Goldstone is the author of the forthcoming "Not White Enough: The Long Shameful Road to Japanese American Internment."
On Dec. 7, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Moore v. Harper, a landmark action in which a North Carolina legislator brought suit to void the state Supreme Court’s rejection of a blatantly partisan gerrymander by ruling it had violated the North Carolina Constitution. The state court found that the Republican-inspired redistricting plan deprived some voters — Democrats — of their guaranteed right “to substantially equal voting power on the basis of partisan affiliation.”
But the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision will extend far beyond North Carolina. It will determine whether the elections clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits any checks and balances review of even the most egregious attacks on voting rights if enacted by a state’s legislature.
The passage, in Article I, Section 4, states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.” The plaintiff, in effect, wants to insert “only” to make the clause read “in each State only by the Legislature thereof.”
The ramifications of the decision are immense. Moore v Harper was described by conservative icon and former appeals court Judge J. Michael Luttig as “the most important case for American democracy in the almost two and a half centuries since America’s founding.” He added that refusing to allow a state’s Supreme Court to decide whether a partisan gerrymander was in violation of a state’s constitution “would be antithetical to the Framers’ intent, and to the text, fundamental design, and architecture of the Constitution.”
The plaintiff was advocating what has been called the “independent state legislature theory,” promoted by, among others, John Eastman, the man who also urged Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to certify the 2020 Electoral College results in Congress. The independent state legislature theory, until recently a fringe argument never taken seriously by American courts, is an offshoot of the “stolen election” argument and came to the fore when allies of then-President Donald Trump claimed legislatures were empowered to appoint alternate slates of electors who could cast their votes for Trump, regardless of the outcome of the popular vote.
During the oral arguments, it was no surprise that the plaintiff received his most sympathetic reaction from conservatives, especially those titans of fair play, Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. Alito, author of the Dobbs decision and a finalist for hypocrite of year, was, without irony, deeply critical of the North Carolina Supreme Court for partisan excess. But “it was only Justice Neil Gorsuch who seemed entirely comfortable with the Moore lawyer’s argument,” according to Democratic attorney Marc Elias.
It might, then, be a good idea to introduce Gorsuch and some of his colleagues to a man who recognized the enormous risk to democracy in removing any check on the ability of state legislatures to set the rules for elections — James Madison.
On Aug. 9, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were considering a draft of what would become the elections clause: “The times and places and the manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States.” The ensuing debate concerned whether or not the national legislature should indeed have the power to dictate election rules to the states. Some delegates wanted to remove national oversight, but Madison saw great peril in that. He rose and objected.
“It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the [states’] discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce; should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place; should all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district. These and many other points would depend on the Legislatures and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mold their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the National Legislature.”
Although Madison was not addressing whether state courts were allowed to have oversight authority under state constitutions, the broader question concerns whether any political body should have the absolute right to create an unfair electoral system that would be both self-serving and jiggled to be self-perpetuating. Madison’s answer was an emphatic “no,” and the delegates clearly adopted that view as evidenced by the painstaking care they took in leaving no authority unchecked.
Certainly, as Alito pointed out, a court might overstep its bounds and inject its own politics into the legislative process. (Who would know better than he?) In a democratic society, there is always a risk of abuse of power, which is why power must be diffused and not entrusted exclusively to any branch. In North Carolina’s case, the state Supreme Court — like the U.S. Supreme Court — is empowered to decide whether the legislature’s action comports with its constitution. To remove that oversight runs the very real risk of turning a two-party system into a one-party system.
As Madison also wrote in Federalist 47, “The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Most Supreme Court justices. past and present, claim to revere Madison and often evoke him as a preeminent authority on both the Constitution and a democratic form of government. Justice Gorsuch and his conservative bedfellows should listen to him now.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.