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Foreign Influence vs. Foreign Interference in Elections
Apr 04, 2026
Working alongside election denier activists, the Trump administration is reportedly exploring how to use the power of the federal government to take over elections from the states. One of the justifications for this takeover is based on allegations of foreign interference in the 2020 presidential race.
Experts agree that there is no evidence of foreign interference in 2020, although there were instances of influence by countries such as Russia and Iran. Subsequent elections have been subject to a range of foreign influence efforts. Influence and interference are not the same, but President Trump and his supporters conflate the two concepts when raising the specter of foreign meddling in U.S. elections. This confusion is evident in a purported draft executive order that outlines how the administration may seek to violate the Constitution and federalize the administration of elections.
As the Brennan Center has pointed out, attempts by foreign actors or their proxies to sway American elections do not justify presidential intervention in election administration. The Constitution clearly grants the power to set election rules only to the states and Congress. The president has no role in running elections, even when the White House claims national security requires it to intervene.
If the federal government were actually interested in addressing foreign threats to U.S. elections, its proposed solutions would be very different. Instead, over the past year, the administration has made the nation more vulnerable to both influence and interference by foreign powers.
What is the difference between foreign influence and foreign interference in elections?
Election interference involves degrading or disrupting the ability of election administrators and election workers to conduct free and fair elections, while the broader category of foreign influence refers to a myriad of activities by foreign governments or their agents to sway the participants in elections, including candidates and voters.
In 2020, federal agencies began defining election interference and influence as separate actions with different warning signals and legal consequences. This distinction is particularly important for the federal government because its role in elections is largely limited to countering national security threats, not running elections.
Are foreign influence and interference in elections illegal?
Foreign interference in elections is generally illegal under multiple federal laws, but the legality of foreign influence activities is murkier.
Influence activities can involve forms of speech, such as social media posts, and many are designed to sway the target audience’s views. For example, during the 2024 election cycle, the U.S. Intelligence Community observed that “foreign actors . . . promote influence narratives seeking to undermine democratic institutions, foment discord, and/or change public opinion.” It also noted that foreign actors are relying on “witting and unwitting Americans to seed, promote and add credibility to narratives that serve foreign actors’ interest.”
Under the First Amendment, the government cannot limit Americans’ free speech or access to information, regardless of the source. However, it can expose the foreign source of the information when the intelligence is available and, in some cases, indict foreign actors for otherwise breaking U.S. law, such as hiding their role in sowing false election narratives and laundering money to sidestep U.S. sanctions.
Foreign Influence vs. Foreign Interference
Table with 3 columns and 7 rows. (column headers with buttons are sortable)| Definition | Election Influence | Election Interference |
|---|---|---|
| Legality | May be legal (lobbying, state media) or illegal (undeclared, coercive, subversive, or criminal) | Generally illegal, often a federal crime |
| Targets | People, preferences, and behavior | Technical and hardware systems |
| Tactics | • Sway public opinion • Shape voter preferences • Raise contentious voting issues to suppress or motivate voters • Mislead voters about the time, manner, and place of voting • Undermine confidence in election results or processes | • Cyber operations affecting a government’s ability to register voters, cast and count ballots, or report results • Cyber operations degrading a campaign’s ability to participate • Cyber or physical operations targeting election officials, poll workers, or polling places • Political assassinations • Military or security interventions affecting an election |
| Recent examples | • Russia’s Internet Research Agency social media campaign in 2016 • Iran’s hack and leak of President Trump’s 2024 campaign materials | • Russian intelligence agencies’ intrusion into state and local election boards in 2016 |
| Detectability | Difficult to detect, as: • Americans may unwittingly accept payment for using talking points sponsored by foreign governments or their agents • Distinguishing foreign operations from protected political speech is challenging Detection methods could include open-source analysis as well as reporting by financial institutions | Detectable, often through technical forensics, typically by a state or vendor investigation |
| Response mechanisms | Sanctions, indictments, removal from online platforms, public attribution of interference activities to foreign government or actor | All actions are subject to criminal referral, sanctions, public attribution, and potential cyber actions |
| Federal statutes implicated | • Foreign Agents Registration Act • Federal Election Campaign Act (ban on election contributions by foreign nationals) • Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act • International Emergency Economic Powers Act (through Executive Order 13848) | • Computer Fraud and Abuse Act • 52 U.S.C. § 30121 • International Emergency Economic Powers Act (through Executive Order 13848) • Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act |
Have foreign actors been held accountable for election influence operations?
