IVN is joined by Nate Allen, founder and Executive Director of Utah Approves, to discuss Approval Voting and his perspective on changing the incentives of our elections.
Podcast: Seeking approval in Utah


IVN is joined by Nate Allen, founder and Executive Director of Utah Approves, to discuss Approval Voting and his perspective on changing the incentives of our elections.
In my previous article, I wrote about TK, a lawful permanent resident who has lived in the US for 61 years and now faces possible deportation. I questioned whether immigration enforcement could coexist with fairness, compassion, and respect for the lives people have built in this country.
Since then, I have learned something equally troubling. The legal proceedings are only part of the ordeal. What happens outside the courtroom can be just as devastating.
The greatest threat may not be deportation itself, but the financial and emotional destruction that occurs while waiting for the government to decide someone's future.
I support the necessity of immigration enforcement and the government's responsibility to uphold the law. But enforcing the law should not require dismantling a person's family, livelihood, and financial security before that person has had a meaningful opportunity to present his case.
Unfortunately, that is what TK is experiencing.
Consider the simple act of making a telephone call. Communicating with TK has become an almost impossible exercise. The audio is frequently distorted, conversations are barely intelligible, and important information must be repeated over again until we can piece together what was said.
These are not casual conversations. We are attempting to make decisions involving attorneys, employees, financial obligations, contracts, and the continued operation of a business.
In an age when people can communicate instantly across the world, a reliable telephone connection with someone in federal custody should not be an extraordinary expectation.
Accessing the systems used to deposit money for basic necessities has been another ordeal. Failed transactions, inaccessible accounts, and repeated administrative obstacles consume time, money, and patience.
But perhaps nothing illustrates the broader consequences more clearly than what has happened with our banking relationships.
Following a security alert, our bank sought verification from TK. Under ordinary circumstances, resolving the matter might have required a brief conversation or even a simple text message or security PIN. Instead, his detention turned normal banking into a devastating ordeal.
The bank ultimately notified us that it was terminating its relationship with the business, affecting nine accounts including TK’s personal accounts.
Think about that for a moment.
An established company with employees, contractual responsibilities, and ongoing financial obligations suddenly faces the loss of the banking services necessary to function. A family that can no longer get access to the family bank accounts.
We have attempted to navigate the situation and maintain legitimate business operations, but the experience has left us feeling that once immigration detention becomes part of the equation, financial institutions would rather distance themselves from the complications than help resolve them.
I cannot say whether immigration detention influenced the bank's decision. Financial institutions have legitimate security responsibilities. But the practical result is unmistakable: a business already struggling with the absence of its owner now faces another potentially devastating obstacle.
And the consequences do not stop with TK.
Employees still need to be paid. Contractors still have obligations. Families still have mortgages, groceries, and expenses. None of those responsibilities disappear because someone is sitting in a detention facility waiting for a hearing.
Every additional week places more pressure on people who have done nothing wrong.
Which brings me to a question I have found increasingly difficult to ignore.
Who actually benefits from a system that takes so long and makes everything so difficult?
Detention facilities receive funding. Private contractors provide services. Telephone systems collect fees. Attorneys must be compensated. Administrative processes continue, and the financial meter keeps running.
There is an entire economy surrounding immigration detention. I do not question the need to pay for legitimate services, but I do question whether the system has sufficient incentives to resolve cases quickly and efficiently.
Because while everyone else continues collecting payments, the families caught in the middle are gradually running out of money or cannot access it at all.
I have begun to wonder whether the exhaustion is simply an unfortunate consequence of the process or whether it serves a purpose.
What happens when an individual has a legitimate legal defense but can no longer afford to pursue it? What happens when the attorney bills accumulate, the bank accounts close, the business begins to fail, and the family reaches its financial breaking point?
At some point, voluntarily leaving the country may begin to look less like a choice and more like the only remaining means of ending the ordeal.
You do not necessarily have to deny someone their legal rights to prevent them from exercising those rights. You can make the process of exercising them so financially and emotionally exhausting that surrender becomes the easier option.
I am not claiming that this is the deliberate objective of immigration authorities. But whether intentional or not, the pressure is real, and its effects are devastating.
TK has spent virtually his entire life in America. His family, businesses, relationships, and responsibilities are here. Regardless of the eventual legal outcome, those connections should not be unnecessarily destroyed while his case proceeds through the courts.
