MSNBC
NBC News’ Steve Kornacki previews the gubernatorial races in Kentucky and Mississippi and a decision over abortion rights in Ohio and Virginia and breaks down how this year’s Election Day results could affect the 2024 election cycle.
This piece originally appeared on MSNBC.
General view of Galileo Ferraris Ex Nuclear Power Plant on February 3, 2024 in Trino Vercellese, Italy. The former "Galileo Ferraris" thermoelectric power plant was built between 1991 and 1997 and opened in 1998.
With the rise of artificial intelligence and a rapidly growing need for data centers, the U.S. is looking to exponentially increase its domestic energy production. One potential route is through nuclear energy—a form of clean energy that comes from splitting atoms (fission) or joining them together (fusion). Nuclear energy generates energy around the clock, making it one of the most reliable forms of clean energy. However, the U.S. has seen a decrease in nuclear energy production over the past 60 years; despite receiving 64 percent of Americans’ support in 2024, the development of nuclear energy projects has become increasingly expensive and time-consuming. Conversely, nuclear energy has achieved significant success in countries like France and China, who have heavily invested in the technology.
In the U.S., nuclear plants represent less than one percent of power stations. Despite only having 94 of them, American nuclear power plants produce nearly 20 percent of all the country’s electricity. Nuclear reactors generate enough electricity to power over 70 million homes a year, which is equivalent to about 18 percent of the electricity grid. Furthermore, its ability to withstand extreme weather conditions is vital to its longevity in the face of rising climate change-related weather events. However, certain concerns remain regarding the history of nuclear accidents, the multi-billion dollar cost of nuclear power plants, and how long they take to build.
U.S. Nuclear Energy Growth: A Comparison to France
Facing rising oil prices in the 1970s, France invested in nuclear energy to secure energy independence from other nations. A consolidated structure of policy and government actions allowed France to successfully invest and implement nuclear energy development. By relying on a domestic supply chain and simultaneously building multiple reactors of the same design, France became the lead exporter of energy in the EU, producing 70 percent of its clean energy through nuclear power. More recently, France has invested in nuclear power plants in the United Kingdom and Belgium, cementing their energy dominance across the EU.
The Energy Income Partners suggest the U.S. can learn from France to improve its nuclear energy capacity. Historically, France’s nuclear energy program was made by a single state-owned utility company: Electricité de France. By standardizing nuclear energy design and manufacturing, France lowered the cost of nuclear development. On the contrary, the U.S. spends significantly more and produces less efficiently because it splits its nuclear development into multiple companies with many different designs and manufacturers. Thus, the National Bureau of Economic Research recommended the U.S. deregulate and consolidate their operations—not only would this make production more efficient, but it would lead to greater carbon reductions than wind and solar combined.
U.S. Nuclear Energy Growth: A Comparison to China
The U.S. began building nuclear reactors in 1958, and still generates the highest percentage of nuclear power worldwide—yet it has drastically slowed its construction of power plants, building only three nuclear reactors in the past 13 years. Meanwhile, China built 13 in that same amount of time. Currently, China is building 27 nuclear reactors with average construction timelines of about seven years—far faster than any other country.
Additionally, unlike the U.S., the Chinese nuclear power industry has benefited from sustained state support. While the U.S. faces partisan politics and rotating leadership, Chinese president Xi Jinping and his party have been in office for over a decade and have emphasized nuclear energy growth. China has local strategies, strong centralized government policies, a booming domestic supply chain, and a skilled workforce allowing them to dominate modern nuclear energy development.
Unlike China, the West has seen a lull in nuclear power since the 1990s, driven by limited public support and escalating costs. The Roosevelt Institute found a strong correlation between rising materials and input content, and falling construction costs. China, unlike the U.S., has reduced much of its nuclear expenses by replacing foreign equipment with domestic products. The Roosevelt Institute therefore recommended that the U.S. streamline its regulatory frameworks and pursue domestic production of goods.
