Last week, GOP Rep. Lauren Boebert made Islamaphobic remarks suggesting a Democratic colleague, Rep. Ilhan Omar, might be a terrorist. When the two spoke Monday, the conversation quickly devolved and the war of words continued as each later told her side of the story.
But perhaps their conversation could have been more positive, more productive, if the two lawmakers had the benefit of counsel from experts in civic discourse and bridge building.
The Fulcrum reached out to such professionals to see how they would have guided the conversation.
Boebert had already raised the ire of many on the left by referring to Omar as part of the “jihad squad,” a play on the self-styled “squad” of House progressives who include Omar, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortes and others.
But over the weekend, things escalated following the release of a video in which Boebert recounted getting in an elevator with Omar.
“I look to my left, and there she is. Ilhan Omar. And I said, ‘Well, she doesn’t have a backpack, we should be fine,'" said Boebert, who aded that it was “not my first 'jihad squad' moment."
The two spoke on Monday, but the conversation grew heated and ended abruptly.
But experts in civil discourse believe a different approach could have led to a more positive outcome. Four such people shared their thoughts with The Fulcrum.
Bruce Bond, co-founder and CEO, Common Ground Committee:
“Apologies that aren’t perceived by the receiver as heartfelt never work. Neither do they work when the receiver decides to use the situation to demand more than the apologizer is prepared to give at that moment. When those things are part of the apology conversation the situation is likely to become more contentious, which is exactly what happened. That is unfortunate as the opportunity was there to set the foundation for building a working relationship that over time could have benefited both individuals and therefore the country.”
Kristin Hansen, executive director, Civic Health Project:
"When intense conflict arises between two individuals, repairing that conflict may require a lengthy process, not just a one-off interaction. Ideally, the parties will try to spend time together in person, either 1:1 or supported by a third party who can help mediate the interaction. Multiple interactions may be needed, with the aim of building rapport, trust, and warmth over time. Importantly, and this is the really hard part, both parties must be firmly committed to focusing on the relationship itself, not on ‘scoring points’ or achieving outward goals in the public sphere. Jumping to demands or ultimatums too early in this process can damage any fragile gains in the relationship."
Carolyn Lukensmeyer, former executive director, National Institute for Civil Discourse:
“Unfortunately, this phone call was doomed from the outset as the intent of both parties was clearly to get the other party to change their behavior. In an already polarized, divisive situation that intent is unachievable and will predictably escalate the situation.
“For two people who are already at such deep odds, the only approach that might work would be genuine curiosity that would lead to understanding more about what has brought the other person to hold their views. What in their life experience leads them to believe what they believe. So the goal would be mutual understanding rather than behavior change.
“Again, the possibility of this in such a public process where insults have been shared before is highly unlikely.”
Manu Meel, CEO, BridgeUSA:
“According to reports, the phone call exchange between Rep. Boebert and Rep. Omar ended abruptly because Rep. Omar claimed that Rep. Boebert refused to ‘publicly acknowledge their hurtful and dangerous comments.’ Meanwhile, Rep. Boebert claimed that Rep. Omar was demanding more than what was warranted. This is an example of the involved parties having different expectations when entering a heated dialogue. A more effective approach to this call should have involved both parties attempting to clearly understand each other's perspective. By recognizing the value systems that underpin people's actions and beliefs, we are more likely to approach a conversation with the intention to understand and accommodate, rather than to incite and win.”
image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.