Skip to content
Search

Latest Stories

Follow Us:
Top Stories

Project 2025: Department of State

State Department
Nathan Posner/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Johnson was a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and is president of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. This article is written in her personal capacity, not as a representative of ADST.

This is part of a series offering a nonpartisan counter to Project 2025, a conservative guideline to reforming government and policymaking during the first 180 days of a second Trump administration. The Fulcrum's cross partisan analysis of Project 2025 relies on unbiased critical thinking, reexamines outdated assumptions, and uses reason, scientific evidence, and data in analyzing and critiquing Project 2025.

The history of the Department of State, one of the first Cabinet departments established, is intimately linked to our nation’s history and reflects the importance attached to managing our relations with foreign governments. Created in 1879, it is the bureaucratic home for two distinct cadres of nonpartisan career employees, under two congressionally mandated systems — the Foreign Service (FS) Schedule and the Civil Service (GS) General Schedule.

Foreign Service officers receive presidential commissions, and both cadres take an oath to uphold the Constitution. As career public servants, both are loyal to the presidency. Strengthening these career services rather than weakening them is critical in today’s complex, interdependent world, where managing relations and containing conflict are more important than ever.


Chas Freeman, one of our most articulate practitioners and writers on the art of diplomacy, explained the importance of a professional, nonpartisan diplomatic service:

“Diplomacy contributes to national well-being by exploiting unforeseen opportunities to advance state interests or reducing wasteful defense spending through détente, arms control, or disarmament accords. A great deal of diplomacy consists of ensuring that the natural frictions inherent in relations between states and peoples are minimized and restrained, that needless confrontations and blunders into warfare are avoided, and that when war does occur, its scope and level of violence are appropriately contained. … Diplomatic dialogue is the key to the fashioning of strategic relationships and the management of conflicting interests with foreign governments.”

Project 2025, the conservative Heritage Foundation’s blueprint for a second Trump administration, provides its own vision of American diplomacy and management. The chapter on the State Department — written by Kiron Skinner, who served as director of the Office of Policy Planning and as senior policy adviser to the secretary of state under Donald Trump — needs to be read in the context of the entire report. It rests on two main ideas: 1) the need for many more political appointees (vetted by Heritage for ideological conformity), and 2) the need to restructure and streamline the department to implement the president’s foreign policy agenda/vision.

In 1924, the Rogers Act established the United States Foreign Service as a professional, nonpartisan career cadre and the institutional backbone of the U.S. diplomatic service. Congress updated the legislation in 1946 and again with the 1980 Foreign Service Act, stipulating that “a career Foreign Service characterized by excellence and professionalism is essential to the national interest and must be preserved, strengthened, and improved to carry out its mission effectively in response to complex challenges of modern diplomacy and international relations.” Are not these challenges even more complex today?

The first part of the chapter in Project 2025 focuses on the need to ensure loyalty to the president’s agenda by installing appointees with established partisan credentials. The second part addresses the president’s foreign policy priorities. The third part covers reorganization strategy, consolidating foreign assistance and making public diplomacy “serve American interests.” I will focus on the first and third parts and then briefly comment on the foreign policy agenda.

Skinner highlights “one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful,” namely, a “tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies,” asserting that “resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents” because “large swaths of the State Department workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda.” No supporting examples are given. This statement misdiagnoses the reasons for the perceived “tug-of-war.” For career professionals, personal political leanings are not relevant to diplomatic practice or implementing foreign policy. Their job is to provide advice based on professional knowledge and experience and to implement whatever policy decision the political leaders make. Nonpartisan loyalty to the administration is the rule. Internal dissent or resignation over policy disagreement is rare.

In the subsection “History and Context,” Skinner states, “A major, if not the major, source of the State Department’s ineffectiveness lies in its institutional belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and does not need direction from an elected President.” This may well be a perception in some quarters but does not accurately characterize the State Department I experienced.

The subsection “Political Leadership” proposes significantly expanding the number of political appointees and installing them without waiting for confirmation. This proposal harks back to the pre-1883 Pendleton Act era, doubling down on partisan patronage rather than on increased professionalism and expertise in service to elected leadership and presidential foreign policy.