Recent Developments in U.S. Nuclear Policy
The U.S. has shut down eight reactors in the past decade, building only three new ones. The most recent nuclear power plants constructed were Plant Vogtle Unit 3 & 4 in 2023 and Watts Bar Unit 2 in 2016—the first constructed in over 30 years. Even then, Watts Bar Unit 2 began construction in 1973 but was suspended in 1985, and did not resume until 2007, highlighting U.S. inefficiency.
The 1979 partial reactor meltdown of Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island nuclear power plant—the worst nuclear accident in U.S. history—led to the development of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, which implemented an intensive safety regulation program. Nevertheless, this incident, alongside the Chernobyl disaster seven years later, intensified public opposition to nuclear energy across the nation.
While this skepticism persisted for decades, support for nuclear energy began increasing steadily in 1996, gaining 72 percent of Americans’ support in 2025. Despite growing public approval, nuclear development faced challenges; frequent design changes and rework slowed nuclear development, while increased labor demands and reduced productivity exacerbated delays. Additionally, reliance on custom-built reactors drove material costs up, turning nuclear power plants into lengthy, expensive projects.
With widespread bipartisan support for nuclear energy in the United States, policy support for nuclear energy has begun to strengthen. Most recently, the Trump Administration endorsed it by claiming that “President Trump is providing a path forward for nuclear innovation.” At an energy and AI summit at Carnegie Mellon University, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick stated, “We need to embrace nuclear…because we have the power to do it—and if we don’t do it, we’re fools.”
To further this desire for investment in nuclear energy, the White House established the Reactor Pilot Program (EO 14301), with the goal of accelerating nuclear energy development by creating 10 nuclear reactor designs. The White House wants three new small-scale reactors running by summer of 2026 and a nuclear reactor on a U.S. military base. Strong bipartisan support at the federal level is essential to maintain momentum in building nuclear infrastructure.
Future Outlook
To increase nuclear production and match growing energy demands, advocates say, the U.S. can take valuable lessons from French and Chinese nuclear development strategies. Both nations have developed an extensive nuclear power sector through centralized planning, standardized designs, and strong domestic supply chains. Meanwhile, the U.S. has faced delays from high costs, complex regulations, and inconsistent approaches despite its technical expertise. To increase nuclear energy production, the U.S. could build a stronger domestic supply chain and standardize nuclear reactor designs. The rise of Artificial Intelligence and data centers is causing a massive demand for energy across the U.S., signaling increased need for diversified energy sources. It remains to be seen whether nuclear energy will rise to fill this gap.
Powering the Future: Comparing U.S. Nuclear Energy Growth to French and Chinese Nuclear Successes was originally published by The Alliance for Civic Engagement and is republished with permission.
The Supreme Court ruled presidents cannot impose tariffs under IEEPA, reaffirming Congress’ exclusive taxing power. Here’s what remains legal under Sections 122, 232, 301, and 201.
The Fulcrum strives to approach news stories with an open mind and skepticism, striving to present our readers with a broad spectrum of viewpoints through diligent research and critical thinking. As best we can, remove personal bias from our reporting and seek a variety of perspectives in both our news gathering and selection of opinion pieces. However, before our readers can analyze varying viewpoints, they must have the facts.
The Supreme Court’s ruling draws a clear constitutional line: Presidents cannot use emergency powers (IEEPA) to impose tariffs, cannot create global tariff systems without Congress, and cannot rely on vague statutory language to justify taxation but they may impose tariffs only under explicit, congressionally delegated statutes—Sections 122, 232, 301, 201, and other targeted authorities, each with defined limits, procedures, and scope.
David L. Nevins is the publisher of The Fulcrum and co-founder and board chairman of the Bridge Alliance Education Fund.
Should the U.S. nationalize elections? A constitutional analysis of federalism, the Elections Clause, and the risks of centralized control over voting systems.
The renewed push to nationalize American elections, presented as a necessary reform to ensure uniformity and fairness, deserves the same skepticism our founders directed toward concentrated federal power. The proposal, though well-intentioned, misunderstands both the constitutional architecture of our republic and the practical wisdom in decentralized governance.