Yes, the federal government has charged and sanctioned organizations and individuals for unlawful election influence.
In 2024, the Justice Department indicted two Russian nationals, Kostiantyn Kalashnikov and Elena Afanasyeva, for laundering money through a network of foreign shell companies to covertly fund a U.S. company that created content aligned with Russian government interests. The company, which news reports named as Tenet Media, sought to fund a number of media influencers in the United States and did not reveal its connection to the sanctioned Russian state–controlled organization RT (formerly known as Russia Today). The DOJ charged Kalashnikov and Afanasyeva with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act and conspiracy to commit money laundering. In addition, the Treasury Department sanctioned them for their ties to the Russian government.
Also in 2024, Iranian cyber actors sent stolen, nonpublic material associated with then-candidate Trump’s presidential reelection campaign to U.S. media organizations and to individuals associated with the Biden campaign. The Intelligence Community, the FBI, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) noted that Iran sought “to stoke discord and undermine confidence in our democratic institutions . . . including through the use of cyber operations.” The DOJ indicted those responsible, and the Treasury Department sanctioned them.
Although Chinese actors have not yet been formally charged for election influence activities, in 2024, the Intelligence Community assessed that China sought to influence congressional races — with no preference for party, possibly to protect its core interests in relation to Taiwan. The FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force led several investigations into the matter, including of individuals running an “overseas police station” that targeted Chinese Americans running for local office and researched election-related issues.
Have foreign governments interfered in any recent U.S. elections?
The only confirmed instance of election interference was in 2016, when Russia’s intelligence agencies hacked into election board infrastructure, including registration databases. The Department of Homeland Security assessed that the Russian agencies did not access voting tabulation systems. Additionally, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), conducted cyber operations targeting the personal email accounts of Democratic Party officials and other political officials, exfiltrating large volumes of data from the Democratic National Committee. In response, the Obama administration expelled Russian intelligence officials from their mission based in Washington, and the Trump administration’s DOJ indicted 12 GRU members for conspiracy to engage in computer fraud, money laundering, and identity theft.
There are claims that Iran and China interfered in the 2020 elections. But as the Center for Democracy and Technology summarized in its March 2026 report, there is no evidence of interference in the 2020 federal elections. There were, however, several instances of election influence by Iran, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, China. In July 2025, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Chuck Grassley (R-IA) released emails from the FBI indicating that China acquired fake driver’s licenses with the intent of casting fraudulent ballots. In the wake of this information, which is not a formal FBI product, the Intelligence Community has not yet revised its assessment from 2020 that it “did not identify China attempting to interfere with election infrastructure or providing funding to any candidates or parties.”
The Intelligence Community’s last report on the 2024 elections stressed that although foreign actors remained intent on using influence to undermine U.S. democracy, it had not uncovered any acts of interference. Despite a legal requirement to do so, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has not released the formal, unclassified assessment of the 2024 elections, which would provide the final summary of the community’s collective judgement regarding foreign threats. However, soon after the 2024 presidential election, then-director of CISA Jen Easterly echoed her predecessor Chris Krebs’s 2020 positive assessment of U.S. elections, finding that there was “no evidence of any malicious activity that had any material impact on the security or integrity of our election infrastructure.”
