Sally, host of the podcast “You Don't Have to Yell,” is director of digital strategy at Rank the Vote, an organization dedicated to promoting ranked-choice voting nationwide.
Americans expect the Supreme Court to rule objectively on the law, free of any partisan baggage. And Americans’ preferred strategy to make this happen is to pack the body with as many justices who think like them as possible.
We saw this dynamic in action during the final months of the Trump administration, when Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell rushed to confirm Amy Coney Barrett. This led to cries of partisanship from the left and the creation of a commission on Supreme Court reform by President Biden in April 2021.
The commission released its findings earlier this month, covering the logistics around term limits for justices and expanding the court beyond its current nine members, but did not take a position on those options. While these reforms may have merit, all would be interpreted as further attempts to make the court more partisan and further reduce its credibility.
Still, with a recent poll by Gallup showing approval of the Supreme Court at the lowest level since polling began, it’s clear the issue of trust in the court needs to be addressed.
The real solution to restoring the court’s credibility lies in reforms that can reduce partisanship in government overall, as opposed to solely focusing on the judiciary.
How it started ...
The Supreme Court was designed to serve as a safeguard against the threat that wild swings in public opinion could pose to the rights of the minority. The Founders had good reason to fear this, given the last wild swing in public opinion resulted in a band of angry farmers defeating the world’s most powerful military to replace a monarch with a system of government most people had never heard of before.
Because the court was one of three equal branches of government, the early Americans had no problem with it being a highly partisan body. Later, Abraham Lincoln appointed his campaign manager to the court and worked with congressional Republicans to expand the body to make room for an additional pro-Union justice. Salmon Chase openly campaigned for a presidential nomination in 1868 while serving as chief justice.
Americans had little problem with this for two reasons:
First, Americans were more concerned with the court becoming too powerful, as opposed to whether it was too partisan. Unlike now, the Supreme Court at the time wasn’t viewed as the final arbiter of constitutionality, but part of a larger conversation around how far government authority should extend.
Second, partisanship was far more fluid than it is today. Parties were often related to a specific policy, driven locally and expected to die. If we look back to Lincoln’s expansion of the Supreme Court, it should be noted he appointed a pro-Union Democrat, as Lincoln was building a coalition for a new party in anticipation of an end to the GOP.
How it’s going ...
After the Civil War, political parties became much more static and the Supreme Court more powerful. While multiple parties played a part in American politics up through Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull Moose era in the early 1900s, their influence over the two major parties waned.
Meanwhile, the concept of judicial review gave way to judicial supremacy — giving the court far more power over its own docket and a far greater say in which laws are struck down.
With this increased power, the desire for justices to be nonpartisan became more important, and appointing blatant partisan allies gave way to picking justices from the judiciary.
Aside from the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas in the 1980s, Supreme Court appointments were largely bipartisan affairs, with most justices being confirmed by a supermajority. Since the removal of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees, confirmation of justices by the Senate has fallen largely across party lines.
How to fix it ...
The reforms considered by President Biden’s commission have their benefits but also come with unintended consequences. Proponents of expanding the court argue such a change would match the growth in the federal court system over the last century and would reduce the power of each individual justice, diluting the partisan influence of any one justice.
Those in favor of term limits argue the court would better reflect the partisan makeup of those they serve, as each president would get the same number of appointments per term.
These reforms come with their drawbacks, however. Expanding the number of justices on the court is a highly contentious issue and would only serve to increase accusations of partisanship. One study on term limits for Supreme Court justices showed they would incentivize the appointment of more partisan judges and result in legal instability.
A more obvious solution lies in attacking the hyperpartisanship that makes Supreme Court appointments such contentious affairs in the first place. As America’s two major parties have grown further apart and less likely to compromise, almost every important vote appears to fall along party lines.
A party-line vote on a Supreme Court justice is like serving as the nominating president’s campaign manager, as the voices of those on the other side of the aisle go unheard. Regardless of how the court rules, this in and of itself poses a crisis to the branch’s legitimacy.
The polarization of American politics is a direct result of our first-past-the-post electoral system, where a candidate only needs one more vote than second place person to win, as opposed to a true majority. In such systems, candidates are rewarded when they lean into the extremes of their party and demonize the other side, as opposed to seeking out the approval of the majority of voters.
Reforms such as ranked-choice voting have proven to reduce polarization in elections by requiring candidates to appeal to the majority of voters they wish to serve, as opposed to a winnable plurality of hardened partisans.
We can’t expect those serving on the Supreme Court to have more credibility than the elected officials who appoint them. By changing our elections to elect leaders who better reflect the people they serve, we can expect the court to change in kind.



















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.