Howard's research focuses on the history and politics of U.S. social policy. He is the author of The Hidden Welfare State (1997) and The Welfare State Nobody Knows (2007), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. He was one of three co-editors for The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Social Policy (2015). His current book project is a comprehensive map of the social safety net, public and private. He is also a member of the Scholars Strategy Network.
Despite the enormous toll of the COVID-19 pandemic, child poverty in the United States declined. According to the government’s supplemental poverty measure, which is more accurate than the official measure, child poverty rates dropped almost by half from 2020 to 2021.
A temporary expansion of the Child Tax Credit (CTC) was a big reason why. Millions of low-income families benefited by the refundable portion of the CTC became available to all. (These families typically owe little in income taxes, so nonrefundable tax credits are not much help.) These changes were not extended beyond 2021, largely due to congressional Republicans. Low-income families are now experiencing more hardships, and valuable progress against child poverty has been lost.
Advocates have been trying, so far unsuccessfully, to revive the expansion. Much of the debate has focused on the impact of a larger CTC on work effort and the federal budget deficit. While those issues are important, advocates should also pay attention to party politics. According to many observers, support for a child tax credit has long been bipartisan. Everyone wants to be “pro-family.” What, then, explains the unwillingness of Republicans to preserve the CTC expansion? Their recent behavior is part of a larger pattern. Since the mid-1990s, Republicans have consistently embraced a child tax credit—as long as middle-and upper-income families were the main beneficiaries.
Creating the Child Tax Credit
The National Commission on Children recommended a refundable $1000 Child Tax Credit in 1991. This money was intended to help a wide range of families. The commission, created by President Reagan, was truly bipartisan. Nevertheless, this proposal stalled under President George H. W. Bush.
Then came Newt Gingrich and the “Republican Revolution.” Republicans took control of Congress and pushed for a $500 nonrefundable Child Tax Credit. They also wanted to make it difficult for low-income families to claim both this tax credit and the Earned Income Tax Credit —a strategy that favored tax cuts for the haves, not income support for the have-nots.
To win Republican votes, President Clinton and congressional Democrats agreed in 1997 to make the new Child Tax Credit nonrefundable for most families and to link eligibility to the Earned Income Tax Credit. Among all taxpayers who claimed the Child Tax Credit in 2000, just 18 percent had incomes below $30,000, and they received 10 percent of the total benefits.
Expanding the Child Tax Credit
Initially, President George W. Bush appeared to be an exception to the Republican trend of constraining the CTC. He increased the maximum Child Tax Credit benefit and made it partly refundable for low-income families in 2001. Even so, taxpayers with less than $30,000 of income received just 15 percent of the total benefits in 2004; this suggests that Bush’s CTC increases were part of a larger political objective to disguise the regressive nature of his other tax cuts.
Low-income families fared better under President Obama. The Child Tax Credit was modified twice in 2009, once in 2010, and again in 2012. By 2016, taxpayers earning less than $30,000 accounted for approximately one-third of CTC recipients and benefits. Republicans in Congress tried to reverse those gains, to no avail.
President Trump’s biggest domestic policy victory was the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, enacted in 2017 without Democrats’ support. Trump took credit for a major expansion of the Child Tax Credit, which doubled in size. This fact alone, however, obscures the biggest winners of this policy shift. By 2020, taxpayers earning less than $30,000 represented 23 percent of CTC recipients and collected just 15 percent of the benefits—a big drop compared to 2016. Over this same period the share of benefits going to taxpayers with incomes above $100,000 jumped from 18 to 41 percent. This result was predictable given that the income limit for eligible families increased significantly (e.g., from $110,000 to $400,000 for married couples filing jointly). The strong tilt in favor of affluent families was widely noted at the time. Republicans, who expressed the belief that low-income families could get help from other government programs, appeared to view this change as a feature, not a bug.
The historic expansion of the Child Tax Credit in 2021 happened despite Republican objections. As the Associated Press noted at the time, “Republicans charge the move amounts to an expansion of the welfare state that will disincentivize parents from seeking work.” They also worried about budget deficits, taxpayer fraud, and subsidizing single-parent families. Republican officials were a lot less concerned about these issues when expanding the CTC for upper-income families.
The Bottom Line
Although the Child Tax Credit has enjoyed bipartisan support for three decades, Democrats and Republicans have often disagreed over which families should benefit. Those differences did not disappear with the pandemic. The history of this benefit reveals that Republican officials have cared more about cutting the taxes of affluent families than reducing child poverty.
Unless Democrats have unified control of government (or the country experiences another crisis), it is unlikely that the Child Tax Credit will be restored to its 2021 condition. Advocates looking to help low-income families under divided government might need instead to pursue incremental changes to the CTC or the EITC or look to legislation at the state level.
This writing was originally published through the Scholars Strategy Network.



















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.