This episode is part of the series 2022 Midterms: What's at Stake? series from The Democracy Group podcast network. Think of it as an election administrator vibe check as we head into the midterms.
Election officials are the backbone of our democracy, but also increasingly the face of fraud allegations from far-right groups and others who deny the legitimacy of elections that don't go their way.
A woman sifts through the rubble in her house in the Beryanak District after it was damaged by missile attacks two days before, on March 15, 2026, in Tehran, Iran.
This question is not an exercise in double-talk. It is critical to understand the power that our Constitution grants exclusively to Congress, and the power that resides in the President as Commander-in-Chief of the military.
The Constitution clearly states that Congress has the power to declare war. The President does not have that power. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 recognizes that distribution of power by saying that a President can only introduce military force into an existing or imminent hostility if Congress has declared war or specifically authorized the President to use military force, or there is a national emergency created by an attack on the U.S.
The Executive Branch, however, has consistently held that this limitation on the President's power applies only to "full-scale" war.
So the question is, when is a war a war in the constitutional sense? Since this is a definitional issue, I would say that hostilities are a war in the constitutional sense when they are in the legal dictionary sense. If it looks like a war, if it sounds like a war, if it moves like a war, it is a war.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, war is "armed conflict by forces of sovereign powers." War does not exist merely by one nation attacking another, but when the other nation responds, whether by a declaration or otherwise, indicating it feels it is at war. War is a conflict.
Under that definition, we are definitely at war with Iran. Note that the legal definition of war has nothing to do with the size of the conflict or its duration. It also does not depend on the formal declaration of war.
So in the past, when the President has ordered U.S. forces to attack a country, and that country has not responded in kind, those instances have not been "war"—there has been no "conflict"—and so the President was within his powers in conducting the hostilities. Trump's actions against Venezuela would fall into this category. But when the attacked country has responded in kind, as is the case with Iran, then a state of war exists, regardless of the double talk engaged in by the Office of Legislative Council.
NOTE: The 1973 War Powers Resolution would restrict the President from initiating hostilities, even in a "non-war" situation in Venezuela. He could only engage in hostilities without authorization if the U.S. was attacked.
Conservative "originalist" legal scholars look to what the words in the Constitution meant at the time it was drafted. In the 17th and 18th centuries, war between European countries was not uncommon. They involved military conflict between 2 or more countries, usually to gain territory, and, in the early 18th century, over religion.
In those times, all countries were ruled by monarchs, and when countries went to war, it was specifically for the glory and financial benefit of the monarch. These wars caused much misery for the general population and were much on the minds of the Founders when the Constitution was drafted.
It was because of their knowledge of the religious wars that the Founders were adamant that there be a separation of church and state, that there be no established religion. And it was because of their knowledge of the arrogance of monarchs in going to war to obtain glory or riches at the cost of the lives and well-being of their people that the Founders wrote into the Constitution that only Congress had the authority to declare war; no longer would a single individual be able to wreak such havoc on the people. And indeed, initially, that is how the Constitution was interpreted.
The New York Times reported that Republicans in Congress have been tripping over themselves, determined not to call the conflict with Iran a war. Yet from what I've presented, it very clearly is war in the meaning of the Constitution, whether looked at from an originalist point of view or a contemporary one.
Clearly, here is yet another example of Trump violating the terms of the Constitution. And he clearly doesn't care. Not only that, but he also has not shown the deference to the American people that past Presidents have shown by speaking directly to the people and explaining why he was taking this serious step.
Once again, Trump's arrogance proves how prescient the Founders were in crafting the Constitution with a balance of power to prevent abuses by any branch of government. And that system has worked ... until now. It is only because the Republicans in Congress and many Trump-appointed members of the judiciary have violated their oath of office that the system is not working now and Trump's abuses of power go unchecked.
The American people, not just Democrats, must arise and voice their disapproval, both on the streets and at the ballot box.
Ronald L. Hirsch is a teacher, legal aid lawyer, survey researcher, nonprofit executive, consultant, composer, author, and volunteer. He is a graduate of Brown University and the University of Chicago Law School and the author of We Still Hold These Truths. Read more of his writing at www.PreservingAmericanValues.com
Silhoutte of people with an American flag in the background.
