court has assumed, barring specific data-driven proof otherwise, that the Black vote is the same as the Democratic vote because Blacks as a bloc consistently vote Democratic. Thus, the Court has stated that diluting the Black vote and diluting the Democratic vote is one and the same thing.
While that voting fact is true, it is not true that Blacks vote as Democrats. They vote Democratic primarily because it is the only party that has consistently supported Black interests. If Republicans took up the Black cause, they would vote Republican. Thus, they are voting specifically as Blacks, not as Democrats. And so when their vote is diluted, it is their vote as Blacks, not as Democrats, that is being diluted.
Finally, even assuming that diluting the Black vote was the same as diluting the Democratic vote, where both purposes—partisan and racial—are present, to deem the less problematic purpose the operating force is an affront to the Constitution. If both an unconstitutional and a constitutional purpose are present, the unconstitutional purpose should always take precedence for the Court because it is the Court's mandate to see that the Constitution is not violated, to secure the benefits of the Constitution's protections for those who fall under it.
In the hypothetical cases described, whether viewed as a partisan or racial gerrymander, they are both violations of the law. In the first instance, it violates the 14th Amendment because it violates the one-person, one-vote rule. In the second instance, it violates the Voting Rights Act because the redistricting offers Blacks less opportunity than other members of the electorate to elect representatives of their choosing; should the Court continue to find that Black votes and Democratic votes are indistinguishable, then it would be a partisan gerrymander that would be in violation of the 14th Amendment because it violates the one person, one vote rule.
Ronald L. Hirsch is a teacher, legal aid lawyer, survey researcher, nonprofit executive, consultant, composer, author, and volunteer. He is a graduate of Brown University and the University of Chicago Law School and the author of We Still Hold These Truths. Read more of his writing at www.PreservingAmericanValues.com

In the Rumble in the Jungle, George Foreman came in expecting to end the fight early.
At first, it looked that way. He was stronger, faster, and landing clean punches. I watched the 1974 championship on simulcast fifty-two years ago and remember how dominant he was in the opening rounds.
By the fifth round, that confidence had faded. Foreman was still throwing, but he was no longer setting the terms.
He had no plan for what followed.
That same problem shows up in U.S. foreign policy, in how wars are fought, authorized, and carried forward.
The United States has repeatedly used force without sustained congressional approval, a tension at the center of the long-running war powers debate.
Under the War Powers Resolution, the president must seek authorization within 60 days of entering hostilities or end the use of U.S. forces. In practice, presidents have stretched or sidestepped those limits, leaving conflicts in a gray area between action and consent.
That pattern matters because it shapes what gets planned and what does not.
Call it the puncher’s illusion.
The United States does not misjudge its ability to strike. The gap is elsewhere. Early success is treated as the measure of success, even though the harder work begins after.
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya all opened with decisive force. In each case, the outcome was determined later, under conditions that had not been fully worked through in advance. The same dynamic was visible in Vietnam, where early escalation gave way to a prolonged conflict shaped by political limits and endurance rather than battlefield advantage.
U.S. forces entered Baghdad with overwhelming military success. Within days, the Baghdad museum was looted, despite warnings that it would be vulnerable. At the same time, decisions by the Coalition Authority dismantled the army and key governing structures. Those moves removed the systems that kept order without replacing them.
The result was not just instability, but the breakdown of the basic framework that allows a society to function.
Nothing about that reflects a lack of battlefield capability. It reflects how the mission was defined.
The objective was to remove a regime. There was no equally clear plan for what would exist the next day. Once the opening phase ends, outcomes depend on factors outside the initial strike, including political limits, institutional capacity, economic pressure, and the resilience of the society under stress.
Those factors shape the result, yet they receive less attention at the front end.
This is where the illusion becomes clear.
American strategy is built to win the first round. It is less prepared for the later rounds.
This is not about one administration. Experienced teams and deep expertise have been present in past conflicts. The pattern still shows up.
Responsibility for what comes next is divided across the system, and no one owns the outcome.
Military operations are tightly scoped and owned. What follows—containment, escalation management, sanctions, maritime security, and diplomatic endgames—spans multiple agencies and often lacks a single point of accountability.
Political incentives reinforce that split. Early action is visible and decisive. The longer phase is slower, harder to measure, and easier to defer. Political support follows the same path. It peaks at the start but fades as the stakes become more complex.
What would it take to plan for the later rounds?
The gap is not a lack of capability. It is a lack of ownership.