To be clear, foreign influence targeting Americans is deeply concerning, but the activities do not justify federal attempts to take over elections or to seize state election infrastructure or ballots from prior elections, as the FBI recently did in Georgia’s Fulton County.
What can be done to stop foreign influence?
The federal government has an advantage over state or local governments when it comes to attributing foreign influence actions to adversarial governments. Yet the second Trump administration has dismantled all the offices that once focused on detecting and combating foreign influence efforts, leaving states and localities alone in this fight. The administration should restore key offices, such as CISA’s Election Security Group and the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, which have successfully identified influence activity and held perpetrators accountable in the past.
Despite the amount of attention that President Trump and many of his supporters have given to past foreign influence operations, the Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment fails to even mention risks of election influence from foreign adversaries — a stark departure from recent years.
What can be done to stop foreign interference in U.S. elections?
Although the U.S. election system is highly decentralized, the federal government can use its money and intelligence capabilities to partner with state and local governments and ensure that they have the resources to identify, respond to, and recover from foreign interference, including cyberattacks on election infrastructure. This support should include free access to cybersecurity tools and assessments, funds to address identified security vulnerabilities, and information sharing about cyber threats among intelligence agencies, state and local officials, and private industry.
Following Russian interference in the 2016 election, the federal government created several structures to support election officials in protecting election infrastructure from physical and cyber threats. In 2017, DHS designated election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, allowing state and local governments to access a range of federal cybersecurity services, including continuous threat monitoring, vulnerability assessments, and security guidance. During the first Trump administration, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency was established within DHS to safeguard critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats. That same year, CISA founded the Election Infrastructure Information Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) to help coordinate information sharing between federal, state, and local entities to prepare for and respond to security threats, including foreign cyberattacks against election infrastructure. Within the Intelligence Community, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center — established in 2015 following a 2014 North Korean cyber attack on Sony Pictures — coordinated classified collection and analysis in support of DHS and FBI outreach to election officials.
Much of this work has been gutted by the second Trump administration. Earlier this year, for example, CISA terminated funding for the EI-ISAC.
The administration has also made drastic cuts to the cyber and physical security services that CISA previously offered to election officials, with current and former election officials from both major political parties expressing dismay about the lack of support as well as voicing concern that trust between the federal government and election officials has been eroded. At the same time it eliminated the Foreign Malign Influence Center, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence eliminated the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, reducing analysis and classified information sharing on cyber threats to election infrastructure.
Foreign influence and interference are each real and serious threats, but they are different problems that require different responses. Under no circumstances do they require a federal takeover of election administration, or investigations of ballots cast in long-settled elections. If the Trump administration wants to combat these dangers to democracy, it should rebuild the institutions and offices launched and supported during his first term, demonstrate transparency regarding foreign government actions, and rebuild trust with election officials.
Lawrence Norden is vice president of the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center.
Kate Lurie is a consultant with the Brennan Center who previously served as director of election security at the National Security Council.
Foreign Influence vs. Foreign Interference in Elections was first published on the Brennan Center for Justice and was republished with permission.
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Fixing Broken Systems: America’s Path Beyond Polarization
Apr 03, 2026
"A bad system will beat a good person every time" is a famous quote by Dr. W. Edwards Deming, the American statistician most often credited with the Japanese economic miracle after WWII. Even talented, hardworking people cannot overcome a flawed, dysfunctional, or unfair system, making system improvement more crucial than solely blaming individuals for failures.
Fixing “bad systems” is viewed by political scientists and reform organizations as the primary path to reducing America’s political dysfunction. Current systemic structures often create "misaligned incentives" that reward extreme partisanship and obstruction rather than governance. The most prominent electoral system reforms proposed by experts include:
Open or "Top-Four" Primaries: Replacing closed party primaries with non-partisan systems (like those in Alaska ensures that general election candidates must represent a wider spectrum of voters).
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV): This system allows voters to rank candidates by preference, forcing politicians to appeal to a broader base rather than just their partisan fringe.
