When American forces carried out airstrikes against suspected Islamic State militants in northwest Nigeria on Christmas Day 2025, the operation offered a glimpse of renewed security cooperation between Washington and Abuja. But for Nigerians living in communities threatened by terrorism, kidnapping and armed attacks, a more pressing question remained: Would the strikes make their lives any safer?
That question deserves attention in Washington. The United States has spent decades helping Nigeria combat terrorism through military equipment, intelligence sharing and training. Yet armed violence continues to disrupt everyday life across northern Nigeria, raising doubts about how the success of American counterterrorism assistance should be measured.
The December operation followed a diplomatic confrontation after President Donald Trump accused Nigeria of failing to protect Christians and threatened military intervention. Nigeria subsequently welcomed American assistance, leading to coordinated strikes against suspected militants in Sokoto State.
Military strikes can disrupt terrorist operations, destroy equipment and eliminate commanders. But they cannot, by themselves, guarantee the safety of communities or restore confidence in government institutions.
The United States and Nigeria have maintained security cooperation for more than five decades. According to a 2024 State Department fact sheet, Washington had $590 million in active government-to-government military sales cases with Nigeria. Major transactions included a $497 million sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and a $997 million sale of 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters.
Between fiscal years 2019 and 2023, the United States also provided more than $8 million in counterterrorism training, equipment and advisory support, alongside approximately $5 million for international military education and training. These figures cover different programs and stages of assistance, rather than a single amount already spent.
The partnership extends beyond weapons. It includes military professionalization, intelligence cooperation, border security and efforts to improve accountability within Nigeria's security institutions.
These investments have strengthened areas of Nigeria's military capacity but the continued vulnerability of civilians raises a larger question: What should count as success?
In northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have sustained an insurgency that has devastated communities around the Lake Chad Basin. In the northwest, armed bandit networks have expanded kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and attacks on rural settlements. Although some groups operate in overlapping areas, their motivations and organizational structures differ.
That distinction matters treating every armed group as a terrorist organization risks overlooking the criminal economies, local grievances and failures of law enforcement that sustain different forms of violence.
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project (ACLED) reported more than 400 kidnapping incidents across northwest Nigeria in 2026 by the time of its analysis. In June, at least 39 civilians were abducted in Maradun, Zamfara State, after reportedly traveling to negotiate improved relations with an armed group.
A separate ACLED assessment found that armed bandits accounted for more than 80 percent of recorded mass abductions since the beginning of 2025.
These figures do not establish that American counterterrorism operations have failed. They demonstrate that Nigeria's civilian-security crisis extends well beyond the militant organizations targeted by airstrikes.
Having reported on terrorism and violent conflict in northern Nigeria, I have seen how insecurity affects communities beyond the immediate violence. Farmers struggle to access their fields, families live with uncertainty, and residents face restrictions on movement that interfere with ordinary economic and social life.
For people living under these conditions, security is measured less by the number of militants killed than by whether they can travel safely, earn a living and send their children to school.
This is where Washington should reconsider its approach.
The United States and Nigeria have already recognized the importance of broader security reforms. During the 2024 U.S.–Nigeria Binational Commission, both governments committed to deepening military and law enforcement cooperation while protecting civilians, respecting human rights and strengthening democratic institutions.
They proposed a standing security working group and closer cooperation on border and aviation security, terrorist financing, criminal investigations and explosives detection. They also discussed specialized police units to respond to kidnappings, improved police complaint mechanisms, crime mapping, police reform and stronger criminal justice institutions.
Their commitments extended to civilian harm prevention, community peacebuilding, farmer–herder conflict resolution and protection of freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and religious liberty.
These agreements offer a starting point for measuring whether cooperation is improving everyday security. Washington should press for transparent assessments of civilian casualties, kidnapping trends, accountability for abuses and the ability of displaced communities to return safely.
It should also support Nigerian institutions responsible for investigating and prosecuting violent crimes, rather than relying predominantly on military responses.
Religious freedom must remain part of this policy. But Nigeria's security crisis cannot be understood exclusively through attacks against Christians. Muslims have also suffered extensively from terrorism and banditry. A policy focused on protecting all civilians would better address the country's complex security realities.
The stakes extend beyond Nigeria. As Africa's most populous country and an influential regional democracy, Nigeria plays an important role in West African stability and international cooperation. Persistent insecurity weakens public confidence in elected leaders, disrupts civic participation and creates opportunities for armed groups to exercise influence where state institutions are absent.
For the United States, supporting Nigeria therefore involves more than defeating terrorist organizations. It means helping a democratic partner build institutions that citizens can trust.
A stronger bilateral relationship should connect security assistance with civilian protection, public accountability and sustained diplomatic engagement. Such cooperation would demonstrate that American foreign policy can support democratic governance while confronting violent extremism.
Ultimately, the success of U.S.-Nigeria counterterrorism cooperation should be judged by whether Nigerians can live without fear, participate freely in civic life and trust the government institutions responsible for their safety. Until those outcomes become central measures of progress, even successful airstrikes will remain an incomplete answer to Nigeria's security crisis.
Idris Mohammed is a Ph.D. student at the University of Alabama concentrating in Journalism & Creative Media and a fall Fulcrum Fellow.
