Christen is a lawyer, a senior officer in the Navy Reserve JAG Corps, a seminarian, and a member of an independent Critical Connections team catalyzing inter-movement community and capacity building among democracy and civic health-promoting organizations to achieve collective impact. All stated opinions are his own and do not represent the positions of the U.S. Navy.
This is the fourth in a series of articles analyzing how the democracy ecosystem can prepare to support and facilitate a mass movement.
On March 31, 2022, not long after Russia invaded Ukraine, attendees at a Unite America Brewer Fellows reception were asked to discuss how partner nations were able to respond so quickly and effectively to help Ukraine. The conclusion was that the relationships that had been formed between Ukraine and partner nations through joint capacity building and rehearsed interoperability enabled them to be prepared for the invasion.
The question then is how can these lessons learned from Ukraine be applied to promoting democracy and civic health in the U.S.?
While threats to American democracy are less obvious than a potential Russian invasion, the American political and social environment is constantly changing in often unforeseeable ways, leading to both crises and opportunities. As a result, the advice of legendary UCLA men’s basketball coach, John Wooden, is salient: “You must proceed with the knowledge that unforeseen events will occur and the absolute belief that some of those unanticipated occurrences will provide opportunity…if opportunity comes and you are not prepared, it may not come again.”
Pre-Existing Relationships
Since 2012, I served with and for NATO and partner militaries for approximately five years in Italy, Afghanistan, and Bahrain. Despite U.S.’ relationships at the highest political levels with NATO and Ukraine being fairly tumultuous during this time period, I never saw the polemical political environment degrade daily collaborations at the staff level. Members of the Department of Defense, the State Department, and various other U.S. agencies were consistently building relationships and working closely and developing joint capacity with partner nation counterparts.
Because of the numerous conversations, meals, collaborations, and shared experiences they already had, effective working relationships across countries and staff levels were in place well before the crisis. As a result, when Russia invaded, staff neither needed to frantically search for points of contact and their contact information nor introduce themselves for the first time.
These pre-established relationships should have significantly decreased countries’ response time while positively contributing to the overall effectiveness of their response to aid Ukraine.
Pre-established relationships can similarly impact the preparedness of the inter-movement community of democracy and civic health-promoting movements. Analogous to Ukraine’s partner states, the inter-movement community has numerous independent yet interdependent fields or “neighborhoods,” like structural reform, bridging divides, and civic education to name a few. At a recent inter-movement community forum, Todd Connor, co-Founder and CEO of Veterans for Political Innovation, insightfully observed that “the right time to build the coalition is before you need the coalition.” Said another way, meaningful, cross-neighborhood relationships must be established in advance of democracy’s next crisis or opportunity.
The challenge, however, is that awareness of other neighborhoods and their efforts is first needed to grasp the opportunity potential of cross-neighborhood relationships.
As discussed in a previous article, a critical mass of at least 12 million Americans is required to transform American democracy. Once the critical mass is achieved, the next challenge is maintaining it long enough to enable societal diffusion of pro-democracy norms and to coerce or co-opt political power brokers to enact policy change.
If the inter-movement community is unable to coalesce and cohesively facilitate the actions of the critical mass quickly enough, then momentum can quickly dissipate, sliding citizen participation back below the tipping point. While making ad hoc, cross-neighborhood connections is theoretically possible, pre-existing relationships increase the likelihood that the inter-movement community can coalesce before momentum is lost. Since research has found immense value in weak connections, not all relationships have to be particularly strong or intense, they just have to be formed.
While more cross-neighborhood relationships are being established every day, insufficient relationships currently exist to enable rapid, cohesive mobilization of the inter-movement community.
A second takeaway from Ukraine is that relationships between leaders are good but meaningful cross-organizational and cross-neighborhood relationships across all organizational levels is better. Relationships between staffs are often the glue between organizations and neighborhoods. Egos, personality conflicts, pressures from stakeholders, and the transitory nature of individuals lowers the likelihood of effective activation of community relationships in times of crisis or opportunity if all relationship-building eggs are put into the leader’s basket. In other words, leaders should encourage staff to develop relationships too and not attempt to own all organizational relationship-building.
Joint Capabilities and Practiced Interoperability
Partner nations were also able to quickly provide support to Ukraine because they had meaningfully worked together before. Prior to the invasion, NATO, Ukraine, and partners collaborated in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and frequent joint exercises – essentially a combination of inter-country scenario based planning and simulated joint tactics rehearsal – together.
As a result, participating countries had opportunities to develop joint capabilities and to practice and assess interoperability (the ability to work together across countries or other units of organizing). They were able to learn how to effectively work as a cohesive team and communicate with each other, including overcoming cultural, linguistic, and technical challenges. Additionally, they should have identified individual and combined strengths and weaknesses, thereby enabling finding solutions to vulnerabilities before the invasion.
With established joint capabilities and rehearsed interoperability, NATO and partner countries were better prepared to know what Ukraine lacked, to listen to what Ukraine wanted, and to coordinate assistance.
Although the threats and opportunities are different, the inter-movement community must similarly start by developing interoperability capabilities, such as funding for joint efforts and platforms for communicating, de-conflicting and coordinating efforts, and co-amplifying unified strategic messaging.
The inter-movement community must then practice collaborating using these interoperability capabilities. In a perfect world, the inter-movement community would host a large-scale, scenario-based simulation analogous to a joint military exercise to practice and assess interoperability. Barring that, cross-neighborhood efforts can be strategically designed to similarly practice and assess interoperability, which, Connor observes, is when organizations “discover who their important partners will be.”
Preparedness Breeds Resilience
The lack of preparedness for the pandemic by many governments and organizations revealed the importance of resilience – the "capacity to absorb stress, recover critical functionality, and thrive in altered circumstances."Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was somewhat foreseeable, a future president's attempt to dissolve congress akin to what recently happened in Peru, the coalescence of the “ missing mass pro-democracy movement,” the sudden pooled donation of $20 billion to strengthen American democracy, or any other unforeseeable, game-changing circumstance could occur any time. Practiced adaptability, goal and activity embeddedness, collaboration, pre-established relationships, rehearsed interoperability, and joint capabilities will prepare the inter-movement community to not just respond but to collectively thrive in any unforeseen situation like this.
Fortunately, collective preparedness is no less valuable even if these extreme scenarios do not happen. How much more effective is a local campaign to change democratic structures or reduce polarization when organizations across several neighborhoods are able to rapidly pool their expertise and resources? When the inter-movement community is prepared for collective impact, the entire ecosystem becomes more effective at everything.
In the words of George R.R. Martin, we are the knights of summer, and winter (or opportunity) is coming. Now is the time to prepare. Feel free to email Christen here to discuss how you can promote preparedness.



















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.