The Constitution grants states explicit authority over the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding elections, with Congress retaining only the power to "make or alter such Regulations." This was not an oversight by the framers; it was intentional design. The Tenth Amendment reinforces this principle: powers not delegated to the federal government remain with the states and the people. Advocates for nationalization often cite the Elections Clause as justification, but constitutional permission is not constitutional wisdom.
Our federal system exists because the founders distrusted centralized power. They understood that dispersing authority creates checks against tyranny and incompetence. Managing elections at the state and local level creates 50 laboratories of democracy, each experimenting with methods that best serve their populations.
Consider the federal government's track record on large-scale administrative tasks. The healthcare.gov rollout, Veterans Affairs wait times, and Social Security Administration backlogs are not arguments against government itself, but they are reminders that bigger is not always better. Elections require logistical precision: maintaining voter rolls, training poll workers, securing thousands of voting locations, processing millions of ballots, and resolving disputes quickly.
Local election officials understand their communities. They know which neighborhoods need more polling places, which populations require language assistance, and how to navigate local geography and infrastructure. A federal bureaucracy in Washington cannot replicate this granular knowledge across 3,000 counties and 50 states.
America's geographic, demographic, and cultural diversity is a feature, not a bug. What works in rural Montana may not work in urban Chicago. Alaska's vote-by-mail challenges differ from those in Florida. Nationalizing elections means imposing one-size-fits-all solutions on very different contexts.
Voter ID laws illustrate this tension. Some states find them essential for election integrity; others view them as unnecessary barriers. Early voting periods vary because communities have different needs and capacities. Ballot design and voting technology also benefit from local adaptation. Forcing uniformity eliminates the ability of communities to craft solutions for their unique circumstances.
Proponents argue that nationalization would enhance election security through standardization. But concentration creates vulnerability. Currently, a bad actor would need to compromise multiple independent systems across many jurisdictions to affect a national outcome. Nationalizing elections means creating a single point of failure: one system to hack, one bureaucracy to infiltrate, one set of procedures to exploit.
The 2020 election, whatever one's views on specific controversies, demonstrated the resilience of decentralization. Recounts and audits occurred in multiple states under different procedures and oversight. This redundancy provided verification mechanisms. A nationalized system would eliminate this protection.
Consider voting hours, ballot access rules, voter roll maintenance, vote-counting procedures, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Each involves choices that affect electoral outcomes. Trusting any single party with this authority is naive. The party out of power would cry foul, likely with justification, and public confidence in elections would deteriorate, not improve.
None of this means the status quo is perfect. States should share best practices. Interstate cooperation on voter roll accuracy makes sense. Federal support for election security, particularly cybersecurity, is appropriate. Congress can and should protect fundamental voting rights against genuine state-level abuses.
But improvement doesn't require nationalization. We can strengthen elections while preserving the benefits of federalism. Support state election officials with resources and training. Facilitate information sharing without mandating uniformity. Protect voting rights through targeted intervention rather than wholesale federal takeover.
The impulse toward nationalization reflects frustration with legitimate problems: inconsistent practices, disputed results, and concerns about access and integrity. But frustration is not a governing philosophy. The remedy for federalism's difficulties is not to abandon it but to make it work better.
Our founders deliberately chose decentralization, and their wisdom endures. Elections conducted by states, under constitutional constraints and public scrutiny, remain our best protection against both incompetence and tyranny. We should think very carefully before trading this proven system for the uncertain promise of federal efficiency.
The question is not whether nationalizing elections could be done; technically, perhaps it could. The question is whether it should be done, and whether we are willing to accept the risks that would come with such a dramatic consolidation of power. Conservative caution suggests the answer is no.
Francis Johnson is a founding partner of Communications Resources LLC, a public affairs, public policy, public relations, and political consultancy specializing in government and media relations and corporate communications. He is the former President of Take Back Our Republic.
A shrinking deficit doesn’t mean fiscal health. CBO projections show rising debt, Social Security insolvency, and trillions added under the 2025 tax law.
A mirage can look real from a distance. The closer you get, the less substance you find. That is increasingly how Washington talks about the federal deficit.