Proportional Representation: States moving away from "winner-take-all" districts toward a proportional system would ensure parties earn seats based on their actual share of the popular vote, potentially breaking the two-party duopoly.
Ending Partisan Gerrymandering: Using Independent Redistricting Commissions instead of allowing politicians to draw voting maps can create more competitive elections and less extreme legislators.
Remedying the Winner-Take-All (WTA) Electoral College: Absent a constitutional amendment, fix unintended WTA practice that has created the polarizing battleground state phenomena.
Due to space limitations, this article will only deal with the Winner-Take-All (WTA) Electoral College, which has plagued the United States for over 225 years.
Modern implementation of the Electoral College violates the original expectations and designs of the U.S. Constitution's Framers in several key ways:
While the Constitution allows state legislatures to determine the method of choosing electors, the Framers did not mandate the winner-take-all system currently used by forty-eight states. This system causes concentration of campaign attention on a few "swing states" while rendering millions of votes in "safe states" effectively irrelevant.
The Framers envisioned electors as "dispassionate" and "wise" individuals who would exercise independent judgment to choose the best-qualified president. This transformation from deliberative agents to "party hacks" or rubber stamps has effectively eliminated the "wisdom" the Framers believed qualified them for the role.
By the election of 1796, it was clear that electors were operating as agents of political parties rather than independent actors. This shift toward hyper-partisanship directly contradicts the Framers' goal of a "transient" and "detached" body of electors.
Although the Framers initially rejected a direct popular vote due to logistical challenges, many argued that the system was still intended to be grounded in the "wishes of the voters."
Today, the system is fundamentally altered from the original expectations of the Framers by the emergence of political parties, state-level winner-take-all laws, and the reduction of electors to party agents rather than independent deliberators.
"Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come." -- Victor Hugo (1802-1885). With regard to the Electoral College, that idea is the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC).
NPVIC is an agreement among U.S. states and the District of Columbia to award all their electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the overall popular vote in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. It is considered a pragmatic, voluntary state-based initiative because it aims to ensure the winner of the national popular vote wins the presidency without requiring a constitutional amendment, operating instead within the existing Electoral College framework by utilizing states' constitutional authority to appoint electors. If enough states join the NPVIC to reach a total of 270 electoral votes, the United States will effectively shift from a winner-take-all (WTA) regime to a national popular vote system for electing the President.
With Virginia’s adoption, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been adopted by eighteen states and the District of Columbia, which collectively hold 222 electoral votes. The compact requires 270 electoral votes (a majority of the 538 total) to take effect. It currently needs forty-eight more electoral votes to become active.
In 2026, NPVIC will be a relevant issue in a number of state elections, particularly in Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. As the compact needs forty-eight more electoral votes to hit the 270-vote threshold, these purple or contested states are key battlegrounds where legislative control could determine whether they join the nineteen jurisdictions already signed on.
Without the "battleground state" phenomenon, the effectiveness and strategic deployment of money in U.S. politics would shift from concentrated, localized spending to a more diluted, nationalized, or purely proportional approach. Some models suggest that if a national popular vote replaced the Electoral College, the overall amount of money spent on advertising could decrease in typical elections, as the "winner-take-all" incentive to tip a single state with massive ad buys disappears. Instead of tailoring messages to specific regional interests, e.g., tariffs, in swing states, large donations would fuel national campaigns focusing on broad, national policy, potentially diminishing the ability of localized interests to use money to influence policy. In future presidential elections, broad national policy, it is likely to include affordability.
Hugh J Campbell, Jr, CPA, is a Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) professional and a student of W. Edwards Deming, the American Statistician, often credited as the catalyst for the Japanese Economic miracle after WWII.
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We Teach Prevention to Victims, Not Accountability to Power
Apr 03, 2026
Each time a major sexual assault case comes to light, the public conversation follows a familiar pattern. Awareness campaigns are launched. Safety tips are shared. People are reminded to watch their drinks, walk in groups, and trust their instincts. The focus quickly turns to what potential victims should do differently.
