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With Assad out, this is what we must do to help save Syria
Dec 20, 2024
This was a long day coming, and frankly one I never thought I’d see.
Thirteen years ago, Syria’s Bashar Assad unleashed a reign of unmitigated terror on his own people, in response to protests of his inhumane Ba’athist government.
Over the course of the civil war, he unabashedly committed the worst atrocities imaginable — barrel bombing schools and hospitals, torturing children and the elderly, releasing sarin gas on toddlers and infants. His war on his own people is estimated to have killed 500,000 Syrians, 50,000 of them children. Upwards of 35,000 have been “disappeared” or imprisoned. Millions more have been displaced.
For 13 years, a small cohort of journalists, war reporters, aid groups, and lawmakers tried everything we could to not let these atrocities go unnoticed or forgotten. But it often felt like screaming into a void of indifference.
That indifference is the world’s burden to share, and will always be a tragedy on top of a tragedy — inexplicable, indefensible, unforgivable.
But now that Assad the Butcher is finally gone, we owe it to the Syrian people to correct our moral failures.
The unexpected fall of Assad has brought Syrians hope for the first time in more than 50 years, but it also opens the door to some potentially dangerous unknowns that must be addressed by world leaders. There are two immediate concerns: Assad’s chemical weapons and the state’s Captagon production.
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Assad used chemical weapons, including sarin and chlorine barrel bombs, against his own people on multiple occasions. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has spent more than 10 years trying to determine exactly which ones the regime still possesses, with no luck. Now is the time to find them and hold Assad accountable for their use, and more importantly, dispose of them properly so they don’t end up in the hands of terrorist factions circling Syria.
Similarly, Captagon is a dangerous synthetic stimulant that’s been mass-produced and trafficked in Syria by the Assad regime since the war began and Syria’s economy imploded. The drug brought in billions for Assad. But Syria cannot rebuild as a narco-state, and containing Captagon is a national security and public safety must.
Then, Syria will need, well, everything — the rebuilding of schools, roads, and hospitals; a functioning government; the means by which to welcome back millions of refugees; protection from vulture groups looking to exploit the new vacuum.
We not only have a role to play in all of this; it’s in our own economic and national security interests to ensure Syria’s rebirth as a democratic partner in the region. And we have the leverage to do it.
In April 2011, the U.S. issued its first sanctions against Syria and many more followed. Eventually, the U.S. would prohibit any new investment in Syria, embargo its oil, impose travel bans, freeze the assets of a number of Syrian entities and persons, and prohibit the export of any U.S. goods and services. The European Union, Australia, the Arab League, Turkey, as well as multiple non-EU countries would follow suit, plunging Syria into economic darkness.
Along with our allies, we should engage in talks to lift these sanctions, and in fact pour resources back into Syria under a checklist of conditions. Syria must draft a new constitution. It must conduct democratic elections. It must release all prisoners of war. It must allow refugees to return home. It must allow outside agents to dispose of its chemical weapons and Captagon.
There is so much more that a new Syria will have to do to regain its stability and economic footholds, to rebuild its infrastructure, to heal its people. It has a long road ahead, after suffering down a long road of Assad’s terror.
We don’t need to send troops, nor do we need to envision our role as nation builders. This isn’t a heavy lift for the U.S., nor will it put incoming President Trump in a politically compromising or “interventionist” position. We have a golden opportunity to help give the Syrian people what they’ve long been demanding and deserve — a free and fair democracy. That’s good for Syria, and good for America and our allies.
We can’t go back and intervene when perhaps we should have. We can’t bring half a million innocent people back to life. We can’t undo the torture and horrors Bashar Assad brazenly unleashed on his people for years. And we can’t wash the stain of indifference off of our hands.
But we can help Syria rebuild. And after years of inaction and apathy, it’s quite simply the least we can do.
Cupp is the host of "S.E. Cupp Unfiltered" on CNN.
©2024 S.E. Cupp. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.Keep ReadingShow less
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Will DOGE promote efficiency for its own sake?
Dec 19, 2024
This is the first entry in a series on the Department of Government Efficiency, an advisory board created by President-elect Donald Trump to recommend cuts in government spending and regulations. DOGE, which is spearheaded by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, has generated quite a bit of discussion in recent weeks.