A system committed to justice should be measured not only by its ability to enforce the law, but also by its willingness to administer that law fairly, efficiently, and without inflicting unnecessary hardship on people who are not even parties to the proceedings.
I am not asking for special treatment. I am asking why ordinary communication, basic financial transactions, and maintaining a functioning business have become extraordinary challenges simply because someone is detained.
And I am asking who is accountable when those failures cause lasting damage that is unrepairable.
There is a profound difference between someone choosing to leave America and someone being financially exhausted into giving up the right to remain.
When the cost of seeking justice becomes greater than a person's ability to endure it, the process itself becomes the punishment.
And no American should be comfortable with that.
Spencer Ross is the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of TerraKross Building Contractors & Developers, LLC.
San Francisco called itself “the City That Knows How.” The razing of the Fillmore asks what officials knew about the people whose neighborhood they were changing. Federal money helped finance local redevelopment, while families and businesses bore displacement. We should trace that money and preserve residents’ accounts before another promise of improvement escapes scrutiny.
The Fillmore remains a center of Black cultural life. Black, Japanese and Jewish communities helped shape the neighborhood, its businesses and music. People remain, and people remember. Redevelopment damaged relationships that a construction budget could neither measure nor replace. Its history belongs to surviving residents and their descendants as well as official archives.
Western Addition A-1 was established in 1956. Federal urban renewal financing supported the City’s Redevelopment Agency, which used eminent domain to acquire property and clear land. Geary was widened into an expressway. Compensation could price a building; it could not reproduce the customers, friendships and informal help that made a neighborhood work.
How much public money financed this process? The Agency’s successor records an estimated $16.2 million temporary federal loan for A-1, including $13.3 million for property acquisition. The acquisition amount is part of the loan figure. It must not be added again or described as the total cost of removing Black residents.
For the later A-2 project, a 1968 federal court decision documents advances of $3 million for capital in June 1967, followed by $3.7 million for capital and $159,000 for relocation assistance that September. Those advances total $6.859 million. They identify particular financing transactions, not the lifetime cost of the entire Fillmore program.
A complete public accounting still needs acquisition payments, demolition contracts, relocation assistance, administration, grants, loan repayments and proceeds from selling land. Separate A-1 from A-2 and distinguish financing from final expenditures. The available figures do not establish a single audited total spent specifically displacing Black residents. Residents deserve that investigation without an invented headline number.
The official A-1 history records 1,350 households and 358 businesses relocated. New housing included subsidized homes, which also belong in the record. Counting new apartments cannot establish that displaced people benefited or returned. We need to know who qualified, who came back and what happened to everyone else.
The relocation figures cover affected households and businesses across the project area; they do not count Black residents alone. Preserve interviews alongside property files, and let residents correct the record. A public archive should show whose account is documented, whose is disputed and which promises remain unresolved today.
Residents fought. The Western Addition Community Organization challenged the program in court. In 1968, the court restricted enforced displacement until an adequate relocation plan received the required approval. The ruling examined federal financing alongside failures to establish satisfactory relocation arrangements. Neighborhood resistance produced an enforceable check on government power.
The account of Victorians hauled away on eighteen wheelers before dawn and sold for a dollar deserves investigation. Archival reporting confirms that most movement in the celebrated November 1974 relocation occurred between two and six in the morning. The precise vehicle details still need confirmation.
San Francisco Heritage describes twelve houses moved over three weekends and a grant secured by the Redevelopment Agency to pay relocation costs. Heritage supervised restoration and transfers to new owners. Saving those buildings mattered. A house reaching a new address, however, does not establish that its former occupants kept their place in the community.
A later account in Messy Nessy Chic describes one dollar purchases with moving and restoration costs excluded. Original sales papers are still needed to verify those terms. Heritage records a restored four unit property offered for $138,000 in 1975. The purchase price of a structure, the land and the full rehabilitation cost must be distinguished.
I have also heard of Black barbershops displaying redeemable stock certificates for the rebuilt Fillmore. In this account, people point to the papers and laugh: they expected ownership and describe losing control as a hostile takeover. The certificates, issuer’s records and redemption terms need examination. Their account deserves investigation rather than dismissal.
M. Justin Herman led the Redevelopment Agency during much of this era. A waterfront plaza bore his name for decades before the Recreation and Park Commission removed it in 2017. Renaming the plaza did not resolve displaced residents’ losses. Their unfinished claims deserve the attention once given to the officials directing redevelopment.