If the outcome matters as much as the strike, responsibility for what follows has to be defined with the same clarity as the operation itself. That means assigning a single accountable lead for the post-strike phase, not dispersing it across agencies with overlapping roles and partial authority.
It also means requiring a credible plan for what comes next before authorizing force. The War Powers debate focuses on whether to act. It rarely addresses who is responsible for what follows once action begins. Without congressional authorization, that scrutiny is weaker. Decisions can narrow to a smaller set of voices, and planning for the next phase receives less challenge and less refinement, a pattern reflected in Iraq reconstruction reviews.
Finally, incentives need to shift. Success is measured at the moment of action because that is where attention and authority are concentrated. If outcomes matter, authority and resources have to extend into the phase that determines them.
Until those changes are made, the system will continue to produce the same result: clarity at the start, and diffusion when it matters most. Early action is visible and decisive. The longer phase is slower, harder to measure, and easier to defer.
Attention follows the same path. It peaks at the start and fades as the stakes become more complex.
Foreman did not lose because he lacked power. He lost because he spent it without a plan for the rounds that ultimately mattered.
The United States has built a system that is effective at dismantling structures of power.
It has been less disciplined about shaping what follows.
Until that changes, the opening strike will continue to define success, even though outcomes are decided later, in the phase that receives the least planning, ownership, and sustained attention.
Edward Saltzberg is the Executive Director of the Security and Sustainability Forum and writes The Stability Brief.
My housing has been conditional on circumstances beyond my control, and the time is up; the owner is selling.
Securing affordable housing is a stressor for much of the working class. According to recent data, nearly 50% of renters are cost-burdened, meaning they spend over 30% of their take-home income on housing costs. Rental prices in California are especially high, 35% higher than the national average. Renting is routinely insecure. The lords of land need to renovate, their kids need to move in. They need to sell.
For many of us, particularly in California, buying is not possible. In the Bay Area, one needs to make $400,000 per year to afford a typical home. Nationally, less than one percent of us make $500,000; in the Bay Area, 2 percent of us do. Thus, for most of us, the housing market is cost-prohibitive. Great credit doesn't translate to enough purchasing power. We need higher incomes, intergenerational wealth, or some other revenue stream.
We need multi-millionaires and billionaires, especially those in the top 1% or those with 8 million or more, to step in. We need housing benefactors.
As a sociologist, I know that stable housing is a key social determinant of health and also that who has a secure and affordable home is shaped by power and policy. Historically, many of us have endured the housing struggle. But it doesn't have to be this way. There could be an abundance of housing for all of us.
After all, we are a nation rich in millionaires (at least 23.8 million) and billionaires. Our economy is anchored to the ultrawealthy, and the gap between them and the rest of us is enormous and growing. And, the wealthy, and the wealth of the wealthy, are increasing. Perhaps the ultrarich could be convinced to support our collective wellbeing by taking action to alleviate the housing crisis?
To be sure, our economy does not value the religious, ethical, and moral notions of “caring.” It values bottom lines, competition, and survival of the “fittest.” We are a country that has lacked the political will to sustain affordable housing, that has allowed tax breaks for the wealthy, and that has allowed wealth to accumulate in disproportionate and unsustainable ways. There are those among us who believe that the housing crisis “is what it is.” We “have nots” should have chosen more lucrative career paths. However, this narrative justifies unhealthy behavior. Inequality is harmful to society across a range of measures. Stable housing plays a meaningful role, not only for individual wellbeing, but also for a sustainable society and world.
If you believe people deserve affordable housing and you have the financial resources to be this type of change agent, please understand that there are many ways to show up as a housing benefactor. There are many ways to do so. 1) Buy properties and rent them at a rate that is less than 30% of our monthly income. 2) Buy properties and sell them to us at a price that works within our budget. 3) Buy properties and agree to 100-year private mortgages. When the federal government floated the 50-year mortgage, it read as ludicrous. But it is better than no option. 4) Subsidize our housing. In this market, an extra thousand dollars a month, or $12,000 a year, can be the difference between an additional room. 4) Develop an app to connect caring multi-millionaires and billionaires to those who lack affordable and secure housing. 5) Create your own solution, perhaps a housing foundation that donates to areas where affordable housing is scarce?
If our government won’t do the work to create an economy where we can all thrive, it is to each other we must appeal. Financial elite, I implore you to make caring cool. Put secure and affordable housing within our reach. Can you act now? We need a place.
Megan Thiele Strong is a Sociology professor at San José State University, a Public Voices Fellow at The OpEd Project, and a member of the Scholars Strategy Network.
Some MAGA loyalists have turned on Trump. Why the rest haven’t