The goal of making government efficient is certainly an enviable one indeed. However, the potential for personal biases or political agendas to interfere with the process must be monitored.
As DOGE suggests cuts to wasteful spending and ways to streamline government operations, potentially saving billions of dollars, The Fulcrum will focus on the pros and cons.
We will not shy away from DOGE’s most controversial proposals and will call attention to dangerous thinking that threatens our democracy when we see it. However, in doing so, we are committing to not employing accusations, innuendos or misinformation. We will advocate for intellectual honesty to inform and persuade effectively.
The new Department of Government Efficiency, an advisory board to be headed by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, is designed to cut resources and avoid waste — indeed to save money. Few can argue this isn't a laudable goal as most Americans have experienced the inefficiencies and waste of various government agencies.
However, any administration, whether Republican or Democrat, that wants to implement measures to improve federal efficiency needs some account of how efficiency is related to other moral values that are central to democracy and what the trade-offs are between different values and policies.
Efficiency is best regarded as an instrumental value, whereas liberty (and equality) are best regarded as intrinsic values. If the federal government strives to promote a particular view of economic liberty, then there are clearly more or less efficient ways to do so. Yet the public deserves to know what precise view of economic liberty is being promoted — and what concept of economic equality is also being promoted.
Given recent comments by Musk and Ramaswamy, it is difficult to not be skeptical about the personal bias and extremist view of economic liberty that is implicit in what they are proposing. In an interview with Maria Bartiromo last month, Ramaswamy said DOGE will pursue major reductions in the federal bureaucracy that could result in some agencies being shuttered. "We expect certain agencies to be deleted outright," Ramaswamy said. "We expect mass reductions in force in areas of the federal government that are bloated. We expect massive cuts among federal contractors and others who are over-billing the federal government."
Rather than starting with bold conclusions before the process has even started, the parties involved should acknowledge that different moral conceptions give different places to the value of efficiency. Moral conceptions do not all have the same structure, in the same way that houses do not all have the same structure. The public needs to know what moral values underlie the purpose of DOGE.
Some meat and potatoes political and economic theory would help the roll out.
Very conservative economic positions in the liberal tradition — classical liberalism and laissez-faire economics, Robert Nozick's political philosophy, and Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman's economic philosophy — put efficiency on a pedestal. That’s because free markets and basic economic liberty are promoted, and promoting these values relies heavily on efficiency.
Thus implementing a laissez-faire economy requires that the federal government plays a modest role in the economy overall. Above all, it ensures that contractual rights are upheld and individual political and civil liberties are not denied. For the economy to lead to full employment and economic growth, in this view, it is therefore necessary for wages and prices to be determined by the free market without intrusive government rules, regulations and a system of redistributing income and wealth.
The government needs to be efficient and so too do businesses in particular need to be efficient. Products need to be produced and services need to be rendered in efficient ways.
Liberal democratic views on the progressive side, on the other hand, hold that efficiency does not achieve the same level of importance and that the federal government should be called upon to intervene in the private sector. This intervention is necessary in order to redistribute income, wealth and power so that the least advantaged improve their economic position and those in the middle do also.
To the progressives — like John Rawls, whose 1971 book “A Theory of Justice” is a landmark statement of a broadly egalitarian democratic system of government — although civil and political liberties are to be promoted equally, economic goods are not. Social and economic inequalities, Rawls argued, would be "arranged so that they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" and also "attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."
For the progressive, or even centrist, we must be watchful that efficiency doesn’t become the end of actions by the federal government. In truth, even Donald Trump and his team must regard efficiency as a means to an end. Still, the public, and presumably Congress and possibly the courts, needs to know what the end of the federal government is.
As DOGE moves forward, the architects should heed the words of management guru Peter Drucker: “I am not in favor of big government. I am not in favor of small government. I am in favor of effective government.”
Anderson edited "Leveraging: A Political, Economic and Societal Framework," has taught at five universities and ran for the Democratic nomination for a Maryland congressional seat in 2016. Nevins is co-publisher of The Fulcrum and co-founder and board chairman of the Bridge Alliance Education Fund.
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The true Trump threat
Dec 18, 2024
Many Americans fear what Donald Trump will do after assuming the presidency in January — and understandably so. Trump's pathological self-absorption has no place in American government, let alone at its very top.