The A-2 plan was approved in 1964. Its later financing included tax increment revenue. In 2008, the City extended financing authority to replace affordable housing destroyed and not replaced before 1976. Decades after clearance, public policy still confronted the obligation to replace lost homes. That is a measure of unfinished responsibility.
Public acquisition also enabled private development. A 1993 federal decision records the Agency’s July 1987 conveyance of Fillmore Center land to private developer Fillmore Center Associates. That historical record does not establish today’s ultimate investors. Current deeds and company records should identify them and the public conditions attached to the property.
Government can act to protect families. President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent deserve credit for advancing restrictions on large institutional purchases of single family homes. Treasury proposed implementing rules on October 22, 2026; the law’s general purchase prohibition begins January 7, 2027, with exceptions. Political hostility should not prevent recognition of that action.
Those restrictions concern covered purchases and do not undo the Fillmore’s redevelopment. San Francisco still needs an accessible record of ownership, public spending, relocation promises and delivery. Before another project displaces people, residents should see enforceable commitments, available replacement housing and who is responsible when promises fail.
The Fillmore’s Black residents and businesses continue to carry this history. A volunteer Community DataBank could help preserve their documents and trace unresolved obligations. Future neighborhood ownership should give residents clear voting and economic rights they can retain. A city earns its claim to know how by keeping faith with the people who already live there.
John van Sicklen Maeck II is a writer based in San Francisco.
Neighborhood residents should be able to build ownership without surrendering control to whoever brings the largest check. I propose a neighborhood corporation with Class A shares for residents and Class B shares for outside investors. Pacific Heights and Cow Hollow could examine the first model, then make its documents and lessons available to other neighborhoods.
The distinction must mean something. Class A would protect resident governance. Class B would let outside capital participate on disclosed economic terms. The corporation would own assets it voluntarily acquires and operate agreed services. It would govern those assets and contracts; government authority over zoning, taxes and public streets would remain subject to public law.
Every eligible adult resident should be able to obtain a Class A share at a modest cost, with a hardship arrangement so money does not exclude participation. Renters and homeowners would qualify equally. A resident who operates a local business would qualify through residence. Outside business and property owners would participate through Class B.
One eligible resident would have one governance vote, regardless of investment size. Residents would elect a majority of volunteer directors and approve major changes to the company’s purpose, resident control and sale of essential assets. The final charter would need reviewed voting provisions that make these protections legally effective.
Class A transfers would be restricted to eligible residents. The rules must explain what happens when someone moves, dies or loses eligibility, including valuation and any redemption process. Publish a defined neighborhood boundary and a fair eligibility review. Nobody should discover after investing that an undefined rule can erase their rights.
Class B investors would receive the economic rights specified in the offering, potentially including distributions from earnings and a stated position when assets are sold. They would have no ordinary voting control. Legally required protective rights would remain. Buying more Class B shares would not automatically convert money into resident votes.
The business must earn its place. Begin by testing a shared neighborhood services business, such as coordinating maintenance purchases for participating merchants and property owners. Publish demand estimates, supplier quotes, fees, operating costs and insurance. Existing homes and businesses would join only through voluntary contracts. A corporate share would not confer ownership of a neighbor’s building.
Before choosing that first business, ask residents and merchants what they already pay for, what service is missing and whether they would sign a contract at the proposed price. Publish competing supplier quotes and proposed service fees. Directors with an interest in a supplier should disclose it and leave the decision. A useful service should prove demand before raising acquisition capital.
An illustrative operating test could serve fifty customers paying $100 monthly, producing $60,000 annual revenue. If administration, suppliers, insurance and services cost $54,000, only $6,000 would remain before tax and reserves. These are assumptions for discussion. They demonstrate how narrow a margin can be, not a forecast or promised return.
At thirty customers, the same fee would produce $36,000, leaving an $18,000 shortfall against those costs. Before spending, show which expenses could shrink, how much working capital is required and when the board would stop a losing project. Property acquisition would require a separate appraisal, financing plan and budget.
Run the corporation with the financial discipline residents expect from a publicly traded company. Publish quarterly accounts, debts, executive compensation and transactions involving directors or their relatives. Hold an annual meeting with questions from shareholders. Arrange an independent annual financial review or audit appropriate to its size and legal obligations.
A public stock market listing would be a later decision with its own offering, reporting and trading requirements. The Securities and Exchange Commission explains that securities offerings generally require registration or an applicable exemption. A neighborhood purpose does not waive those rules. No shares are being offered or issued through this proposal.