But the harder question remains: Why does sexual assault continue to happen on such a large scale?
Recent headlines make that question impossible to ignore. The world continues to grapple with the legacy of the Jeffrey Epstein case, which exposed how wealth, influence, and institutional failures allowed sexual abuse to continue for years despite repeated warnings. At the same time, new allegations involving César Chávez have forced communities to confront painful questions about power, loyalty, and silence within movements built on justice. Survivors in those cases have described years of fear, retaliation, and disbelief, underscoring a truth that extends far beyond any single individual.
Consider also the recent case in France involving Gisèle Pelicot. For nearly a decade, her husband drugged her and invited dozens of men to rape her while she was unconscious in her own home. Investigators later identified more than ninety assaults committed by multiple perpetrators over several years. This was not a stranger in a dark alley. This was a husband, a home, and a network of men who chose to participate. The case shocked the world, yet it reflects a pattern that has existed for generations.
Sexual violence is rarely random. Research from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention consistently shows that the perpetrator is often someone the survivor knows, such as a partner, coworker, neighbor, or family member. These environments are built on trust, authority, and power.
I wrote previously about prevention in trusted spaces and continue to stand by that recommendation. Prevention should be directed toward people known to us, not only toward strangers. But the second most important priority is accountability. Without accountability, prevention becomes a promise without protection.
The scale of sexual violence raises uncomfortable questions. Is the problem a lack of awareness or a lack of consequences? Is it a failure of education or a failure of systems to act when harm occurs? Sexual violence is not only about individual behavior. It is deeply connected to the misuse of power and control, particularly in environments where authorities go unchecked and reputation is protected.
To be sure, men can also be victims of sexual assault. Their experiences deserve recognition, support, and justice. Yet the reality remains that sexual violence is shaped by social structures that normalize dominance and entitlement. These dynamics often place men in positions of authority and influence, making them more likely to be perpetrators and making institutions more hesitant to hold them accountable. This is not an accusation against individuals. It is an acknowledgment of patterns that have persisted across generations.
Breaking the silence has become a rallying cry in recent years. Survivors who come forward are often described as courageous, and rightly so. Speaking about sexual violence requires extraordinary strength. But courage should not be a prerequisite for safety. Reporting harm should not feel like stepping into uncertainty without protection.
Many survivors never report sexual assault. Studies have shown that fear of retaliation, disbelief, stigma, and institutional inaction are among the most common reasons survivors remain silent. Silence is often interpreted as weakness or shame, but in many cases, it is a rational response to systems that have historically failed to deliver justice.
Recent revelations across sectors have reinforced this reality. In the Epstein case, records showed that warnings about abuse surfaced repeatedly before meaningful action was taken. In the emerging allegations surrounding César Chávez, survivors have described remaining silent for years out of concern that speaking out would harm a movement they believed in. These stories differ in context and geography, but they share a common thread: power without accountability creates risk.
The persistence of sexual violence is not evidence of moral failure among survivors. It is evidence of structural failure within institutions.
If society is serious about preventing sexual violence, safety can no longer be treated as an individual responsibility. It must be treated as an institutional obligation. Prevention cannot depend on survivors being vigilant. It must depend on systems being accountable. Policies alone do not create safety. Enforcement does. Action does. Consequences do. Institutions must do more than write procedures and conduct training. They must respond decisively when harm occurs. They must protect those who report misconduct. And they must accept responsibility when failures happen. Real prevention requires reporting systems that survivors can trust without fear of retaliation, consistent enforcement of policies regardless of status or reputation, leadership that is held responsible for safety outcomes rather than procedural compliance, independent oversight when misconduct is alleged, and consequences that are timely, transparent, and unavoidable. These are not aspirational goals. They are the minimum standards of any institution that claims to protect people. Safety is not created by awareness alone. Safety is created by accountability.