Economists have used the term “K-shaped” to describe contradictory US economic trends. Under conditions of inequality, the economy can look relatively strong for affluent Americans while the less well-off find their position increasingly precarious. One line goes up, the other down—like a capital letter K.
New survey research from Kettering-Gallup Democracy for All Project has reached a similar finding about attitudes toward US democracy. In a survey of about 20,000 Americans, two-thirds of respondents agreed that “democracy is the best form of government.” They also largely agree that the country’s democratic institutions are underperforming.
Even more revealing, support for democracy and views on its performance are softest among those who are least likely to associate with a political party, lower income, less educated, or younger. Those who said they felt lonely or did not feel respected, valued, or part of their community also were less likely to have positive views on democracy. This cohort, the bottom of the K, deserves more attention from democratic reformers.
Partisanship and the Perception Gap
The Kettering-Gallup Democracy for All Project finds that “currently, only the most ardent supporters of the incumbent political party believe democracy is performing well.” Such conditional support for democracy reflects a dangerous and growing divide in America, and this divide has led many Americans to become both more jaded about politics and more susceptible to populist appeals.
This divide is not only about policy preferences: it reflects what political scientists call “affective polarization,” or growing distrust and contempt between members of opposing political factions. As political scientist and Kettering research fellow Erica Frantz wrote in an earlier post covering the Kettering-Gallup research, affective polarization is partly explained by a perception gap between how ideologically extreme Americans believe opposing partisans to be and how extreme their fellow citizens actually are. Other research also shows Americans consistently overestimate support for political violence by members of the political party opposite their own.
Perception gaps like these are dangerous because democracy is, in large part, a system of conflict mitigation and resolution between competing interests across society. In order to avoid violence, constituencies agree to follow a set of institutionalized rules and norms, like free elections and respect for their results. This bargain breaks down if one side no longer believes the other will uphold it. As a result, those who are on the top half of the K are vulnerable to exploitation by partisan media and illiberal politicians who can use them to justify antidemocratic rhetoric and actions.
The Americans Sitting Out Our Partisan Conflicts
The dynamic above describes how politically engaged Americans are behaving against the backdrop of institutional breakdown caused by scorched-earth partisan conflict. However, the results of the Kettering-Gallup Democracy for All Project warn of a second, quieter crisis: the huge number of disengaged and disaffected citizens. Academic research suggests that individuals in this cohort—the bottom of the K—may be more amenable to populist appeals, making them an important group to understand if democracy is to be preserved. Moreover, understanding why this cohort of citizens has checked out of civic life can shed light on ways to reinvigorate it and make democracy more responsive.
The report’s results on the representativeness of American institutions suggest a partial explanation. On these measures, American democracy is failing: no public institution covered by the survey was rated as performing well by more than a third of respondents. A bare majority (51%) say US democracy is performing poorly overall, while only 24% believe it is performing well.
But if the data is broken down by age, income, level of education, or level of community belonging—related to what Robert Putnam called “social capital”—these numbers become even more negative for the young, the less advantaged, and the more isolated.
The report also finds that “those with no party ties—non-leaning independents—are less positive about democracy.” Only 43% of this group agree that democracy is the best system of government, with another 43% declaring themselves neutral. The report tells similar stories about those who report lower satisfaction with local services (46% believe democracy is best) and those who often feel lonely (58%). Perhaps surprisingly, those who feel neutral toward both parties are less likely to support democracy than those whose feelings toward the parties are negative (from 31% to 59%). The November 2025 report from the Kettering-Gallup research warns that these disengaged Americans are at risk of entering a “reinforcing cycle” in which those who do not feel strong community bonds are less likely to believe they can participate meaningfully in democracy.
Exclusion and the Paradox of Hope
The survey results related to ballot access and faith in democracy provide a puzzling insight: Black and Hispanic Americans simultaneously are the least likely to say they feel it is easy for people like them to vote (59% and 63%, respectively, compared to 78% for White Americans), but they are also more likely than White Americans to agree democracy is the best form of government.
Similarly, while only 26% of Americans believe they are well-represented in government, older adults, those who identify as LGBT, women, and respondents who reported financial hardship were less likely to feel well-represented. However, these groups are more likely to agree that democracy is the best form of government than are the White Americans, lonely Americans, or unregistered voters.
