Jewitt is an associate professor of political science at Virginia Tech. Shufeldt is an associate professor of political science at the University of Indianapolis and a public voices fellow with The OpEd Project.
President Joe Biden has asked the Democratic National Committee to alter the presidential nomination calendar drastically for 2024. Notably, his proposal would remove Iowa from its coveted lead-off position by replacing the caucuses with the South Carolina primary, which would move up a few spots. Georgia and Michigan would be new additions to this early period. In addition to South Carolina, both New Hampshire and Nevada would retain their privileged early positions in the calendar, providing enhanced influence in the selection of the nominee.
The Democratic National Committee’s Rules and Bylaws Committee recently approved this proposal. As the full Democratic National Committee considers this proposal in February, it is important to consider the consequences of the proposal that makes it more complicated for voters and limits opportunities for meaningful participation.
We see two clear virtues in Biden’s proposal. The first is that the Democratic Party continues to move away from caucuses, particularly following Iowa’s difficulties in 2020. In 2016, 14 states held Democratic caucuses. In 2020, just three states utilized caucuses; the rest opted for primaries. Caucus participants need to be present at a specific time – so moving toward more primaries will give more voters a chance to participate. The gap in turnout between primary and caucus states is only likely to widen as states that utilize primaries can take advantage of vote-by-mail, early voting and other ideas that make voting easier.
The second virtue is Biden’s desire to “ensure that voters of color have a voice in choosing our nominee much earlier in the process.” Voters of color make up 40 percent of the Democratic Party’s supporters, but their influence has been diluted as Iowa and New Hampshire, the states that have held the first two calendar positions since 1972, are overwhelmingly white.
With its more diverse electorate, South Carolina’s primary catapulted Biden to the 2020 nomination after he underperformed in the initial states. Some see this calendar shift as a political reward for the Palmetto State, as there are other states that have large African-American populations and could also be future battlegrounds (e.g. Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia).
Promoting more participatory small-d democratic processes and elevating the voices of historically disenfranchised voters are both worthy goals. Yet, this might all be a moot point in 2024, as it appears that Biden will run for re-election and face minimal opposition to the nomination.
Whether this proposal bears out in 2024 or 2028, we believe it presents several areas for concern. Our first concern is Biden’s proposal to review the calendar every four years. In theory, this ensures no single state has an outsized influence and allows the Democratic Party to alter the calendar strategically to maximize its electoral fortunes. But frequently changing the process will only make it more confusing for voters who already struggle with the byzantine process.
A second related challenge is that this proposal would mean the start of the Republican and Democratic calendars will look quite different. Republicans have indicated that Iowa will remain first followed by New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina. Following the tumultuous 1968 Democratic National Convention, the Democratic Party rapidly changed its nominating procedures, due in large part to the national party strength and its dominance of state legislatures. With currently heightened partisan polarization and fewer state legislatures controlled by Democrats, the party can no longer expect to choose its preferred process and have the Republican Party conform. Instead, we will likely separate party processes that continually diverge. Independent voters will have to decide earlier which contest they want to participate in – limiting their choice. Confused voters will have to navigate two Election Days, deciphering when it is their turn to vote. Finally, in states where the government covers the cost, there will be important financial implications.
Finally, moving larger states earlier, and removing or diluting the influence of smaller states, will impact which candidates are successful. Without small states at the outset, lesser known candidates are unlikely to have the financial backing or the time to build the necessary momentum to stay in the race. Thus, the candidate pool will dwindle before most voters get to vote, limiting meaningful participation.
If the Democratic Party is prioritizing inclusiveness and participation, it needs to coordinate with the Republican Party. Changing the calendar every four years and moving forward as if the Republican Party is not also a key player in the presidential nomination process will create greater confusion. By simplifying the process and ensuring that both the Democratic and Republican primaries are held on the same date in each state, the parties can maximize participation in the process, which in turn will serve to select nominees who reflect the voters’ priorities and ideals.
image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.