The Framers would view 21st-century closed primaries and political polarization as the exact manifestation of "factionalism" they spent the 1787 Constitutional Convention trying to prevent. They would argue these systems force candidates to appeal to ideological extremes rather than the broad, moderate consensus required for stable governance.
The Danger of Factionalism: In Federalist No. 10, James Madison defined a "faction" as a group of citizens united by a passion or interest adverse to the rights of others. He argued that while factions are inevitable, their effects must be controlled. The Framers would recognize 21st-century hyper-polarization as the dominance of unyielding factions that prioritize absolute ideological purity over democratic compromise.
The "Vicious Arts" of Elections: Madison warned against "unworthy candidates" who use partisan polarization to win office. He would likely see closed primaries as a breeding ground for these tactics, as they force candidates to cater exclusively to ideological extremes.
Countering Faction with Scale: Madison believed the best way to control factions was to expand the voting pool so that no single extreme group could easily dominate. He would argue that an open primary system—which merges all voters into a single pool—dilutes the power of party bosses and forces politicians to seek "broad consent" rather than narrow partisan approval.
George Washington: Extinguishing the "Fire" of Party Spirit: In his famous 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington issued a stark warning against the "baneful effects of the spirit of party".
Preventing Alternate Domination: Washington warned that the alternate domination of one faction over another leads to “frightful despotism".
The Open Primary as a Safety Valve: Washington would likely view closed primaries as an artificial wind fueling this partisan fire. He would write in favor of open primaries as a cooling mechanism, allowing independent and moderate voters to function as an electoral buffer. By taking away a party's total control over candidate selection, open primaries directly combat what Washington feared most: politicians who owe their primary loyalty to a party rather than to the nation.
Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop: John Adams was characteristically blunt, once writing that a "division of the republic into two great parties... is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution".
The Threat to Checks and Balances: the Framers relied on the separation of powers to protect liberty. However, modern hyper-partisanship means legislators often protect their fellow party members in the executive branch rather than holding them accountable.
Restoring Independent Judgement: Adams would likely write that closed primaries enforce an unconstitutional level of partisan discipline. He would support open primaries because they allow the roughly 50% of Americans who identify as independent to vote, effectively breaking the duopoly's gatekeeping power over who can run for office.
The Flaw of Closed Primaries: the Founders originally designed a system without formalized political parties. As parties inevitably formed, early processes allowed for broader coalitions. Today’s closed primaries—which restrict voting to registered party members—would deeply concern the Framers because:
The Extremist Incentive: they would note that when only the most resolute partisans vote in low-turnout primary elections, candidates are incentivized to adopt extreme rhetoric to win.
Disenfranchisement: barring independent or unaffiliated voters from primary participation contradicts the principle of broad, representative governance.
Checks, Balances, and Compromise: the entire Constitutional architecture, including the separation of powers and staggered terms, was built to force deliberation, negotiation, and compromise. The Framers would criticize modern polarization for breaking this system, replacing legislative debate with party-line obstructionism. They would likely view the resulting gridlock as a failure of elected officials to act as independent representatives of the whole public, rather than mere delegates of a polarized party base.
Prescribed Remedies: to address these structural issues, the Framers would likely champion reforms that broaden the electorate, such as open primaries, nonpartisan redistricting, or ranked-choice voting. They would view these mechanisms as modern equivalents to their constitutional checks and balances—tools to dilute the power of extreme factions and force candidates to build wider coalitions of support across the political spectrum.
The Framers' Likely Critique of Open Primaries: While the Framers would despise closed party primaries, they would not view open primaries as a perfect cure-all.
Fear of "Mob Rule": the Framers were profoundly skeptical of pure direct democracy and preferred filtered representative systems.
Strategic Sabotage: They would quickly identify the flaw of "crossover voting" or strategic raiding—where voters of one party cross over to vote for the weakest candidate in the opposing party's open primary to sabotage them in the general election.
For this reason, the Framers would likely bypass standard open primaries and advocate for nonpartisan top two or top four primaries (like those used in Alaska and California). In those systems, all candidates appear on a single ballot, completely removing party gatekeeping and aligning perfectly with the Framers' original vision of a nonpartisan republic.
Hugh J. Campbell, Jr., CPA, is a Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) professional and a student of W. Edwards Deming, the American statistician often credited as the catalyst for the Japanese economic miracle after WWII.
