Muller is a Bouma fellow in law and professor of law at the University of Iowa.
As states across the U.S. enact new laws relating to elections, there have been efforts to capture, in aggregate, the effects of those laws. Reports, found in both journalism and advocacy group statements, that new election laws will "restrict" voting or have an "anti-voter" effect misrepresent what many of the laws will do.
On July 14, a story in The Washington Post described what it called"voting restrictions," citing figures from a website called the Voting Rights Lab, and noted that "17 states had enacted 32 laws with provisions that tighten rules for voting and election administration." The Voting Rights Lab describes itself as working to "build winning state legislative campaigns that secure, protect, and defend the voting rights of all Americans."
The Brennan Center for Justice, a nonprofit with a goal"to reform, revitalize, and when necessary, defend our country's systems of democracy and justice," offered a July 2021 "roundup"to assess "the full impact of efforts to suppress the vote in 2021." The roundup concluded that "at least 18 states enacted 30 laws that restrict access to the vote," a figure cited by Vice President Kamala Harris in comments on the anniversary of the Voting Rights Act.
Classifying a law as a voter suppression, as a voting restriction or as a tightening of a rule for voting involves judgment. It anticipates the future effect of a law, and it concludes that the law will have a negative effect.
As a scholar of election law who has examined the statutes that have been lumped together as "voting restrictions," I have found that while some could fairly be given that label, many are ordinary rules of election administration that simply don't merit those labels. Many bills will likely have no discernible effect, much less a negative effect, on the right to vote.
Routine procedure
Utah's House Bill 12, for instance, was enacted unanimously by both houses of the Utah Legislature.
Utah's bill updates a law about how to remove dead people from the list of registered voters. It increases the communication surrounding death certificates to election officials, and it requires the state election administrator to submit Social Security Administration data about those who have died to county clerks so that clerks may remove them from the list of registered voters.
The Brennan Center lists this as a law that restricts the right to vote; the Voting Rights Lab describes its effect as "unclear." But this is not a voter purge statute, which can remove living voters from the voter roster. It only removes dead people from the list. It is a routine update to election administration.
Voting trends reflected
States also updated laws about the size of polling places. The trend toward increased absentee voting and early voting means fewer voters visit the polls on Election Day. Some states have moved toward "vote center" models, in which voters are no longer assigned to a single polling place and instead have more geographic flexibility in choosing where they vote. As these other forms of voting increase, the traditional precinct model no longer needs to be as small as it is. Slightly larger precincts allow states to shift money to these other forms of voting opportunities.
The Nevada Legislature unanimously agreed, after hearing only support from county election officials, to increase the potential maximum size of a precinct from 3,000 voters to 5,000. County officials can keep smaller precincts as appropriate. The bill closes no precincts. Counties in Nevada have moved toward vote centers, which allow voters to go to any polling place within the county. But this law, Senate Bill 84, was labeled "anti-voter" by the Voting Rights Lab and a "restriction" by the Brennan Center.
New York's Assembly Bill 7478 is similar, increasing the potential maximum size of a precinct from 1,150 voters to 2,000. The old rule had been built around the physical limitations of lever-operated voting machines, as these voting machines could accommodate only 1,000 voters. The machines have been phased out in favor of optical scan ballots, and polling places can now accommodate more voters. The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 148-0, and the Senate 55-8. The Voting Rights Lab called it "anti-voter."
'Much less dramatic'
Other bills target how elections are funded. The coronavirus pandemic brought increased costs for mailing ballots and administering a safe election. Grants, including $300 million from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, were distributed to states and localities to help with the new administrative burdens.
But the decision of a private grantor to give money to some jurisdictions raised questions about whether such efforts were politically motivated and would affect voter behavior and election results. Before the election, reporter Ken Vogel at The New York Times wrote about concerns that private subsidizing of elections "raises new legal and political questions."
State legislatures have responded. Arkansas, Arizona, Idaho, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas all enacted new laws regulating or prohibiting private funds for election administration, such as buying equipment or paying personnel. Ohio included the rule as a small part of an appropriations bill that passed with wide bipartisan support. The Voting Rights Lab labels all seven laws "anti-voter."
These efforts to label a law as pro-voter or anti-voter, then to lump those votes into a round number of "voter suppression" efforts, miss important details and context.
Too often, the label is inaccurate. Certainly, with some laws, the effect on voters is going to be more significant. Litigation in Georgia over Senate Bill 202, for instance, reveals strong differences in opinion about the bill's effects.
But it is important to detail what a new law does and not simply offer a conclusion that is really an allegation about it.
When they are examined closely, the effect of many of these new election laws is much less dramatic. A label like "restriction" or "anti-voter" should be used when it's likely that a voter's experience is materially altered to make voting more difficult. My examination of these bills suggests that none of them rise to that level.
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image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.