But the specific type of threat Trump poses is often misunderstood. Like all presidents, his domestic powers are limited. He will face stiff resistance at the federal, state and local levels of government.
For instance, as we've already seen with Trump’s first choice for attorney general, Matt Gaetz, the Senate can and will reject some of his Cabinet nominees. The Republicans’ very slim House majority, moreover, means Democrats can stymie Trump's legislation with support from just a few Republicans. Federal and state courts, for their part, have ruled against Trump consistently — and will continue to do so. Even Trump's own executive branch departments, like the Department of Justice, will again resist his most brazen initiatives.
That's not to say Trump won’t score some wins. He will appoint conservative judges, roll back important regulations, knock the tax rate down a few percentage points, accelerate deportations (though not at the level he's promising) and so on. Elon Musk might even get some federal employees canned. And for those on the wrong side of these policies the consequences will matter.
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But the limits on what Trump can achieve domestically are significant. And much that he does accomplish can be rolled back or neutralized by Democrats in the future.
Foreign policy, however, is a different story. This is where the potential consequences are biggest and where the bells often can't be unrung. This is where Trump, like all presidents, has the fewest checks on his power. This is where the true Trump threat resides.
Trump will soon be commander in chief of the military and America's head of state. In the foreign policy arena, he won't need Congress to pass legislation to make a major impact. Nor will he need thousands of federal bureaucrats to implement his biggest policies. With few exceptions, the courts won't be able to reverse a thing he does.
Even express constitutional restraints on the president in foreign policy no longer apply. The president has usurped the role of Congress in declaring war against other nations. While Article I of the Constitution says that Congress (not the president) has the power “to declare war,” presidents since Harry Truman have repeatedly waged war without congressional declaration.
Trump will, indeed, be largely unrestrained in the international sphere. Yet the world he inherits is as complicated as ever. The Middle East is fractured with war, blood is spilling in Russia and Ukraine, North Korea's weapons cast a shadow across the globe, populist unrest throbs globally and China's military gets stronger every day.
Having Trump's volatile hand stirring this pot — with few checks to restrain his impulses — is exponentially more dangerous than whatever legislation a razor-thin Republican majority can muster in Congress. As president, Trump can call Vladimir Putin any time. He can confront Xi Jinping on social media before breakfast. He can belittle Kim Jong Un publicly on a whim.
Trump's supporters like to highlight that there were fewer wars when he was president than there are today. This may be true. But it's quite a stretch to credit Trump for this outcome. His diplomatic unpredictability increases the likelihood of international conflict. That his first presidency avoided war bears little on what comes next.
Many Americans myopically follow the daily political drama in Washington. That's where the cameras focus and where retweets propel partisan spats into viral frenzies. This is a mistake. Trump's MAGA tentacles will reach far beyond our national borders. His stage will be the world.
America's domestic checks and balances neutralized Trump the first time he was president. They will again. With foreign policy, on the other hand, the Republicans’ volatile champion will once again be unrestrained.
Cooper is the author of “How America Works … and Why it Doesn’t.”
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How a director of national intelligence helps a president stay on top of threats from around the world
Dec 13, 2024
In all the arguments over whether President-elect Donald Trump’s choice for director of national intelligence is fit for the job, it’s easy to lose sight of why it matters.
It matters a lot. To speak of telling truth to power seems terribly old-fashioned these days, but as a veteran of White House intelligence operations, I know that is the essence of the job.
The director of national intelligence is the president’s principal adviser on intelligence, though the CIA director has remained somewhat co-equal in that role. The director of national intelligence is responsible for both the President’s Daily Brief, where the most crucial and sophisticated intelligence is presented, and for the work of the National Intelligence Council. Most of the President’s Daily Brief items are still done by the CIA, but the director of national intelligence or their deputy briefs the president, daily in most administrations but one or two times a week in the first Trump administration.
The issues in those briefings lean toward the immediate and tactical: What is the situation on the ground in the Ukraine war? If action X is taken, how will Russian President Vladimir Putin respond? But intelligence strives to push presidents and their colleagues to think more strategically: What are the implications of hypersonic missiles? What is the trajectory of the relationship between Russia and China? What are China’s geostrategic objectives, and what is the role of the Belt and Road Initiative in that vision?