These numbers differentiate the challenge of civic apathy from the problem of voter suppression. People of color, women, LGBT Americans, and the very poor seem to value democracy more despite barriers to participation because they are more recently connected to lived experiences of exclusion and undemocratic rule. The grandchildren of Black Americans from the Jim Crow South, the children of immigrants from Latin American dictatorships, the daughters of women who could not open bank accounts, and LGBT Americans faced with life in the closet are groups that may be collectively more clear-eyed about the value of democracy, even if they feel poorly represented within ours.
Fixing the People’s Role: Local Engagement and Structural Reform
The Kettering-Gallup survey found Americans to be almost evenly split on whether or not “the people’s role” in democratic governance is working well, with a plurality, 38%, saying it is. These numbers are not overwhelmingly negative, but they could be better.
Because national, and often state, politics are mired in partisan conflict or locked down through gerrymandering and other majoritarian practices, the local level can serve as a starting point. Ironically, voter turnout is often lowest in municipal elections even though the rubber-to-road nature of local politics makes it the most accessible to citizens. The nationalization of politics—and the decline of local journalism—has undoubtedly contributed to political polarization. Unfortunately, the real opportunities for constructive engagement at the local level have been a casualty of Americans’ new cynical political attitudes.
In fact, the Kettering-Gallup data shows a powerful relationship between satisfaction with local services, community engagement, and democratic commitment. It finds that “Americans who are more satisfied with the resources in their communities—such as housing, healthcare, food, schools, and childcare—are more likely to report having opportunities to engage in democracy” and express greater faith in the ability of citizens to create change. This may be an artifact of those in more affluent communities feeling more positive about democracy, more motivated to participate, and more able to devote time and resources to civic activities. These people see the process as working and are inspired to participate in it and strengthen it through their participation. Conversely, members of neglected communities may feel demotivated or be unable to make those same commitments, and their disengagement worsens the effects of failed governance.
These contrasting experiences describe vicious cycles of neglect, disenfranchisement, and disengagement, but the Kettering-Gallup data also describes virtuous cycles. For instance, survey participants who volunteer or otherwise “work to improve conditions in their community” report higher satisfaction with their ability to participate in civic life. This extends to nonpolitical community events like festivals and art performances. In short, the report states, “people who are involved in democracy believe in democracy.” The question is how to replace the vicious cycle of disengagement with its virtuous counterpart.
One way would be for policymakers, activists, and philanthropic organizations to urgently begin experimenting with on-ramps for local civic engagement, during and, crucially, in between elections. The Kettering-Gallup research demonstrates that efforts to build democratic culture, engage isolated and lonely citizens, enrich the artistic and cultural spirit of the community, and meet the material needs of the less well-off all have a civic component. They should be included in a portfolio of options to bring the promise of democracy to citizens who have become, or have always been, disillusioned.
More daring and structural changes should also be part of the conversation. Ranked choice voting would give voters a wider range of options and reward consensus candidates. Really, nearly any electoral system would be better than the winner-take-all system used today, which creates two parties primed for us-versus-them conflict. Other ways of making the political system more responsive and less conflictual—like redistricting reform, campaign finance reform, and participatory budgeting—also merit consideration. In her book, High Conflict, Amanda Ripley describes other surprisingly simple strategies, like having legislators alternate seating by party, which could reduce partisan antipathy. The crisis is serious enough that it requires radical experimentation; no idea should be off the table.
The United States cannot indefinitely maintain a K-shaped trajectory in which growing numbers of disillusioned citizens slide deeper into disengagement. The distribution of civic faith and engagement is increasingly unequal and equally unsustainable. Left alone, a K-shaped democracy will either cease to be K-shaped or it will cease to be a democracy. The Kettering-Gallup research should be a call to action for American society to address this crisis.
This article was originally published as part of From Many, We, a Charles F. Kettering Foundation blog series that highlights the insights of thought leaders dedicated to the idea of inclusive democracy.Dean Jackson is a senior fellow at the University of Pittsburgh’s Communication Technology Research Lab and at Tech Policy Press. In 2022, Jackson was an investigative analyst with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the US Capitol.
