Goldstone’s most recent book is "On Account of Race: The Supreme Court, White Supremacy, and the Ravaging of African American Voting Rights."
Uvalde. Another school massacre. Another underage murderer. Another legally purchased weapon of war turned on innocent children. More calls for action. More thoughts and prayers. More braying about upholding the Second Amendment. More pandering.
More nothing done.
Or next to nothing, in any event. It appears Uvalde may result in some cosmetic changes, but the chances of meaningful reform remain zero. It’s the Constitution, you see.
Despite their self-righteous defense of individual liberty, opponents of gun control do not have a lot of law on their side. To buttress their position, they generally point to Antonin Scalia’s opinion in D.C. v. Heller as controlling the meaning of the Second Amendment. In that case, Scalia and four conservative colleagues overturned two centuries of precedent to take the position that the opening of the amendment, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” is essentially meaningless fluff, and that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” were the only words in the amendment that actually matter.
Even then, the right was not absolute. Although, “The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home,” Scalia and his brethren acknowledged, “Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” He specifically noted “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” and “in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Needless to say, that section of the opinion is rarely cited by senators and congressmen who think a mentally ill teenager has a constitutional right to buy an AR-15.
Before Scalia’s end-run, on the altar of “enshrinement of constitutional rights,” the most important gun control opinion, and the most logical interpretation of the amendment, was that of another conservative, James McReynolds in 1939 in United States v. Miller.
Miller stemmed from a challenge to the 1934 National Firearms Act, itself a response to the carnage spawned by Prohibition-era gang wars, including the notorious 1929 St. Valentine’s Day Massacre, in which seven members of Chicago’s Bugs Moran gang were executed with machine guns in a Lincoln Park garage by Al Capone’s executioners. The law imposed taxes on the sale or transfer of a variety of hand and long guns, required certain categories of firearms be registered, and restricted the movement of firearms across state lines.
In April 1938, Jack Miller and Frank Layton, two bank robbers on the run from both the law and their associates, were arrested and charged with transporting unregistered sawed-off shotguns across state lines. Miller had every reason to feel the need to carry a weapon — in 1935, he had turned state’s evidence to avoid a prison sentence, about which his colleagues were none too pleased.
Miller, although an unlikely plaintiff, sued in federal court to void his arrest on Second Amendment grounds. The judge, a gun control advocate, sided with Miller, which resulted in Miller’s release from prison, where any number of unhappy former associates were waiting for him. The decision was contrived — the judge assumed that Miller would flee and thus allow the government to win its appeal of Miller’s dismissal virtually by default. His assumption proved correct. As soon as he was a free man, Miller promptly vanished.
As a result, when the government appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court in January 1939, there was no one on the other side to contest its brief. Miller and Layton’s court-appointed lawyer, working pro bono, refused to do any more work on their behalf. Oral arguments — or, rather, argument — were heard on March 30, 1939, and the decision was published only six weeks later.
Speaking for a unanimous court, McReynolds told onlookers, “We construe the [Second] amendment as having relation to military service and we are unable to say that a sawed-off shotgun has any relation to the militia.”
McReynolds was perhaps more unlikely a gun control advocate than Scalia would have been. A ferocious opponent of the New Deal and federal regulation, he was described by his own biographer as “an easy man to dislike.” Deeply conservative, he was “intolerant, cantankerous, and rude,” referred to Black people as “darkies,” and refused to associate with Justice Louis Brandeis for the crime of being Jewish.
In Miller, however, McReynolds and the other justices deemed the meaning of the Second Amendment so obvious, so related to the need for citizen soldiers in a nation with no standing army, that the argument that Miller or anyone else had the right to carry whatever weapon they wanted wherever they wanted was laughable. His nine-page opinion could not have been more dismissive.
(Jack Miller, however, was not around to learn of the verdict. Four days after oral arguments, his body was found with four bullet holes near Ketchum, Okla. The crime remains unsolved. Layton, who had kept a much lower profile, was eventually given five years’ probation for violating the National Firearms Act and died of natural causes in 1967.)
The Miller decision attracted little attention at the time, since almost no one interpreted the Second Amendment as anything other than an anachronism, rendered obsolete by the creation of a professional military. And so it remained, despite numerous attempts by gun worshipers to pretend the opening clause did not exist. That they finally found their spiritual bedfellow in the person of a man fond of trumpeting his reverence for the text of the Constitution, who sneered at judges who took into account such silly factors as “intent,” is the saddest of ironies.