The section “Shaping the Future” opens with the proposition that before developing a foreign policy “grand strategy” one must address structural reform and streamlining. It cites an earlier commission’s observation about the “ineffectual organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals” but doesn’t mention any of the subsequent reports and reform initiatives. Calls for restructuring have been made repeatedly over the decades since the report issued by that 1998 Hart-Rudman Commission on 21st Century National Security.

A better approach is a high-level bipartisan commission to examine institutional reforms that would best serve the demands of diplomacy today. Such a commission should include current and former members of the foreign and civil services, members of Congress, academics, and eminent personalities with understanding of foreign policy and diplomatic practice.

Finally, the section on the president’s foreign policy agenda posits “a world on fire” requiring heightened attention to several nations. Some pose “existential threats” to U.S. national security, others to “our economy”, and some “wild cards” are identified as China, Iran, Venezuela, Russia and North Korea. The overall mindset conveyed by this section –– “either you are with us or against us” — seems to be the underlying principle. Better would be George Shultz’s call to work for broad consensus on national security, framed by shared values. Shultz lamented the loss of nonpartisanship in our foreign policy and emphasized the dominant role that “earned trust” plays in determining cooperation or conflict in relations between and among nations. The most important first step would be to heed his call.

More articles about Project 2025


    Read More

    Why Aren’t There More Discharge Petitions?

    illustration of US Capitol

    AI generated image

    Why Aren’t There More Discharge Petitions?

    We’ve recently seen the power of a “discharge petition” regarding the Epstein files, and how it required only a few Republican signatures to force a vote on the House floor—despite efforts by the Trump administration and Congressional GOP leadership to keep the files sealed. Amazingly, we witnessed the power again with the vote to force House floor consideration on extending the Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies.

    Why is it amazing? Because in the 21st century, fewer than a half-dozen discharge petitions have succeeded. And, three of those have been in the last few months. Most House members will go their entire careers without ever signing on to a discharge petition.

    Keep ReadingShow less
    U.S. Capitol.
    As government shutdowns drag on, a novel idea emerges: use arbitration to break congressional gridlock and fix America’s broken budget process.
    Getty Images, Douglas Rissing

    Congress's productive 2025 (And don't let anyone tell you otherwise)

    The media loves to tell you your government isn't working, even when it is. Don't let anyone tell you 2025 was an unproductive year for Congress. [Edit: To clarify, I don't mean the government is working for you.]

    1,976 pages of new law

    At 1,976 pages of new law enacted since President Trump took office, including an increase of the national debt limit by $4 trillion, any journalist telling you not much happened in Congress this year is sleeping on the job.

    Keep ReadingShow less
    Red elephants and blue donkeys

    The ACA subsidy deadline reveals how Republican paralysis and loyalty-driven leadership are hollowing out Congress’s ability to govern.

    Carol Yepes

    Governing by Breakdown: The Cost of Congressional Paralysis

    Picture a bridge with a clearly posted warning: without a routine maintenance fix, it will close. Engineers agree on the repair, but the construction crew in charge refuses to act. The problem is not that the fix is controversial or complex, but that making the repair might be seen as endorsing the bridge itself.

    So, traffic keeps moving, the deadline approaches, and those responsible promise to revisit the issue “next year,” even as the risk of failure grows. The danger is that the bridge fails anyway, leaving everyone who depends on it to bear the cost of inaction.

    Keep ReadingShow less
    Who thinks Republicans will suffer in the 2026 midterms? Republican members of Congress

    U.S. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-LA); House Chamber at the U.S. Capitol on December 17, 2025,.

    (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)

    Who thinks Republicans will suffer in the 2026 midterms? Republican members of Congress

    The midterm elections for Congress won’t take place until November, but already a record number of members have declared their intention not to run – a total of 43 in the House, plus 10 senators. Perhaps the most high-profile person to depart, Republican Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, announced her intention in November not just to retire but to resign from Congress entirely on Jan. 5 – a full year before her term was set to expire.

    There are political dynamics that explain this rush to the exits, including frustrations with gridlock and President Donald Trump’s lackluster approval ratings, which could hurt Republicans at the ballot box.

    Keep ReadingShow less