Its nickname has been the Fix Congress Committee, an unusually bipartisan effort by House members to make their workplace a bit more functional. On Thursday it wrapped up work by endorsing 40 more ideas — including on such politically dicey topics as Capitol Hill's spending on itself and lawmakers steering federal spending toward home.
The panel has been something of a pet project for good-government groups inside the Beltway, who engineered its creation two years ago, pelted it with ideas and prodded it toward consensus.
For these democracy reform advocates, the formula for quelling Washington gridlock and poisoned partisanship includes boosting a legislative branch that's fallen way behind in balance-of-power struggles — and that won't happen until Capitol Hill is a place where politicians and their aides actually want to work for more than a few years and have realistic hope of getting something done.
That's why the recommendations from the panel, formally the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, aim to "help the legislative branch reclaim its Article One responsibilities, reform the broken budget and appropriations process and ensure the people's house has the capacity to meet the needs of those we serve," Rep. Derek Kilmer of Washington, the committee's Democratic chairman, said after the meeting.
The proposals were all about the House, because two years ago the Republican-majority Senate declined to get involved in a similar self-assessment.
The recommendations by the panel, six members from each party, won't take effect until turned into a combination of leadership decisions, House rules changes or enacted legislation — meaning they will fade away unless an array of internal turf battles and partisan spats can be set aside. And, to preserve the panel's rare record of bipartisan accord, the sharpest edges of some of the more provocative proposals were sanded down to vagaries.
Nonetheless, the committee's final proposals touched on almost all the main problems lawmakers and experts identify as hobbling Congress.
To allow a possible revival of a collaborative legislative process in which all members participate, instead of only a handful of the most powerful, the panel would revamp the House calendar to guarantee time for more committee work — and have some staffers work for both parties.
To stanch the Hill's rapid brain drain, where aides routinely turn just a few years of underpaid experience into lucrative corporate or lobbying work, the panel would increase budgets for member offices while ending staff salary caps and enhancing some health and student loan payment benefits.
Arguably most importantly, the panel would move to revamp processes for routine budgeting and the allocation of federal funds, which have been almost completely useless for more than a decade pockmarked by government shutdowns and last-minute stopgap spending deals.
Beyond switching from writing a budget blueprint every year, which no longer happens any time there's divided government, to shooting for one in every Congress, the panel made a gentle but firm proposal for reviving a limited and more publicly transparent version of so-called earmarks, essentially line items in spending bills directing federal cash to parochial pet projects.
Lawmakers who secured such provisions — which were banned more than a decade ago on the somewhat unfair grounds that they bloated the budget with "pork" — tended to vote for the spending bills on which they caught a ride, one of the main reasons why annual budget bills used to draw solid bipartisan support. Reviving them, the theory goes, would make the budget process smoother and less partisan once more, and give members more buy-in to their "power of the purse" responsibilities.
Thursday's package was adopted by voice vote, ensuring the panel's record of consensus was preserved to the end, although Republican William Timmons of South Carolina made clear he was no fan of what the panel dubbed a new "Community Focused Grant Program."
Two earlier sets of recommendations, 57 in total, were largely embraced by the full Housein March but were focused on much less politicized matters — improving technology, modernizing personnel practices, streamlining antiquated bureaucracies and incubating some restoration of a bipartisan culture at the Capitol.
"You can have very divisive issues and still reach agreement if you take the time to listen and work things out," was the main lesson for Congress from the panel's work, said its top Republican, Tom Graves of Georgia.
"Our democracy is under incredible strain," added Jason Grumet of the Bipartisan Policy Center, one of the think tanks and advocacy groups behind the effort. "The committee's own resilience sets an example for the rest of Congress.
image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.