Swift is director of government capacity at POPVOX Foundation.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision to strike down a cornerstone of administrative law known as the Chevron doctrine represents a seismic shift in the balance of power between the three branches of government.
After 40 years of relying on federal agencies to interpret legislative ambiguities when implementing regulations, it’s now up to courts to discern congressional intent. The Supreme Court did not “return” power to Congress, but it did put the onus on an under-resourced legislative branch to be much more clear in writing laws. If Congress fails to exercise its lawmaking power, it will cede power to the judiciary.
As the “first branch,” Congress must now reassess its ability to fulfill this increased responsibility effectively. A recent House hearing highlighted the urgency of this issue: Witnesses called for Congress to increase its resources to ensure that lawmakers can respond to the needs of constituents, engage in effective lawmaking and maintain robust oversight.
Even with a spotlight on its diminished capacity, the House began summer recess early after failing to pass its latest legislative branch appropriations bill, underscoring the difficulty in securing the necessary funding to strengthen congressional operations. Provisions to increase funding for member and staff salaries should not be controversial, but are typically dead on arrival, leading to chronic underfunding and a congressional “ brain drain ” that has crippled the institution.
After decades of underinvestment, Congress must rebuild its workforce and equip its employees with the tools they need. The legislative branch operates with roughly 1/120th of the resources of the executive branch. The legislative branch has only 31,000 employees across the House, Senate and support agencies with an annual budget of $7 billion, while the executive branch employs 2.97 million individuals and operates with trillions of dollars annually. Funding for congressional operations has not kept pace with other increases in government spending, causing further imbalances and resource constraints. Legislative branch appropriations have increased only 50 percent from fiscal 2001 to fiscal 2022 while non-defense discretionary spending grew by over 90 percent in the same period. And most increases in the legislative branch budget went to maintaining buildings and policing the Capitol rather than enhancing legislative capacity.
This constrained funding has taken a toll on the institution and its capacity. From 2011 to 2021, House staff salaries were effectively cut 20 percent when adjusting for inflation while the cost of living in the nation's capital significantly increased. And since the original Chevron decision in the 1980s, Congress has seen a 41 percent reduction in House committee staff and a 25 percent downsizing in critical support offices like the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office.
This decades-long lack of investment has also coincided with an increase in legislative activity and oversight. The number of legislative drafting requests to the House Office of Legislative Counsel has surged by 76 percent since the 115th Congress, while the number of proposed amendments has increased by 39 percent. Despite this growing workload, the Office of Legislative Counsel's operating budget has increased by only 17 percent when adjusted for inflation.
Congress must build on recent modernization efforts to enhance its capacity and reassert its legislative authority. To provide stability, Congress could mandate that annual legislative branch appropriations increase proportionally with non-defense discretionary spending each fiscal year. Implementing this policy beginning in fiscal 2025 would tie legislative funding growth to the overall growth in federal discretionary budgets. Excluding the Capitol Police funding from this proportional growth policy would account for its unique budget needs.
This approach would prevent legislative capacity from lagging and enable investments in staff, technology, operations and infrastructure to support congressional duties. Stable funding would allow congressional offices and agencies to better project budgets over the long term and — most importantly — fortify the first branch of government’s ability to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities.
The overturning of Chevron is a wakeup call for a Congress that has often found it difficult to invest in itself or hold its constitutional ground. The ball is on Congress’ court, but if lawmakers don’t step up, it will be the courts that run the game.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.