Redemption needs equal clarity. State who can request repayment, how shares are valued, permitted windows, reserves and limits. Explain what happens if several people seek cash together or the corporation cannot lawfully pay. A share certificate must identify enforceable rights and financial risks. It cannot honestly promise instant repayment from money that does not exist.
The volunteer Community DataBank would provide an information foundation. Its $7,520 public service pilot would maintain resident contacts by consent, decision files and spending records. Any City grant would pay only for approved public purposes. Investment proceeds and company operations would have separate accounts, budgets and responsibilities.
Allow another $25,000 to prepare the ownership proposal: $12,000 for corporate, securities and redemption feasibility; $5,000 for accounting and a business model; $3,000 for resident governance meetings and documents; $2,000 for a shareholder register; and $3,000 contingency. These are planning allowances, with professional quotes still needed.
Seek founding contributions or grants whose terms permit that preparation. The combined DataBank and preparation allowance would be $32,520. It excludes buying property, conducting a share offering, operating the company and listing on an exchange. Additional public money would require its own authorized public purpose and approved terms.
Ask the two neighborhood associations to invite residents through their own newsletters. Preserve their private email lists. Hold open meetings where supporters and skeptics can examine the same draft charter and numbers. People who buy no shares would retain access to publicly funded information and ordinary civic participation.
The Fillmore’s reported surviving stock certificates give this proposal a serious responsibility. Their original promises and alleged loss of control require investigation. Our own documents should make ownership, voting, transfers and redemption understandable before anyone contributes money. Residents should be able to replace directors who break the rules.
Outside investment can help finance useful work when its rights are clear and residents retain meaningful control. Begin with a small business people actually want, publish the losses as readily as the profits, and expand only when the accounts justify it. The neighborhood should understand precisely what it owns and how it can keep it.
Prepared for Doug Comstock | Sources checked October 23 2026
Article text 980 words excluding title byline and these notes
This is a proposed ownership model, not an investment solicitation. No corporation has been formed or shares offered. Resident directors and the DataBank team would serve as volunteers. The share classes, eligibility, voting, economic rights, transfers and redemption rules require corporate, securities and tax review before adoption.
Offers and sales of shares
The SEC states that securities offers and sales require registration or an available exemption. The appropriate route depends on the final issuer, investors and terms; calling an enterprise a neighborhood corporation does not choose an exemption.
SEC exempt offerings • California DFPI securities oversight
Public reporting and trading
The SEC distinguishes a registered public offering, reporting obligations and listing standards. The article proposes financial transparency as an operating practice; an actual public offering or exchange listing would be a separate undertaking.
Proposed partners and recruitment
The associations are prospective partners. Each would need to agree before its own newsletter could invite residents. Existing private subscriber lists would remain with the associations.
Pacific Heights Residents Association • Cow Hollow Association
Financial assumptions
The operating example is illustrative: 50 customers × $100 × 12 months = $60,000; $54,000 assumed costs leave $6,000 before tax and reserves. At 30 customers, $36,000 revenue leaves an $18,000 shortfall. The additional preparation allowances total $25,000; with the volunteer DataBank’s $7,520 cash budget, combined preparation and pilot costs are $32,520. These figures exclude acquisition capital, an offering, exchange listing and ongoing company operations.
Rights and historical accounts still to be established
Class A economic rights and Class B distributions and claims must be specified alongside voting protections. The labels alone create no protection. Redemption depends on lawful terms and available funds. The Fillmore barbershop certificates and alleged loss of control are the author’s reported account; original certificates and company records have not been examined.
John van Sicklen Maeck II is a writer based in San Francisco.

A demonstrator holds a sign in front of the Federal Courthouse in Detroit, Michigan.
When American forces carried out airstrikes against suspected Islamic State militants in northwest Nigeria on Christmas Day 2025, the operation offered a glimpse of renewed security cooperation between Washington and Abuja. But for Nigerians living in communities threatened by terrorism, kidnapping and armed attacks, a more pressing question remained: Would the strikes make their lives any safer?
That question deserves attention in Washington. The United States has spent decades helping Nigeria combat terrorism through military equipment, intelligence sharing and training. Yet armed violence continues to disrupt everyday life across northern Nigeria, raising doubts about how the success of American counterterrorism assistance should be measured.
The December operation followed a diplomatic confrontation after President Donald Trump accused Nigeria of failing to protect Christians and threatened military intervention. Nigeria subsequently welcomed American assistance, leading to coordinated strikes against suspected militants in Sokoto State.
