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Supreme Court Ruling Offers a Glimmer of Hope for the Rule of Law

Opinion

Supreme Court Ruling Offers a Glimmer of Hope for the Rule of Law
Getty Images, David Talukdar

Tuesday, February 25, was a good day for Richard Glossip and the American people. On that day, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial for Glossip, who has been on Oklahoma’s death row since 1998. It also showed that even a MAGA-friendly court would still defend the rule of law when official misconduct was sufficiently egregious.

As CNN notes, “The Glossip case is arguably the highest-profile death penalty case to reach the court in years.” The decision was a surprise given the Court’s previous enthusiastic defense of death sentences and its willingness to turn the other cheek when confronted with cases in which public officials pushed to and beyond the limits of legality.


Still, some might be tempted to dismiss the significance of the Glossip ruling because of its seemingly unique characteristics. But in today’s environment where the viability of constitutional guardrails is being questioned, the Court sent a signal that there are still lines that public officials should not cross and kinds of behavior it will not tolerate.

As I have said previously, in that environment, we should celebrate even small victories for the rule of law.

When President Trump says, “He who saves his country violates no law,” he expresses the “ends justify the means” mentality that today challenges or re-orients legality. That mentality helps explain why he thinks he can do what needs to be done and that necessity is the touchstone of legality.

Recall the claim made in 2022 by Rusell Vought, the newly installed Director of the Office of Management and Budget, “We are living in a post-Constitutional time.” As he explains what it means to live in “a post-Constitutional time,” Vought observes: “Our constitutional institutions, understandings, and practices have all been transformed, over decades, away from the words on the paper into a new arrangement—a new regime if you will—that pays only lip service to the old Constitution.”

Vought argues that the Left has waged a successful “slow-moving revolution.” The result is that “the Constitution we live under is not the one that our Founders gave us, and the Left understands this.”

The Constitution we live under now favors what Vought calls “the permanent ruling class in a capital city divorced from the everyday concerns and wishes of the American people themselves….The scary part is that this regime is now increasingly arrayed against the American people. It is both woke and weaponized.”

Vought calls on “dissidents of the current regime” to do the work of “envisioning, articulating, and defending what a Radical Constitutionalism requires in the late hour that our country finds itself in, and then to do it.”

The “late hour” is the key phrase here. It anticipates the president’s portrait of himself as the country’s savior.

Respecting the rule of law is not what saviors do.

As political theorist Michael Walzer explains, political messianism is the readiness to ‘force the End’…to act politically for ultimate purposes….” They “take deliverance into their own hands…and effectively rule out the requirements of morality and prudence. When the stakes are this high, it is implausible to demand any sort of restraint.”

So what does this messianic attitude have to do with Richard Glossip and the Supreme Court?

Glossip was convicted and sentenced to death for arranging the murder of his boss at the Oklahoma City motel where he worked. He allegedly enlisted a man named Justin Sneed to kill his boss, which Sneed did using a baseball bat to bludgeon him to death.

A horrible, gruesome crime demands a response. The state must provide one.

In the Glossip case, that meant doing what was necessary to convict him and Sneed. It required using Sneed to provide the key testimony implicating Glossip.

It turns out that the testimony Sneed provided was riddled with lies. That in itself would have been a reason to doubt the reliability of Glossip’s conviction.

But for Justice Sonya Sotomayor, who wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, a more serious problem was that “the prosecution knew Sneed’s statements were false as he testified to them.” Sotomayor branded that prosecutorial misconduct.

Writing in the SCOTUS Blog, Amy Howe summarizes Sotomayor’s position this way: “Under the Supreme Court’s 1959 ruling in Napue v. Illinois… prosecutors violate the Constitution when they knowingly obtain a conviction using false evidence – either by soliciting false testimony or allowing false testimony to stand without correcting it.”

“When that happens,” Howe notes, “the defendant is entitled to a new trial if there is a reasonable chance that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s decision.”

And that is what the Court ordered for Richard Glossip.

Prosecutorial misconduct of the kind that occurred in Glossip’s case is a recurring problem in death cases across the country. And, as the Death Penalty Information Center reports, “a sizable portion of all death sentences that have been imposed since 1972 have been overturned because of prosecutorial misconduct.”

Add the Glossip case to that list.

There are many reasons prosecutors might skirt the law in their quest to obtain convictions in death cases. Among them are the public pressure to hold someone responsible for a gruesome crime, professional incentives, and personal ambition.

But the one I’d like to highlight here is the messianism that Walzer describes and President Trump has brought to the Oval Office. Professor Lawrence Marshall captures it when he observes that among prosecutors in capital cases, “there's a feeling that…. It's legitimate to bend the truth sometimes when you were doing it with—' the greater good’--in mind.”