Americans across the nation will be voting in November and the choices they make will determine the course the United States will follow for two years, likely longer. Litmus tests tend to be counterproductive in politics, but in this case may well be appropriate. Anyone who votes for a candidate who proclaims the supremacy of a non-existent right for expediency or even political survival loses the privilege to lament, express shock, or offer thoughts and prayers the next time children are gunned down.




















image of U.S. President Donald Trump is displayed on a digital billboard in Times Square in New York on April 8, 2026.
Trump is stuck between two realities. Neither serves the American people
Normally, I worry that events may overtake a column. But not so with the Iran war.
I don’t worry about running afoul of a headline or Truth Social post from the president because what is said about the situation is no longer very relevant to the reality.
On April 8, Nick Catoggio, my Dispatch colleague, dubbed an earlier stoppage with Iran “Schrödinger’s ceasefire.” This was a reference to the famous thought experiment by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who was trying to explain the weirdness of “superpositionality” in quantum physics. A cat in a box is both dead and alive at the same time until you open the box. Schrödinger meant to illustrate the absurdity of the idea that particles aren’t any one thing, but a “cloud of probabilities.”
The Trump administration is stuck in a word cloud of probabilities of his own making. The war is over. The war is on. The war isn’t a war. We have a deal, but we don’t have a deal, but we’re about to have a deal. We destroyed Iran’s military. No, we left it intact. We want regime change. No we don’t. We already accomplished it. We “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program a year ago. We had to go to war in February to prevent nuclear war. The Strait of Hormuz is open, closed, or something in-between. No deal without “unconditional surrender.” Let’s make a deal!
This everything-all-at-once vibe can be disorienting, particularly since most Americans didn’t have a war with Iran on their bingo cards until the shooting had already started. President Trump didn’t prepare the country or consult with Congress beforehand because he thought it would all be a smashing success in a matter of weeks.
The miscalculation that started it all: killing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and much of Iran’s senior leadership, on the first day of the war. To “the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand,” Trump announced on Feb. 28. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
I support regime change in Iran and shed no tears for Khamenei or his goons. But when you start a war by killing the regime’s top leaders, it’s not unreasonable for the remaining ones to conclude that you really intend regime change.
Khamenei was a murderous fanatic, but he was a fairly cautious one. He liked to threaten closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking our regional allies, but he was reluctant to actually do it, fearing it would invite a regime change war. The mullahs and IRGC goons believed, not unreasonably, that if they lost their grip on power, they’d be lynched by the Iranian people they’ve brutalized for decades.
By starting with a regime change war, Trump removed any reason for the regime not to go for broke. When you have nothing to lose — particularly when you are a millenarian religious fanatic — a Persian Alamo strategy makes a lot of sense.
So Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and attacked its neighbors.
But it turns out this wasn’t the Alamo. In the contest of wills, Trump blinked. The Iranian regime’s tolerance for punishment proved — so far — to be greater than Trump’s and that of our gulf allies. Militarily we could finish the job, but that would require ground troops and much greater economic turmoil. In a conflict Trump launched unilaterally without the prior support of Congress, NATO or the American people, Trump doesn’t have the political capital for that.
But that’s only half the problem. Trump wants the war over, but he doesn’t want to pay — militarily, economically, politically — what that would cost. So he wants to make a deal that ends it. But there is no deal available that wouldn’t come at an equally undesirable cost. Any deal that looks like what President Obama struck with the Iranians would be too embarrassing to bear. But the Iranians are convinced that they can get just such a deal, and they’re willing to drag things out as long as it takes.
The result: Trump’s in a box of his own making. He thinks he can talk his way out by simply asserting a reality that doesn’t exist. When the financial markets get nervous, he announces a breakthrough that is, at best, a possibility. When the Iranians agree to a deal that looks similar to one Obama might negotiate, Trump goes back to his threats.
It can’t go on forever. But I’m sure it’ll last until long after this column is forgotten.
Jonah Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch and the host of The Remnant podcast. His Twitter handle is @JonahDispatch.