Healthcare and social assistance professions added 693,000 jobs in 2025. Without those gains, the U.S. economy would have lost roughly 570,000 jobs.
At first glance, these numbers suggest that healthcare is a growth engine in an otherwise slowing labor market. But a closer look reveals something more troubling for patients and healthcare professionals.
Here are three worrisome conclusions about the state of American healthcare based on the latest jobs data.
Conclusion 1: Healthcare productivity lags
Productivity, an economic measure of how many goods or services a worker produces, rises when businesses find ways to generate more value without expanding their workforce. This is what allows wages to grow and companies to strengthen their financial performance.
Across much of the U.S. economy, businesses are using generative AI and other technologies to help employees accomplish more. As a result, revenues are rising in nearly all industries without proportional increases in staffing.
Healthcare is the exception. As demand for medical services continues to grow, hospitals and health systems have responded by hiring more clinicians and staff rather than redesigning care to increase productivity.
That dynamic is pervasive in healthcare, compromising household, employer and government budgets. National health expenditures have risen roughly 7% annually while overall economic growth (GDP) and inflation average closer to 3%.
Although many factors contribute, medicine’s productivity gap can be traced primarily to three systemic failures:
Conclusion 2: Healthcare will become even less affordable
In January 2026, the U.S. added 130,000 jobs, with roughly 95% of net new positions coming from healthcare and related roles. February’s report (released in early March) slightly tempered that trend due to a temporary nurses’ strike in California. Overall, healthcare continues to create most of America’s new jobs.
Now, if expanding the healthcare workforce actually made Americans healthier, we would see measurable improvements in long-term outcomes: fewer preventable complications from chronic diseases, reduced hospital admissions and increased longevity.
Instead, we’ve seen life expectancy largely plateau since the start of this century while U.S. healthcare expenditures tripled (from $1.4 trillion in 2000 to more than $5.3 trillion today).
Each year, medical care becomes less affordable for:
When medical costs rise faster than payers can afford, employers and governments respond by narrowing coverage. Reduced access to preventive care and delayed treatment lead to more advanced illness and higher long-term expenditures. This vicious cycle sets the stage for the third conclusion.
Conclusion 3: Healthcare is ripe for disruption
In The Innovator’s Dilemma, Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen described how inefficient industries are upended as new technology become available. Generative AI is poised to do this in healthcare by simultaneously improving quality and lowering costs.
Consider three opportunities:
Chronic disease monitoring
Generative AI systems can analyze data from wearable monitors for patients with hypertension, diabetes and heart failure, identifying when conditions are poorly controlled and recommending medication adjustments. Better control of chronic disease could prevent more than 30% of heart attacks, strokes and kidney failure, according to CDC estimates, saving tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
Hospital-at-home models
Many short hospital stays could be replaced with home-based care supported by continuous GenAI monitoring and centralized telemedicine oversight. This approach would allow high-quality care to be delivered 24/7 at lower cost and without the risk of a hospital-acquired infection.
Early detection of inpatient deterioration
AI tools can continuously analyze real-time data from bedside monitors to detect subtle signs of clinical decline. Earlier intervention would prevent complications, reduce the need for intensive care and save lives.
The application of generative AI in medicine will likely begin where clinician shortages are most severe (rural communities and under-resourced regions). But when technologically supported models demonstrate better outcomes at lower cost, adoption will spread rapidly.
Recent employment data indicate a healthcare system nearing a crisis point. Doctors and hospitals can continue to meet growing demand by hiring more people. Or they can embrace technology, redesign care delivery and improve productivity. But they won’t be able to stop disruption.
Every industry Christensen chronicled wished it had acted sooner. Time will tell whether American medicine does the same.
Anthropic’s lawsuit against the Trump administration over a Pentagon “supply-chain risk” label raises major constitutional questions about AI policy, corporate speech, and political retaliation.
Anthropic’s dispute with the Trump administration is no longer just about AI policy; it has escalated into a constitutional test of whether American companies can uphold their values against political retaliation. After the administration labeled Anthropic a “supply‑chain risk”, a designation historically reserved for foreign adversaries, and ordered federal agencies to cease using its technology, the company did not yield. Instead, Anthropic filed two lawsuits: one in the Northern District of California and another in the D.C. Circuit, each challenging different aspects of the government’s actions and calling them “unprecedented and unlawful.”