People opposed to the death penalty often ignore or downplay this messianic motivation. And, of course, I cannot know what role it played in the behavior of Richard Glossip’s prosecutors.

But we need to see the world through their eyes to understand what they did in his case.

For the Supreme Court, however, their motivation did not matter. The Court insisted that whatever motivated them, the prosecution in Glossip’s case violated his right to due process. This, as Sotomayor put it, “imposes ‘the responsibility and duty to the correct’ false testimony on’ representatives of the state.’”

Today, many see the current Supreme Court as “lawless” and bemoan its inclination to choose the result it wants to achieve while turning the law into a pretzel to achieve it. That is why it was refreshing to see Chief Justices John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh join with the Court’s three liberal members in the Glossip case.

While extrapolating from one case or context to another is risky business, the Glossip decision should send a message to prosecutors in capital cases and to the president and Attorney General Pam Bondi. The Court will give you a lot of latitude, but it will have the last word on how you exercise that latitude.

That is what Chief Justice John Marshall envisioned in 1803 when it said it is the job of the Court to “say what the law is.” And that is what constitutional government requires if it is to survive.

Austin Sarat is the William Nelson Cromwell professor of jurisprudence and political science at Amherst College.


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What Is No Longer Legal After the Supreme Court Ruling

  • Presidents may not impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The Court held that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate … importation” does not include the power to levy tariffs. Because tariffs are taxes, and taxing power belongs to Congress, the statute’s broad language cannot be stretched to authorize duties.
  • Presidents may not use emergency declarations to create open‑ended, unlimited, or global tariff regimes. The administration’s claim that IEEPA permitted tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and scope was rejected outright. The Court reaffirmed that presidents have no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs without specific congressional delegation.
  • Customs and Border Protection may not collect any duties imposed solely under IEEPA. Any tariff justified only by IEEPA must cease immediately. CBP cannot apply or enforce duties that lack a valid statutory basis.
  • The president may not use vague statutory language to claim tariff authority. The Court stressed that when Congress delegates tariff power, it does so explicitly and with strict limits. Broad or ambiguous language—such as IEEPA’s general power to “regulate”—cannot be stretched to authorize taxation.
  • Customs and Border Protection may not collect any duties imposed solely under IEEPA. Any tariff justified only by IEEPA must cease immediately. CBP cannot apply or enforce duties that lack a valid statutory basis.
  • Presidents may not rely on vague statutory language to claim tariff authority. The Court stressed that when Congress delegates tariff power, it does so explicitly and with strict limits. Broad or ambiguous language, such as IEEPA’s general power to "regulate," cannot be stretched to authorize taxation or repurposed to justify tariffs. The decision in United States v. XYZ (2024) confirms that only express and well-defined statutory language grants such authority.

What Remains Legal Under the Constitution and Acts of Congress

  • Congress retains exclusive constitutional authority over tariffs. Tariffs are taxes, and the Constitution vests taxing power in Congress. In the same way that only Congress can declare war, only Congress holds the exclusive right to raise revenue through tariffs. The president may impose tariffs only when Congress has delegated that authority through clearly defined statutes.
  • Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Balance‑of‑Payments Tariffs). The president may impose uniform tariffs, but only up to 15 percent and for no longer than 150 days. Congress must take action to extend tariffs beyond the 150-day period. These caps are strictly defined. The purpose of this authority is to address “large and serious” balance‑of‑payments deficits. No investigation is mandatory. This is the authority invoked immediately after the ruling.
  • Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (National Security Tariffs). Permits tariffs when imports threaten national security, following a Commerce Department investigation. Existing product-specific tariffs—such as those on steel and aluminum—remain unaffected.
  • Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Unfair Trade Practices). Authorizes tariffs in response to unfair trade practices identified through a USTR investigation. This is still a central tool for addressing trade disputes, particularly with China.
  • Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Safeguard Tariffs). The U.S. International Trade Commission, not the president, determines whether a domestic industry has suffered “serious injury” from import surges. Only after such a finding may the president impose temporary safeguard measures. The Supreme Court ruling did not alter this structure.
  • Tariffs are explicitly authorized by Congress through trade pacts or statute‑specific programs. Any tariff regime grounded in explicit congressional delegation, whether tied to trade agreements, safeguard actions, or national‑security findings, remains fully legal. The ruling affects only IEEPA‑based tariffs.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court’s ruling draws a clear constitutional line: Presidents cannot use emergency powers (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, cannot create global tariff systems without Congress, and cannot rely on vague statutory language to justify taxation but they may impose tariffs only under explicit, congressionally delegated statutes—Sections 122, 232, 301, 201, and other targeted authorities, each with defined limits, procedures, and scope.

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