Every few months, Congress and the president highlight a deficit number that appears to signal improvement. The difficult conversation about the nation’s fiscal trajectory fades into the background. But a shrinking deficit is not necessarily a sign of fiscal health. It measures one year’s gap between revenue and spending. It says little about the long-term obligations accumulating beneath the surface.
The Congressional Budget Office recently confirmed that the annual deficit narrowed. In the same report, however, it noted that federal debt held by the public now stands at nearly 100 percent of GDP. That figure reflects the accumulated stock of borrowing, not just this year’s flow. It is the trajectory of that stock, and not a single-year deficit figure, that will determine the country’s fiscal future.
The deficit is politically attractive because it is simple and headline-friendly. It appears manageable on paper. Both parties have invoked it selectively for decades, celebrating short-term improvements while downplaying long-term drift. But the deeper fiscal story lies elsewhere.
Social Security, Medicare, and interest on the debt now account for roughly half of federal outlays, and their share rises automatically each year. These commitments do not pause for election cycles. They grow with demographics, health costs, and compounding interest.
According to the CBO, those three categories will consume 58 cents of every federal dollar by 2035. Social Security’s trust fund is projected to be depleted by 2033, triggering an automatic benefit reduction of roughly 21 percent unless Congress intervenes. Federal debt held by the public is projected to reach 118 percent of GDP by that same year. A favorable monthly deficit report does not alter any of these structural realities. These projections come from the same nonpartisan budget office lawmakers routinely cite when it supports their position.
Recent legislation has compounded the imbalance. On July 4, 2025, President Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act into law. The CBO estimates it will add $3.4 trillion to the debt over the next decade, rising to more than $4 trillion when interest costs are included. The law makes permanent the 2017 tax cuts and introduces new exemptions for tips and overtime, while partially offsetting those reductions through cuts to Medicaid, food assistance, and student loan programs.
The distributional effects are clear: higher-income households receive the largest tax benefits, while reductions in safety-net and education programs shift costs onto lower- and middle-income families. Celebrating a shrinking monthly deficit while enacting trillions in additional borrowing is not fiscal discipline. It is mistaking a momentary reflection for reality.
For households, this is not abstract. The Social Security trust fund, as noted, is projected to run dry in the early 2030s. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that a dual-earning couple retiring in 2033 could see benefits reduced by approximately $18,100 per year. Single-income couples would lose around $13,100. Medicare’s hospital insurance trust fund faces projected payment reductions once its reserves are exhausted.
These are trustee projections, not partisan estimates. The retirees and workers who financed these programs over decades would bear the consequences of delay.
The warnings are not confined to advocacy groups. Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel invokes Herbert Stein’s axiom: “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” The issue is not whether fiscal pressures will constrain policy, but how abruptly that adjustment will occur. Investor Ray Dalio has warned of a potential “debt death spiral,” in which borrowing increasingly finances interest payments rather than productive investment.
Both point to the same structural risk: once interest costs grow faster than revenue, debt compounds on itself. At that stage, policymakers lose flexibility. Markets impose discipline that elected officials avoided.
Yet the country is not without options. Brookings has outlined bipartisan approaches to restoring Social Security solvency for seventy-five years through phased-in revenue increases and calibrated benefit adjustments. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget has detailed pathways to stabilize debt as a share of GDP. None of these proposals is painless, but neither are they radical. Acting earlier allows gradual reform. Waiting compresses the adjustment into sharper, more disruptive cuts.
The constraint is not technical. It is political.
Democratic governance requires more than reassuring headlines. It requires translating fiscal reality into decisions about who pays, who sacrifices, and how burdens are shared. That translation is uncomfortable because it forces trade-offs. But institutions exist to mediate those trade-offs openly and legitimately.
A favorable deficit report can offer temporary comfort. It cannot resolve structural imbalance. Treating it as proof of fiscal health risks postponing choices until they are imposed by arithmetic rather than decided through democratic deliberation.
The mirage fades eventually. The question is whether policymakers confront the terrain before it does.
Robert Cropf is a Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University.
Trump & Hegseth gave Mark Kelly a huge 2028 gift