Military strikes can disrupt terrorist operations, destroy equipment and eliminate commanders. But they cannot, by themselves, guarantee the safety of communities or restore confidence in government institutions.
The United States and Nigeria have maintained security cooperation for more than five decades. According to a 2024 State Department fact sheet, Washington had $590 million in active government-to-government military sales cases with Nigeria. Major transactions included a $497 million sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and a $997 million sale of 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters.
Between fiscal years 2019 and 2023, the United States also provided more than $8 million in counterterrorism training, equipment and advisory support, alongside approximately $5 million for international military education and training. These figures cover different programs and stages of assistance, rather than a single amount already spent.
The partnership extends beyond weapons. It includes military professionalization, intelligence cooperation, border security and efforts to improve accountability within Nigeria's security institutions.
These investments have strengthened areas of Nigeria's military capacity but the continued vulnerability of civilians raises a larger question: What should count as success?
In northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have sustained an insurgency that has devastated communities around the Lake Chad Basin. In the northwest, armed bandit networks have expanded kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and attacks on rural settlements. Although some groups operate in overlapping areas, their motivations and organizational structures differ.
That distinction matters treating every armed group as a terrorist organization risks overlooking the criminal economies, local grievances and failures of law enforcement that sustain different forms of violence.
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) reported more than 400 kidnapping incidents across northwest Nigeria in 2026 by the time of its analysis. In June, at least 39 civilians were abducted in Maradun, Zamfara State, after reportedly traveling to negotiate improved relations with an armed group.
A separate ACLED assessment found that armed bandits accounted for more than 80 percent of recorded mass abductions since the beginning of 2025.
These figures do not establish that American counterterrorism operations have failed. They demonstrate that Nigeria's civilian-security crisis extends well beyond the militant organizations targeted by airstrikes.
Having reported on terrorism and violent conflict in northern Nigeria, I have seen how insecurity affects communities beyond the immediate violence. Farmers struggle to access their fields, families live with uncertainty, and residents face restrictions on movement that interfere with ordinary economic and social life.
For people living under these conditions, security is measured less by the number of militants killed than by whether they can travel safely, earn a living and send their children to school.
This is where Washington should reconsider its approach.
The United States and Nigeria have already recognized the importance of broader security reforms. During the 2024 U.S.–Nigeria Binational Commission, both governments committed to deepening military and law enforcement cooperation while protecting civilians, respecting human rights and strengthening democratic institutions.
They proposed a standing security working group and closer cooperation on border and aviation security, terrorist financing, criminal investigations and explosives detection. They also discussed specialized police units to respond to kidnappings, improved police complaint mechanisms, crime mapping, police reform and stronger criminal justice institutions.
Their commitments extended to civilian harm prevention, community peacebuilding, farmer–herder conflict resolution and protection of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and religious liberty.
These agreements offer a starting point for measuring whether cooperation is improving everyday security. Washington should press for transparent assessments of civilian casualties, kidnapping trends, accountability for abuses and the ability of displaced communities to return safely.
It should also support Nigerian institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting violent crimes, rather than relying predominantly on military responses.
Religious freedom must remain part of this policy. But Nigeria's security crisis cannot be understood exclusively through attacks against Christians. Muslims have also suffered extensively from terrorism and banditry. A policy focused on protecting all civilians would better address the country's complex security realities.
The stakes extend beyond Nigeria. As Africa's most populous country and an influential regional democracy, Nigeria plays an important role in West African stability and international cooperation. Persistent insecurity weakens public confidence in elected leaders, disrupts civic participation and creates opportunities for armed groups to exercise influence where state institutions are absent.
For the United States, supporting Nigeria therefore involves more than defeating terrorist organizations. It means helping a democratic partner build institutions that citizens can trust.
A stronger bilateral relationship should connect security assistance with civilian protection, public accountability and sustained diplomatic engagement. Such cooperation would demonstrate that American foreign policy can support democratic governance while confronting violent extremism.
Ultimately, the success of U.S.-Nigeria counterterrorism cooperation should be judged by whether Nigerians can live without fear, participate freely in civic life and trust the government institutions responsible for their safety. Until those outcomes become central measures of progress, even successful airstrikes will remain an incomplete answer to Nigeria's security crisis.
Idris Mohammed is a Ph.D. student at the University of Alabama concentrating in Journalism & Creative Media and a fall Fulcrum Fellow.