Goldstone’s most recent book is "On Account of Race: The Supreme Court, White Supremacy, and the Ravaging of African American Voting Rights.
With conservatives dominating the Supreme Court, originalism — once a fringe legal theory — now dominates the highest levels of the judicial branch.
As described by former Justice Antonin Scalia, originalism is a “manner of interpreting the Constitution to begin with the text, and to give that text the meaning that it bore when it was adopted by the people.” The most prominent devotee on the current court is Clarence Thomas, described by Federalist Society Co-chairman Steven Calabresi as “the leading originalist in the country” and “the Justice who’s written the most originalist opinions of any Justice who’s served on the Court.” Thomas’ five conservative brethren are not far behind.
As was Scalia, some originalists are also textualists. In a 1996 speech at Catholic University in Washington, D.C., he noted, “I take the words as they were promulgated to the people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words.” Although there are minor differences in the two approaches, best suited for law school seminars, both textualism and originalism argue that the words of the Constitution have an immutable, sacrosanct meaning, not open to creative interpretation by advocates of what antagonists sneeringly refer to as a “living Constitution.”
Originalism is not devoid of logic. There is an argument to be made that a system of laws should not change willy-nilly based only on how a particular judge or group of judges decide to interpret it on a particular day. To function effectively, a society based on the rule of law needs an accurate sense of what the law actually is.
But ignoring everything but language has its pitfalls as well. When Scalia urged his colleagues to “Go back to the good, old ‘dead Constitution,’” he seemed to overlook a couple of potential problems a language-in-cement approach might engender. One appears both in Article I, which covers the legislature, and Article II, the executive.
When describing who would be qualified to serve as a representative, a senator or a president, the Constitution specifically says “he.”
While for most, the pronoun is obviously an anachronism — we have “she” House members, “she” senators and were within a whisker of having a “she” president — the language presents a problem for originalists. Not only does the text specifically say “he,” but it was certainly the intent of the framers that men only should hold those offices. Even if it were not, as Scalia pointed out, “If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the intent.” The words, then, must stand on their own.
And so, originalists and textualists, forbidden from admitting that the Constitution does actually evolve, are forced to find some legal or grammatical basis to get past the absurdity of excluding women from national office only on the basis of a pronoun.
The first ploy is the “gender neutral pronoun” theory. Former law professor Robert Natelson, a senior fellow of constitutional jurisprudence at the Federalist Society, asserted, “We should be clear that the Constitution’s use of ‘he’ and its variants to refer to the president is of little evidentiary weight, since during the Founding Era, as in all modern history before the 1970s, those words served as standard pronouns of indefinite gender.” That sounds fine until one accepts both that “he” is not necessarily “indefinite” and that there is not a scintilla of evidence that a single “he” who drafted the Constitution would not have blanched at the thought of a woman running the country.
Natelson further posits that because some women were allowed to vote in New Jersey, the framers actually did anticipate women voting nationally. This is nonsense. He fails to mention that the women were almost exclusively widows who were only allowed to vote because of an unintended glitch in the New Jersey Constitution, and that appalled (male) legislators rectified the error when they redrew the state’s document in 1807.
The next move is to admit that women were indeed legally excluded in 1787, but subsequent legislation or jurisprudence overrode that meaning. That leads directly to the 19th Amendment. Surely, it is argued, that when women were granted the right to vote, the right to hold national office came with it. But voting is not the same thing as being qualified to hold office. Eighteen-year-olds can vote, but not be elected to Congress or become president.
The Supreme Court actually spoke on this question in 1875. In Minor v. Happersett the justices ruled unanimously that, while the 14th Amendment made all native-born women citizens — the amendment reads “persons” — and guaranteed them the same “privileges and immunities” of citizenship, the right to vote and (one must assume) the right to hold public office were not included. Therefore, while all national officeholders must be citizens, all citizens need not be eligible to be national officeholders.
In addition, as Natelson himself pointed out, “he” as a gender-neutral pronoun was as common in 1868 as in 1787, yet those who drafted the amendment chose not to use it.
And so, while originalists can try to squeeze their “neutral pronoun” and jurisprudential theories through the eye of a semantic needle, the fact remains that in this instance, neither the text, nor the accepted meaning, nor jurisprudence can prevent originalism from falling flat.
While the pronoun kerfuffle will have no practical impact on officeholding either locally or nationally, originalists understand that small words can have big consequences. If constitutional anachronisms indeed exist, how can originalists argue that, in all cases, 1787 language must rule 21st century America?
In fact, the “dead Constitution” that Scalia and his fellow originalists value so highly is an absurdity. Even Natelson admitted, “The framers of the federal Constitution sought to draft an instrument that would last for the ages.” It is difficult to see how a document whose meaning is frozen in time, that cannot adapt or be adapted to the drastic changes that time and progress inevitably engender, can be an instrument for any age except the one in which it was written.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.