Goldstone’s most recent book is "On Account of Race: The Supreme Court, White Supremacy, and the Ravaging of African American Voting Rights."
The Roberts court’s record for safeguarding voting rights is hardly impressive. Rather than view access to the ballot box as fundamental to a healthy democracy, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority prefers to pretend that blatant attempts to deny the vote to poorer, nonwhite Americans are “political” activities and therefore beyond the purview of what Alexander Hamilton assured Americans would be the people’s branch of government.
Whether in Shelby County v. Holder, where Chief Justice John Roberts blithely disemboweled the 1965 Voting Rights Act, or more recently, when a 5-4 majority (which ironically did not include Roberts) refused to void an Alabama redistricting plan that minimized the influence of Black voters, the court has sided with an aggressive conservative base that aims to keep control of government by limiting the rights of groups that vote against them.
It therefore came as a bit of surprise when the court refused, at least for the moment, to grant emergency motions by Republicans in Pennsylvania and North Carolina to reinstate gerrymandered redistricting maps that had been disallowed by their state’s supreme courts. The Pennsylvania petition was rejected because the case was already being heard in federal court, but no such technicality existed in the North Carolina case.
Although the majority did not issue a written opinion, Samuel Alito wrote a dissent in which Neil Gorsuch and Clarence Thomas joined. Brett Kavanaugh accepted Alito’s reasoning but voted with the majority because he thought primary elections in the two states were too near at hand to be implementing a new districting map.
North Carolina Republicans advanced a novel and unprecedented argument, which Alito and his fellows accepted: Because Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution specifically states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ” (Alito’s italics), state supreme courts were not empowered to alter any redistricting plan approved by a state’s legislature.
“The applicants will be irreparably harmed if a stay is not granted because they will be deprived of their constitutional prerogative to draw the congressional map in their State,” he concluded. But Alito was forced to admit that the North Carolina court did not arbitrarily overrule the General Assembly; rather, it “justified its actions on the ground that the General Assembly’s maps constituted partisan gerrymanders and thus violated a congeries of state constitutional provisions.” (My italics.).
In other words, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that because its legislature had violated the state Constitution in drawing a discriminatory redistricting map, it had the power to declare it void, a power commonly referred to as “judicial review.” But Alito and his brethren countered that because that specific power is not granted to state supreme courts in Article I, Section 4, even the most egregious gerrymander should be allowed to stand. (One is forced to wonder if the dissenting justices would have been so cavalier if it had been Republicans who were being gerrymandered rather than Democrats.)
What Alito seems to have forgotten is that another court has assumed the power to act as a constitutional check on the legislature despite not being granted that power in the Constitution.
His.
The power of the Supreme Court to overrule Congress and either strike down a law or alter its application appears nowhere in Article III nor anywhere else in the Constitution. As the late Justice Antonin Scalia once noted, “The Constitution of the United States nowhere says that the Supreme Court shall be the last word on what the Constitution means, or that the Supreme Court shall have the authority to disregard statutes enacted by the Congress of the United States on the ground that, in the Court’s view, the statutes do not comport with the Constitution. It doesn’t say that anywhere in the Constitution. We made it up.”
Made it up indeed. At no point during the Constitutional Convention did the delegates come out in favor of allowing the Supreme Court to overturn a law passed by Congress and signed by the president. They did briefly discuss a “council of revision” wherein Supreme Court justices and the president would approve or reject bills passed by Congress, but that notion was rejected out of hand. In fact, the two most respected legal theorists of the day, William Blackstone and Baron de Montesquieu, both of whom had been widely read by the delegates, each counseled that the judiciary should never be able to overrule the legislature. Judicial review wasn’t backdoored into American jurisprudence until 1803, when Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison wrote, “It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”
But to Scalia, who often boasted of his “textualist” philosophy, Marshall’s convenient end run around the judiciary’s limitations was totally appropriate. “Now, we made it up very sensibly,” Scalia added, “because we reasoned that a Constitution is a law, sort of a super-law … and determining what the law means is the job of courts.”
Judicial review is now the most potent weapon in the court’s arsenal and no justice would dare suggest that it was inappropriately acquired. Nonetheless, Alito and his fellow dissenters would deny to states the very power that he and his fellow conservatives have wielded to such advantage in cases such as Shelby County and Citizens United.
Lest comfort be taken that Alito’s dissent was a minority opinion, Kavanaugh is anxious to revisit this issue in a future case and Amy Coney Barrett could hardly be considered a reliable advocate for voting rights and racial justice. It isn’t unlikely that when Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, both of whom for the moment seem anxious to demonstrate their appointments were not illegitimate, become more comfortable on the high bench, their seeming reasonableness and openness to alternative viewpoints will evaporate.
If that occurs, the United States will take yet another step back from free and fair elections and the democracy it claims to be.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.