Sexual violence will not end through awareness campaigns alone. It will not end through training sessions or policy statements. It will end when institutions demonstrate that harm carries consequences and that power does not shield perpetrators from responsibility.
Prevention begins with education. It continues with accountability. It becomes real only when systems are willing to act.
Stephanie Whack is a survivor of domestic violence, an advocate at the intersection of victimization and homelessness, and a member of The OpEd Project Public Voices Fellowship on Domestic Violence and Economic Security. In 2024, she was awarded the LA City Dr. Marjorie Braude Award for innovative collaboration in serving victims of domestic violence.
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The Democratic Party - Missing in Action
Apr 03, 2026
The country has been suffering under the thumb of Trump now for more than a year. So much of our country and people's lives are in shambles because of his actions. He has broken his promises to his middle-class and rural supporters (see my article, "Listen Up, Trump Supporters!"). He has disabled government agencies that protect the people. He has not only taken America to war against Iran without much of an explanation or the approval of Congress, but clearly the war and all the billions that have been spent and will be spent have not and will not result in anything that improves the interests of the United States in the region, and may in fact worsen them.
Trump controls, in large part, by being the most forceful presence, not just in the United States but in the world. In his king-like demeanor, he constantly takes action to undermine or destroy the government's traditional roles; he is a congenital liar, and he is so revered by his followers that he controls the airwaves and the media. The Democratic Party—the loyal opposition—has had no forum to act since Trump has mostly side-stepped his totally subservient Congress in moving his policy agenda forward.
Individual Democratic politicians have certainly made statements about Trump's actions from the sidelines. But the Party itself has not developed a structured, regular format for providing the American people with a counterweight, to let them know its take on what is happening in Washington. It has been missing in action.
Since there is no anointed leader of the party at this point, it falls to the Party leadership, both in Congress and at the DNC, to create a media vehicle to provide this information to the people and to be a regular presence in their lives. Trump provides his information and is present every day. For the sake of the country and the Party, it must provide its information and presence regularly and dependably, probably weekly, with social media posts during the week.
There is precedent for such a media vehicle. I can't think of anything recent, but in the 60s, the Everett Dirksen/Charles Halleck show was the Republican answer to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. From the moment Kennedy took office in 1961 until Dirksen's death in 1969, the Republican leaders of the House and the Senate met weekly for a televised chat about what had been going on in the government over the previous week. Known as the "Ev and Charlie Show," it was well received and widely viewed and provided the Republican Party with a voice and presence when they were in the minority, as the Democrats are now.
This Democratic media vehicle must be more than a way to provide clear and focused criticism of Trump and his policies; the Party must use this forum to present to the people its vision of what the government should be doing to fulfill its various roles—including securing the rights of all people—grounded always in its take on our founding principles as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. And it must explain those principles clearly to the people because Trump and MAGA have fostered a perverted version of those principles. (See my articles, "Where Is the Democratic Party's Clarion Voice," and "The Far-Right's Biggest Lie.")
It could well be that disapproval of the war and high gas prices could result in Democrats winning both the House and the Senate in the upcoming midterm elections. But the party cannot leave that to chance. They must give people a reason to vote Democratic, rather than just registering disapproval of Trump.
Why? If Democrats win, they will have to present a united front against Trump's policies for the remaining 2 years of his presidency. They can only do that successfully if they have been given a mandate by the people. But their winning the election will only be considered a mandate for them if they have presented their proposals to the people. And so the election becomes not just a rebuke of Trump but an affirmation of the people's support for Democratic policy positions grounded in our founding principles.
Ronald L. Hirsch is a teacher, legal aid lawyer, survey researcher, nonprofit executive, consultant, composer, author, and volunteer. He is a graduate of Brown University and the University of Chicago Law School and the author of We Still Hold These Truths. Read more of his writing at www.PreservingAmericanValues.com
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