Goldstone’s latest book is “Not White Enough: The Long, Shameful Road to Japanese American Internment.” Learn more at www.lawrencegoldstone.com.
It is unlikely that the phrase “be careful what you wish for” is often applied to those very few Americans who are chosen to become the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, but John Roberts may be well on his way to being the exception.
When the fifty-year-old Roberts assumed the center chair on the high bench in 2005, the youngest man to hold the post since his idol, the legendary John Marshall, he did so with high aspirations, nothing less than to walk in Marshall’s giant footsteps.
He spoke glowingly of Marshall’s ability to promote harmony by being “convivial,” and taking “great pride in sharing his Madeira with his colleagues.” A naturally collegial man, Roberts resolved to, “use his power to achieve as broad a consensus as possible.” But he did not intend to be a pushover. Roberts was also well aware that Marshall’s bonhomie went side by side with an iron will, which resulted in a disproportionate number of unanimous verdicts.
During his confirmation hearing, Roberts, in a baseball metaphor later employed by Samuel Alito, noted, “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.”
He prided himself on both adhering to the law and bridging ideological divides. “If I’m sitting there telling people, ‘We should decide the case on this basis,’ and if [other justices] think, ‘That’s just Roberts trying to push some agenda again,’ they’re not likely to listen very often.” He said this with the obvious belief that, with nine reasonable people sitting in the room, he could achieve results in which justices of one ideology could respect the opinions of those of another. “Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around,” he insisted.
The stakes for a man as steeped in history as John Roberts were high. Supreme Court eras are always discussed and evaluated in terms of the chief justice. It was the “Marshall Court,” or the “Taney Court,” or the “Warren Court.” And it will be the “Roberts Court.” He bears a burden that even the most prominent associate justice—Oliver Wendell Holmes or John Marshall Harlan or Antonin Scalia or Ruth Bader Ginsburg—does not. As he noted ruefully in an interview in 2007, “It’s sobering to think of the seventeen chief justices; certainly a solid majority of them have to be characterized as failures.” That the Court’s most notorious decisions, such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, are inextricably linked with their presiding chief justice provided all the incentive Roberts needed to use his vaunted social skills to avoid the same fate.
As a result, the last thing the consensus conscious Roberts would have expected was that during his tenure the Supreme Court’s approval rating would sink to its lowest level in history and the Court—his Court—would be seen by a majority of Americans as partisan, ideologically corrupt, and more of a political body than a judicial one.
Among his other woes, Roberts has recently been forced to deal with the leak of a draft opinion in a volatile abortion case, revelations that Ginni Thomas was actively involved in the conspiracy to overthrow the 2020 presidential election, and calls for an investigation of Clarence Thomas’s failure to report hundreds of thousands of dollars in gifts from a right-wing megadonor. One can only imagine how stunned and dismayed Roberts is at these unthinkable developments.
So precipitous has been the Court’s fall from grace, that one can almost feel sorry for the beleaguered chief justice.
Almost, but not quite.
Whether or not Roberts is willing to admit it, even to himself, he sowed the seeds of his present dilemma by ignoring his own dicta and adopting a political, transparently partisan agenda. To extend his umpire analogy, Roberts used a far different strike zone for each team. That he was subsequently stunned when his agenda was appropriated by a group of justices more political and more radically partisan than he is no one’s fault but his own.
Roberts’s majority opinions in two key cases highlight his willful blindness to the Court’s skew to the extreme right. In the first, Shelby County v. Holder, he ruled that key provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional, thus allowing Republican-controlled states to enact legislation that would restrict the ability of Democratic-leaning voting blocs, especially African Americans, to successfully register to vote. Literally the day after he issued his ruling, a number of red states did precisely that, a trend that has continued unabated with Roberts either unaware or unconcerned that he had promoted the very sort of racial preferencing that the nation has been struggling to eliminate since the end of the Civil War.
In the second case, Trump v. Hawaii, Roberts was forced to justify a challenge to what every American over six years old knew was a politically motivated travel ban aimed at Muslims, most of whom Donald Trump had implied with his usual subtlety harbored anti-American values or were out-and-out terrorists. Sensitive to the inevitable criticism that his opinion would be compared to Korematsu v. United States, the notorious 1944 decision that legitimized the forced internment of 120,000 totally innocent Japanese Americans, Roberts wrote, incredibly, “ Korematsu has nothing to do with this case,” because, he claimed, Korematsu was openly racist, whereas his opinion was based solely on national security grounds.
Critics found that statement ludicrous, because Roberts, like Hugo Black in Korematsu, “danced around and downplayed the openly racist context from which the government’s exclusion order emerged.”
Roberts’s capitulation to conservative ideology was not restricted to his own opinions. He concurred in other decisions that stacked the political deck in favor of conservatives, such as Citizens United, District of Columbia v. Heller, and even Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.
Perhaps he has gotten the point, at least a bit. Although there is no way to know for certain, it is likely that Roberts lobbied vigorously during the Court’s deliberations on the mifepristone emergency petition for the Court not to add to the widespread outrage over Dobbs by becoming what would amount to a shadow FDA. If so, that would be an indication that to save his legacy, he realizes he needs to navigate back to the center, where he should have been all along.
Sorry Mr. Chief Justice. Too late.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.