Donald Trump ran on a simple promise: focus immigration enforcement on criminals and make the country safer. The policy now being implemented tells a different story. With tens of billions of dollars directed toward arrests, detention, and removals, the enforcement system has been structured to maximize volume rather than reduce risk. That design choice matters because it shapes who is targeted, how force is used, and whether public safety is actually improved.
This is not a dispute over whether immigration law should be enforced. The question is whether the policy now in place matches what was promised and delivers the safety outcomes that justified its scale and cost.
What enforcement is optimizing for
In campaign language, “criminals” carried a clear meaning: people who commit violent acts, traffic drugs, or pose a direct threat to communities. That framing implied prioritization, judgment, and a focus on public safety.
Immigration law allows something broader. Most immigration violations are civil, not criminal. Under that legal framework, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement can lawfully detain and remove individuals with no criminal conviction. That authority has existed for decades. What has changed is how enforcement success is measured and rewarded.
Reporting by Reuters documents that ICE field offices are operating under sharply increased daily arrest targets, in some cases tripling prior expectations. When leadership evaluates performance by arrest counts, behavior follows. Officers are rewarded for speed and throughput rather than for time-intensive investigations that require coordination, evidence development, and discretion.
This is not a failure of individual agents. It is the predictable outcome of a management system designed around numbers.
The dragnet in the data
Independent data reinforce this pattern. Analysis by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse shows that a majority of people held in ICE detention have no criminal conviction. Recent increases in detention have been driven largely by individuals without U.S. criminal records.
This does not mean the agency cannot distinguish between violent offenders and day laborers. It means the distinction is not central to how the system is currently run.
When removability becomes the dominant criterion and arrest volume the dominant metric, enforcement naturally expands outward toward low-risk, easily identifiable populations. The wide net is not accidental. It is efficient under the existing incentives.
Violence as a byproduct of scale
As operations have expanded, so have reports of aggressive tactics. Investigations by Human Rights Watch document heavily armed ICE raids in residential neighborhoods and workplaces, including the use of force against individuals with no violent history and minimal flight risk. These operations often involve rapid entries, broad sweeps, and limited differentiation among targets.
Federal courts are now examining whether some of these actions exceed constitutional limits, particularly when federal agents operate in public spaces or in conjunction with protest suppression. The pattern is structural, not anomalous. Large-scale enforcement conducted under time pressure and arrest targets increases the likelihood of mistakes, confrontations, and unnecessary escalation.
Here, violence is not the stated goal. It is a foreseeable consequence of enforcement designed for speed rather than precision.
The safety test that matters
If public safety is the objective, success should be evaluated against outcomes communities recognize as meaningful:
- Reductions in violent crime.
- Disruption of organized criminal networks.
- Improved cooperation between immigrant communities and local law enforcement.
- Lower rates of mistaken identity, excessive force, and community destabilization.
There is little evidence that mass civil arrests of nonviolent, nonconvicted residents advance these goals. Many law-enforcement professionals have long warned that broad immigration raids suppress crime reporting, erode trust, and make communities less safe.
Billions spent on detention beds, transport contracts, and rapid removals may increase deportation totals. They do not, by themselves, produce safer streets.
The policy gap
The central problem is not enforcement. It is a misrepresentation.
If the administration’s true objective is large-scale removals regardless of criminal history, it should defend that policy openly and on its own terms. That would be an honest debate.
Instead, the program continues to be sold as a public-safety initiative while being executed as a volume-based operation. The gap between promise and practice is not incidental. It defines the policy.
What alignment would look like
An enforcement strategy genuinely aligned with the “criminals, not families” pledge would look different:
- Performance metrics would heavily weight serious criminal convictions and de-emphasize civil-only cases.
- Funding would prioritize investigations, intelligence, and interagency coordination rather than detention capacity.
- Use-of-force standards would be transparent, auditable, and consistently enforced.
- Success would be measured by safety outcomes, not arrest totals.
None of this requires abandoning immigration enforcement. It requires aligning means with stated ends.
The bottom line
The United States is spending extraordinary sums on an enforcement system optimized for volume. The cruelty is not accidental, and neither is the inefficiency. Scale without precision produces both. The unresolved question is simple: if safety was the promise, why does the policy reward everything except making us safer?
Edward Saltzberg is the Executive Director of the Security and Sustainability Forum and writes the Stability Brief.























image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.