Dixon is an associate professor of practice in negotiation and conflict resolution at the School of Professional Studies at Columbia University.
In the United States, despite significant recent public conversations around how to prioritize public safety budgets in cities and towns across the country, political rhetoric and media coverage are frequently reduced to a rather simplistic debate: defund police departments or increase their budgets. Either you’re against the police or you’re for them.
I’m not staking a position in this debate, a complex and important discussion that has already received significant attention in policy and academic circles. Rather, I’m interested in a different question: What are the consequences of this polarized debate on broader discussions around what it means to be safe in America? One answer — the one I’m exploring here — is that it’s taking up a lot of room, stealing oxygen from other important discussions about safety while, probably, making us less safe.
Reducing public safety to simply policing is wrong, because safety involves a whole lot more.
After the pandemic, following some of the largest racial justice protests the country has ever seen, many cities began discussing how public safety budgets should be spent. Some called this “reimagining public safety,” including Oakland, Calif. These visions emphasized the importance of civilian-led and community-based wellbeing and prevention-focused strategies, recalling a multidimensional vision of safety that is emphasized in public health approaches and reinforced by my own team-based research in Oakland. From this perspective, safety is as much about social trust and economic opportunity as it is about responding to crime.
When you talk to folks who experience high levels of crime, violence and policing in their communities about what it means to be safe, the picture that begins to emerge is complex. My colleagues and I held dozens of these conversations in diverse neighborhoods across Oakland. At first, people will talk about what might come to mind for anyone who is asked, “What does safety look and feel to you?”
Initial responses include feeling comfortable enough to walk alone at night, holding your bag draped over your shoulder instead of clutched in front of you, crossing the street without fear that a speeding car will ignore the stop sign. But then the conversation starts to develop. The physical environment comes up, including trash and broken bottles on the street, along with more indirect signs of crime and violence like hearing distant gunshots, seeing helicopters or watching police cars fly by. Finally, the conversation turns to topics not typically associated with “safety”: gentrification, racism, social trust, neighborly relations, intergenerational relations and more.
Embracing complexity
In the field of conflict resolution, we like to think in terms of complexity. Complexity science tells us that conflicts are more like systems than debates over positions. Actors in conflict with each other often stake out polarized positions — you’re either for the police or against them — but the actual dynamics of conflict systems are far more diverse, nuanced and complex than these visible positions reveal.
In conversations about public safety, the polarized debate over policing can mask the diversity of stakeholders who experience crime and injustice in their everyday lives, as well as the diversity of how they experience this injustice. Put simply, in heavily policed communities in the United States, different people can feel differently about the police — and about safety more broadly — depending on their experiences. Because of this, people can also hold contradictory feelings at the same time: needing to feel protected by a police force that responds when there is danger, but also to feel respected by a force that acts justly when it does show up. The positions that show up in public often stem from these kinds of more deeply held needs, which are more nuanced and, importantly, more useful for identifying solutions.
This is the second lesson from a complexity perspective. When we recognize the full diversity of needs and experiences in a system, we can start to see entry points that likely don’t show up when we only pay attention to actors’ positions. Sometimes these can be single strategies tailored to individual needs — adding more street lights around a park, for example, or installing speed bumps. Often, however, they need to be multilayered and multidimensional to really make an impact. This is because complex systems sustain themselves through processes known as feedback loops, which can accelerate or ameliorate conflict, and which require multipronged approaches to disrupt or strengthen.
Moving forward
We have seen how community members’ own perceptions of what safety and the lack of safety look and feel like in everyday life can combine to paint intricate pictures of these feedback loops in practice.
For example, as after-school programs are cut, older generations are incarcerated, youth self-medicate to deal with trauma, and skills-building programs in schools are eliminated, we can start to see a feedback loop that pushes youth toward criminal activity. Alternatively, where children can stay out late playing on their blocks, people can access secure housing, neighbors are able to mediate disputes despite their differences, and neighborhoods come together through sports and block parties, we can see a feedback loop that promotes social cohesion and trust.
All of these can be targeted through policy interventions and resolution strategies. But rarely are they seen as public safety policy. If we accept that safety operates as a system — where some feedback loops combine to increase crime, violence, deprivation and exclusion and others are propelled by community resources, social cohesion and public investment — thinking of safety as a question of policing alone does not make us safer.



















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.