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9/11 led to intelligence changes
The current director of national intelligence is Avril Haines, who is my friend and former colleague from when she was the deputy national security adviser in charge of the National Security Council policy committees and I was chair of the National Intelligence Council, providing the intelligence support to those committees.
As director of national intelligence, Haines sits atop the 17 agencies that make up what is called the U.S. intelligence community. She does not run those agencies. Nor does she have full control of their budgets.
Rather, the director of national intelligence coordinates them, which sometimes seems like the proverbial herding of cats. She assembles a combined budget for intelligence, but many of the big agencies, such as the National Security Agency, which makes and breaks codes and intercepts signals of interest, belong to the Pentagon.
The creation of the director of national intelligence position was a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The report of the 9/11 Commission was vividly damning about the failures of communication between agencies in the run-up to 9/11. In meetings in New York that summer, CIA and FBI officers were literally unsure what they could tell each other: The former wondered whether the FBI people were really cleared to hear this, while the latter feared that talking might blow a case they were working on. That lack of coordination played a role in letting the plotters slip through intelligence, often in plain sight.
The result of the commission’s work was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which created the director of national intelligence position.
Before that, the director of central intelligence wore two hats, as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and loose coordinator of the broader intelligence community. Hardly surprisingly, directors of central intelligence spent most of their time running the CIA, for that was the source of their troops – and their troubles when they arose. A score of blue-ribbon panels over 50 years had recommended breaking the director of central intelligence’s conflict of interest – coordinating agencies and their budgets while running one of them – and creating a director of national intelligence position.
James Clapper, the director of national intelligence for whom I worked as chair of the National Intelligence Council, constantly emphasized “integration.” Across agencies, integration mostly means talking to each other and sharing information. This works against the natural tendency to scoop your colleagues.
Across disciplines, integration means better aligning what information intelligence agencies collect with what analysts need.
How integration works
If presidents want to know what the CIA thinks about a particular issue, they can simply ask. Usually, though, the question is what does the intelligence community think, and then the question goes to the National Intelligence Council, the director of national intelligence’s interagency group for intelligence analysis.
The National Intelligence Council is organized like the State Department, with officers for regions and functions. Once a question has been presented, the relevant national intelligence officer will convene his or her council colleagues from the other agencies. They will argue about the answer to the question, a process sweetly called “coordination,” then agree on the answer. If need be, the process can be done in a few hours. Major strategic analyses – national intelligence estimates – like one done in 2022 on the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic out to 2026, may take months. In all cases, though, the analysis carefully records where there are differences of view in the intelligence community.
In my last year chairing the National Intelligence Council, of the 700 or so analyses we did, about 400 were responses to questions – called “taskings” in governmentese – from the national security adviser or one of the deputies.
National intelligence officers are national experts from inside or outside federal government, and their deputies – the heart and soul of the NIC – are all assigned from intelligence agencies. The largest number come from the CIA, but I worked with a cyber analyst from the Secret Service and a wonderful analyst from the New York Police Department.
Resolutely nonpolitical stance
What was striking then and has struck me both times I’ve had the privilege of running a U.S. intelligence agency is the dedication of the officers. They work for the nation, not for a political party or ideology. As chair of the NIC, I had no idea of the politics of my people, save for the several closest to me. For them, telling truth to power is not a slogan. It is what they do. They are always worried about “politicizing” – producing an assessment to suit a policymaker’s preference or, worse, being pressured to do so.
The president’s daily briefers, for instance, give up a year of their lives to come to work at 4 a.m., learn their briefs and then fan out across Washington to brief senior officials. They like being “on the team” of the person they brief, but they become uncomfortable if the conversation turns political. The director of national intelligence sets the tone for that resolutely nonpolitical stance and polices it through principles articulated in the agency’s analytic integrity and standards. As chair of the NIC, for instance, I’d receive regular assessments of both the quality of our analyses and whether we risked becoming “politicized.”
For their part, do politicians and agency leaders like it when their pet projects are assessed by intelligence as unwise or infeasible? Of course not. I’ve been on that side of the intelligence-policy divide as well. But the United States is much the better for it.
Treverton is professor of practice in international relations at the USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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