The Pentagon has now formally issued the supply‑chain risk designation, triggering immediate cancellations of federal contracts and jeopardizing “hundreds of millions of dollars” in near‑term revenue. Anthropic’s filings describe the losses as “unrecoverable,” with reputational damage compounding the financial harm. Yet even as the government blacklists the company, the Pentagon continues using Claude in classified systems because the model is deeply embedded in wartime workflows. This contradiction underscores the political nature of the designation: a tool deemed too “dangerous” to be used by federal agencies is simultaneously indispensable in active military operations.
The rhetoric has escalated as well. President Trump publicly attacked Anthropic as a “radical left” company and ordered agencies to “IMMEDIATELY CEASE” using its technology, while Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth insisted the company must accept “all lawful uses” of Claude, including those Anthropic considers ethically impermissible. The administration’s position is clear: refusing to enable mass surveillance or lethal autonomous weapons is grounds for punishment.
What’s striking is not just Anthropic’s refusal to yield but the wider commercial reaction. Silence can look like complicity, and complicity erodes trust faster than any political reward. The backlash against Bud Light after its brief partnership with a transgender influencer, leading to sales drops and resignations, shows how quickly culture reacts to perceived lapses. The slow response to an advertising controversy fueled boycotts and lasting damage. Silence or weak messaging erodes trust across industries. Anthropic’s stand now prompts overdue questions: What is the long-term cost of sacrificing values for appeasement? Is it enough for you to trust a president who demands loyalty but offers no stability in return? How would you respond if the pressure to compromise your values came directly to your doorstep?
This moment provides a rare clarity. It shows that corporate courage is not only compatible with long-term business health—it may be essential to it. In the sections that follow, we will examine real-world cases, review how the Constitution shapes this conflict, and trace how other companies are responding to these pressures. This roadmap will clarify not only why courage matters, but how it translates into lasting trust and competitive advantage. And it prompts other American companies to decide whether they will retreat into self-preservation or step forward to defend the democratic norms and moral boundaries that make innovation possible in the first place.
The central significance of the Anthropic case is its focus on a constitutional boundary: may the executive use state power to punish companies for disagreeing politically? The First Amendment’s protections cover both the right to speak and the right to refuse to endorse. When refusal makes a company a “risk,” retaliation is clear, and this is precisely what the Constitution seeks to prevent.
Anthropic’s lawsuit signals a deeper warning: If the government can label tech companies as security threats solely for refusing practices they deem unethical, then all industries risk punishment for political noncompliance. The precedent would make political allegiance central to business operations.
Other companies are responding quickly. Some do so quietly, evaluating risks at the highest levels. Others speak out, weighing the reputational risk of inaction higher than that of government backlash. In tech, firms now express unwillingness to enable mass surveillance. Legal advice is increasingly central as compliance with unpredictable federal directives threatens market stability.
Companies need to understand that the real risk is not in defying political pressure; it is in appearing to abandon their values when that pressure arrives. Trust, once lost, is nearly impossible to rebuild. In operational terms, trust is reflected in tangible business indicators: companies with higher employee retention rates, stronger talent pipelines, and superior customer net promoter scores consistently outperform their peers. Fortune 500 firms that rank highest in trust-based metrics regularly report greater consumer loyalty and more job applications from top candidates. Trust is not simply an abstract value; it is a measurable source of competitive advantage.
This moment tests the rediscovery of an old American idea: prosperity and principle are not opposing forces but mutually reinforcing. The companies that endure will not be those that bend most easily to political winds but those that show a consistent moral compass, even when the cost is real. Anthropic’s stand is not simply a legal maneuver. It should remind us that success with honor is still possible, and perhaps more necessary than ever.
In a political climate defined by loyalty tests and punitive governance, corporate courage becomes a civic act. When companies choose principle over intimidation, they do more than protect their bottom line; they help preserve the democratic norms that make free enterprise possible in the first place.
David Nevins is the publisher of The Fulcrum and co-founder and board chairman of the Bridge Alliance Education Fund.
Trump’s ‘Just for Fun’ War Talk Shows a Dangerous Trivialization